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Abstract 
The failure to recognise and to respond to adult deteriorating patients in general hospital wards leads 
to unexpected and potentially preventable deaths. 
Aims 
1. To improve the understanding of the clinical processes and influences involved in managing 
patient deterioration. 
2. To examine the effect of a deteriorating patient intervention on cl inical processes and patient 
outcome. 
3. To determine if the effects of a deteriorating patient intervention are sustainable. 
Methods 
Quantitative Studies 
i. Observational Study: Clinical processes in 34 patients undergoing 45 Medical Emergency 
Team reviews were examined retrospectively. 
ii. lnterventional Study: A prospective controlled trial , before and after a multifaceted intervention 
for managing patient deterioration was undertaken in two wards in two hospitals for two-
four month periods. Changes in deteriorating patient clinical processes and outcome 
were measured. 
iii. Sustainability Study: Adult patients admitted to two wards in one hospital during three four-
month periods, one before, one immediately after the patient deterioration intervention 
and one two years later. Changes in deteriorating patient clinical processes and outcome 
were measured. 
Qualitative Studies 
i. Behavioural Study: Interviews of 12 healthcare workers involved in the patient deterioration 
intervention were undertaken to generate a model of why behaviour changed with the 
installation of the multifaceted intervention for managing patient deterioration. Grounded 
theory methodology described on page 80 was used. 
ii. · Human Element Study: Focus groups of healthcare workers were held to generate discussion 
and used to generate a model of the infl_uences on healthcare professionals in managing 
patient deterioration. Grounded theory methodology was used. 
Results 
Clinical processes for managing patient deterioration were found to be deficient. Deficiencies included 
infrequent documentation of vital signs, particularly respiratory rate and limited involvement of senior 
decision makers leaving junior clinicians to manage patient deterioration, which delayed appropriate 
treatment. 
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The multifaceted intervention significantly improved patient outcome and improved behaviour such as 
documentation of vital signs, supported by a hospital policy, and timeliness of medical review, triggered 
by more confident nursing staff underpinned by objective evidence (the modified early warning score) 
of patient deterioration. Improvement in timeliness of medical review and documentation of vital signs 
were sustained two years later but patient hospital outcome and the nurses calling for further medical 
help were not. 
Further investigation of behaviours that were not sustained revealed that junior medical and nursing 
staff lacked adequate clinical experience to facilitate timely decision making necessitating input from 
their consultants. Timely and appropriate communication was hindered through fear, lack of confidence 
or lack of knowledge and poor consultant approachability. 
Conclusion 
Identified shortcomings in the teamwork managing patient deterioration improved with the installation 
of a multifaceted intervention and, improved patient hospital outcome. Significant behavioural issues, 
especially communication with consultants, were identified as likely to hamper further improvement. In 
an age of shift work and reduced clinical experience, enhanced decision making will need a more 
intelligent system that can accurately detect patients at risk of patient deterioration and improved 
access to consultants to gain maximal benefit from the healthcare team. 
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Description 
System 
of the Health Care 
The Australian Capital Territory (ACT} is the capital territory of the Commonwealth of Australia and is 
the smallest self-governing internal territory. There are two public acute care hospitals in the ACT, The 
Canberra Hospital (500 beds) and Calvary HealthCare ACT (200 beds), serving a metropolitan 
population (360 000) . The larger tertiary and university affiliated hospital, The Canberra Hospital, also 
provides tertiary services to the surrounding region in southern New South Wales (population 240 
000). 
Patients admitted to the two hospitals are cared for by a medical specialist who are either employed by 
the Health Directorate, ACT Government or contracted to deliver specialist services as a visiting 
medical officer. The medical specialist commonly supervises a registrar who is either a basic trainee or 
an advanced trainee of a particular college, which refiects their degree of clinical experience. 
Additional members of the patient's medical specialist's team, the parent team, include a resident 
medical officer who is usually two or three years post-graduation and an intern who is in their first 
postgraduate year and is yet to be a fully registered medical practitioner. 
Once patients are admitted to the acute care wards of the two hospitals, nursing care is delivered by, 
predominantly, registered nurses who are varied in their degree of clinical experience. Occasionally, 
wards will employ enrolled nurses and nursing assistants to provide some aspects of nursing care. All 
the nursing staff are supervised by a ward clinical nurse consultant who is responsible for the 
operational activities on the ward as well as supervision of the nursing care delivered to patients. 
Staffing in-hours, which is considered between the days of Monday through to Friday and the hours of 
0800 hrs until 1800 hrs is significantly different for both medical and nursing . For the medical staff, the 
· medical specialist is more likely to be available to both the patient and junior medical staff on site but 
they are often in the operating theatre or outpatient clinics. The junior medical staff; registrar, resident 
medical officer and intern, will be caring for the patient directly and will hand over care to an out of 
hours medical team. The composition of the out of hours medical team varies but there is a significant 
reduction in the availability of doctors, particularly senior experienced doctors, out of hours. Out of 
hours, most medical specialists will be on call from home and not in the hospital to provide advice for 
patient management. 
For the nursing staff, the staffing ratios for direct patient care remains similar between in hours and out 
of hours but the clinical nurse consultant is no longer available out of hours. Instead, there is one 
clinical nurse consultant available for the whole of the hospital. 
11 
LIST of ABBREVIATIONS 
AIN 
APACHE 
ATP 
BP 
BPM 
BpM 
Cl 
CNC 
EN 
GCS 
Hb 
HR 
ICU 
MERIT 
MEWS 
OR 
RN 
RR 
RRR 
SaO2· 
SBAR · 
uo 
Assistant in Nursing 
Acute Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation 
Adenosine triphosphate 
Blood Pressure 
Beats per minute 
Breaths per minute 
Confidence Interval 
Clinical Nurse Consultant 
Enrolled Nurse 
Glasgow Coma Scale 
Haemoglobin 
Heart Rate 
Intensive Care Unit 
Introduction of the Medical Emergency Team 
Modified Early Warning Score 
Odds Ratio 
Registered Nurse 
Respiratory Rate 
Relative Risk Rate 
Arterial Oxygen Saturation 
Situation, Background, Assessment and Recommendation 
Urine Output 
12 
TABLE of CONTENTS 
PATIENT DETERIORATION: THE EFFECT OF HUMANS AND SYSTEMS IN ONE HEALTH CARE 
SYSTEM 1 
1 DECLARATION 
2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
3 MY CONTRIBUTION 
4 PUBLICATIONS BY THE CANDIDATE RELEVANT TO THE THESIS 
5 PRESENTATIONS BY THE CANDIDATE RELEVANT TO THE THESIS 
6 PRIZE AWARDED TO THE CANDIDATE RELEVANT TO THE THESIS 
ABSTRACT 
AIMS 
METHODS 
Quantitative Stud ies 
Qualitative Studies 
RESULTS 
CONCLUSION 
LIST OF TABLES 
DESCRIPTION OF THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 
1.1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.4 
INTRODUCTION 
Setting the Scene 
DEFINITION OF THE " DETERIORATING PATIENT" 
THE IMPORTANCE OF PATIENT DETERIORATION 
AIMS OF THE THESIS 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 
2.2 
2.2.1 
2.2.2 
2.2 .3 
2.2.3 .1 
2.2.3.2 
-2.2.3 .3 
2.2.3.4 
.I 
INTRODUCTION 
EPIDEMIOLOGY OF PATIENT DETERIORATION 
The Incidence of a Deteriorating Patient? 
Can the " Deteriorating Patient" be Detected? 
Bedside Tools for Detecting Patient Deterioration 
Vital Signs 
Normal Ranges of Vital Signs 
Optimal Frequency of Measurement of Vital Signs 
Other Consequences of Measuring'Vital Signs 
13 
2 
3 
5 
5 
6 
7 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
20 
21 
21 
21 
22 
22 
23 
24 
24 
24 
25 
28 
28 
28 
29 
29 
2.2.3.5 
2.2.4 
2.2.4.1 
2.2.4.1.1 
2.2.4.1.2 
2.2.4.1.3 
The Ability of Vital Signs to Detect Patient Deterioration 29 
The Consequences of Failing to Detect and Respond to Patient Deterioration 32 
Summary of Individual Vital Signs' Ability to Recognise Patient Deterioration 32 
Respiratory Rate 
Blood Pressure 
Heart Rate 
32 
33 
33 
2.2.4.1.4 Temperature 33 
2.2.4.1.5 Arterial Oxygenation 33 
2.2.4.2 Non Vital Sign Parameters' Ability to Recognise Patient Deterioration 34 
2.2.4.2.1 Mental State 34 
2.2.4.2.2 Urine Output 34 
2.2.4.2.3 Base Excess 35 
2.2.4.2.4 Presence of Pre Existing Chronic Illness 35 
2.2.4.2.5 Advancing Age 35 
2.2.4.2 .6 
2.2.5 
2.2 .5.1 
2.2.5.1.1 
2.2 .5.1.2 
2.2.5.2 
2.2.5.2.1 
2.2.6 
2.2.6.1 
2.2.6.2 
2.2.6.3 
2.2.6.3.1 
2.2.6.3.2 
2.2.6.3.3 
2.2.7 
Summary 
Clinical Processes to Manage Patient Deterioration 
Recognition of Patient Deterioration 
The Documentation of Vital Signs 
Interpretation of Vital Signs 
Response to Patient Deterioration 
Appropriate and timely communication 
Systems for Recognising and Responding to Deteriorating Patients 
Documentation of Vital Signs 
Specific Deteriorating Patient Education 
Detection of Patient Deterioration 
Early Warning Scores 
Rapid Response Teams 
Other Patient Deterioration Trigger Systems 
Summary 
366 
36 
36 
36 
37 
38 
38 
40 
40 
42 
43 
43 
45 
477 
47 
CHAPTER 3: METHODS 488 
3.1 
3.2 
3.3 
3.3.1 
3.3.2 
3.3.3 
3.3.4 · 
3.3.5 
3.4 
PROJECT DESIGN 
PURPOSE OF THE PROJECT 
PROJECT STRUCTURE 
499 
499 
499 
An Observational Study of Patient Deterioration: "The Observational Study" 499 
A Prospective Controlled, Before and After Multifaceted Intervention Trial for 
Recognising and Responding to Patient Deterioration: "The lnterventional 
Study" 50 
A Qualitative Study to Understand Behavioural Changes with the Multifaceted 
Intervention: "The Beh9vioural Study" 50 
Are Changes to Behaviour and Patient Outcomes Sustainable? SO 
The Human Element of Managing Patient Deterioration: "The Human Element 
Study" 511 
STATISTICAL ANALYSES 511 
CHAPTER 4: AN OBSERVATIONAL STUDY OF PATIENT DETERIORATION 533 
4.1 
4.2 
4.3 -
4.3.1 
INTRODUCTION 
AIM 
METHOD 
Setting 
14 
544 
544 
544 
544 
4.3.2 
4.3.2.1 
4.3.2.2 
4.3.3 
4.3.4 
4.4 
4.4.1 
4.4.2 
4.4.3 
4.4.4 
4.4.5 
4.4.6 
4.5 
4.5.1 
4.5.2 
4.5.3 
4.6 
Clinical Processes for the Recognition and Response to Patient Deterioration 544 
The Ward Observation Chart 544 
Medical Review and Management 544 
Study Period and Subjects 544 
Data Collection 555 
RESULTS 
Patient Demographics 
Documentation of Frequency of Observations 
MET Reviews 
Delayed MET Review 
Communication Prior to MET Review 
Out of Hours MET review 
DISCUSSION 
Documentation of Vital Signs 
Communication and Medical Review 
Patient Related Outcomes 
CONCLUSION 
555 
555 
566 
566 
588 
588 
599 
60 
60 
611 
611 
622 
CHAPTER 5: A PROSPECTIVE CONTROLLED BEFORE AND AFTER MULTI FACETED 
INTERVENTION FOR RECOGNISING AND RESPONDING TO PATIENT DETERIORATION 633 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 644 
5.2 AIM 655 
5.3 METHODS 655 
5.3.1 The Hospitals 655 
5.3.2 The Multifaceted Intervention for Managing Patient Deterioration: 655 
5.3.2 .1 Development of a New Ward Observation Chart 655 
5.3.2.1.1 Current Ward Observation Chart 655 
5.3.2.1.2 Features in the New Observation Chart 666 
5.3.2 .1.2.1 Clarity 666 
5.3.2.1.2.2 Graphical and Numeric Trending 677 
5.3.2 .1.2.3 Placement of Variables 677 
5.3.2.1.2.4 Embedding of the MEWS 677 
5.3 .2.1.2 .5 Embedding of the Colour Coding of Vital Sign Derangement 677 
5.3.2.2 A Specific Deteriorating Patient Education Package "COMPASS©" 688 
5.3.2 .2.1 The Manual 699 
5.3.2.2.2 The DVD 699 
5.3.2.2.3 The Quiz 699 
5.3.2 .2.4 
5.3.2.3 
5.3.3 
5.3.4 
5.3.5 
5.3.6 
5.3.7 
5.3.8 
5.4 · 
5.4.1 
5.4.2 
5.4.3 
5.4.4 
5.4.5 
5.4.6 
The Face to Face Learning 
The Track and Trigger System 
Study Design 
Study Principles 
Study Periods 
Subjects 
Data Collection 
Outcome Measures 
RESULTS 
Study Processes 
Patient Demographics 
Patient Outcomes 
Vital Sign Measurements 
Communication and Medical Review following Clinical Instability 
MET Review following fulfilment of MET Criteria 
15 
699 
70 
70 
70 
711 
711 
711 
711 
722 
722 
722 
733 
744 
744 
755 
5.5 DISCUSSION 755 
5.5.1 Documentation of Vital Signs 755 
5.5.2 Communication and Medical Review 755 
5.5.3 Patient Related Outcomes 766 
5.6 CONCLUSION 777 
CHAPTER 6: A QUALITATIVE STUDY TO UNDERSTAND BEHAVIOURAL CHANGES WITH THE 
MULTIFACETED INTERVENTION 788 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 799 
6.2 AIM 80 
6.3 METHOD 80 
6.3 .1 The Setting 80 
6.3.2 Data Sources 81 
6.3.3 Collection of Data and Analysis 81 
6.4 RESULTS 81 
6.4.2 A Sense of Obligation 82 
6.4.2.1 Nurses Communicating to the Doctors regarding Patient Deterioration 833 
6.4.2.1.1 Pre Instalment of the Intervention 833 
6.4.2.1.2 Post Instalment of the Intervention 833 
6.4.2.2 Nurses Completing the Ward Observation Chart 844 
6.4.2 .2.1 Pre-instalment of the Intervention 844 
6.4.2.2.2 Post-instalment of the Intervention 855 
6.4.2.3 Medical review of the patient 855 
6.4.3 Provision of Objective Evidence of Patient Deterioration 866 
6.4.4 A Sense of Confidence by the Nurses to Communicate with Doctors 877 
6.4.5 Provision of a Structure of Care for Managing Patient Deterioration 877 
6.5 DISCUSSION 888 
6.5.2 Implications for Managing Deteriorating Patients 90 
6.5.3 Limitations 90 
6.6 CONCLUSIONS 911 
CHAPTER 7: ARE CHANGES TO BEHAVIOUR AND PATIENT OUTCOMES SUSTAINABLE IN 
EVERYDAY CLINICAL PRACTICE? 922 
7.1 
1.2 
7.3 
7.3.1. 
7.3.2 
7.3.3 
7.3.4 
7.3.5 
7.3.6 ' 
7.3.7 
7.3 .8 
7.4 
7.4.1 
7.4.2 
7.4.3 
7.4.4 
7.5 
INTRODUCTION 
AIM 
METHODS 
The Setting 
Pre a.nd Post Intervention Systems for Managing Deteriorating Patients 
Study Design 
Study Principle 
Study Periods 
Subjects 
Data Collection 
Outcome Measures 
RESULTS 
Patient Demographics 
Patient Related Outcomes 
Vital Sign Measurements 
Communication and Medical Review following Clinical Instability 
DISCUSSION 
16 
93 
93 
93 
93 
93 
94 
94 
94 
94 
94 
95 
95 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
7.5.1 
7.5.2 
7.5.3 
7.6 
Patient Related Outcomes 
Documentation of Vital Signs 
Communication and Medical Review 
CONCLUSION 
99 
100 
100 
101 
CHAPTER 8: THE HUMAN ELEMENT OF MANAGING PATIENT DETERIORATION 102 
8.1 
8.2 
8.3 
8.3 .1 
8.3 .2 
8.3.3 
8.4 
8.4.1 
8.4.1.1 
8.4.2 
8.4.2.1 
8.4.2.2 
INTRODUCTION 
AIM 
METHOD 
The Hospital 
Data Sources 
Collection of Data and Analysis 
RESULTS 
Characteristics of the Patient 
Acute Nature of Deterioration 
Junior Doctor or Nurse Attributes 
Clinical Experience 
Communication Skills 
8.4.3 The Patient's Consultant 
8.4.3 .1 Patient Ownership 
8.4.3.2 The Consultant Supervising Care 
8.4.3.2 .1 The Role and Expectations of Healthcare Professionals 
8.4.3.2.2 Decision Making and its Consequences 
8.4.3 .2.3 Decision Challenging and its Consequences 
8.4.3.2.4 Admission of Knowledge Deficits and its Consequence 
8.4.3.2 .5 Personal Reflection and Peer Review 
8.4.3.2 .6 Individual Performance Feedback 
8.4.4 Healthcare Institution Rostering 
8.4.4.1 Adequate Clinical Exposure 
8.4.4.2 Safe working hours and fiscal responsibility 
8.4.4.3 Workload 
8.4.4.4 Adequate Senior Support 
8.5 DISCUSSION 
8.5.1 Principal Findings 
8.5.1.1 Patient Characteristics 
8.5.1.2 Junior Doctor or Nurse Attributes 
8.5.1.2.1 Clinical Experience 
8.5.1.2.2 Communication Skills 
8.5.1:3 Supervising Consultant 
8.5.1.3.1 Patient Ownership 
8.5 .1.3.2 The Consultant Supervising Care 
8.5.1.3.2.1 The Role and Expectations of Healthcare Professionals 
8.5 .L3 .2.2 Decision Making and their Consequences 
8.5.1.3 .2.3 Decision Challenging and their Consequences 
8.5.1.3.2 .4 Admission of Knowledge Deficits and their Conseq uences 
8.5.1.3 .2.5 Peer Review and Personal Reflection 
8.5 .1.3 .2.6 Individual Performance Feedback 
8.5.1.4 Healthcare Institution Rostering 
8.5.1.4.l · Adequate Clinical Exposure 
8.5.1.4.2 Safe Working Hours and Fiscal Responsibility 
8.5.1.4.3 Workload 
8.5 .1.4.4 Adequate Senior Support 
17 
103 
103 
103 
103 
104 
105 
106 
106 
107 
108 
108 
111 
113 
113 
115 
116 
118 
119 
120 
122 
123 
124 
124 
125 
125 
127 
129 
129 
129 
130 
130 
130 
131 
131 
132 
132 
132 
133 
133 
134 
135 
136 
136 
136 
137 
137 
8.5.2 
8.6 
Strengths and Limitations of the Study 
CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER 9: SUMMARY, FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND CONCLUSION 
9.1 
9.2 
9.2.1 
9.2.2 
9.2.3 
9.2.4 
9.3 
INTRODUCTION 
KEY FINDINGS 
Lack of Consistent Definition of the "Deteriorating Patient" 
Clinical Processes in Managing Patient Deterioration are Deficient 
Patient Deterioration Systems only Partially Improve Clinical Processes 
Decision Making Determines Timely and Effective Clinical Management 
LIMITATIONS 
9.4 THE IMPACT OF THE THESIS FINDINGS ON THE CANDIDATE'S WORK AT THE CANBERRA 
HOSPITAL 
9.5 
9.6 
FURTHER STUDIES 
CONCLUSION 
REFERENCES 
APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: COMPARATIVE RANGES FOR SCORING THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS 
OF THE MODIFIED EARLY WARNING SCORES 
138 
139 
140 
141 
141 
141 
142 
142 
143 
144 
145 
145 
145 
147 
161 
162 
APPENDIX B: EXAMPLES OF RAPID RESPONSE TEAMS (TRIGGERS AND TEAM MEMBERS) 
165 
APPENDIX C: OLD WARD OBSERVATION CHART 167 
APPENDIX D: NOTIFICATION PROCESS 169 
APPENDIX E: NEW WARD OBSERVATION CHART 170 
APPENDIX F: HOSPITAL POLICY FOR MEASURING VITAL SIGNS 173 
Attachment A 176 
Patient's Usual Systolic BP 177 
Attachment B 178 
APPENDIX G: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET FOR BEHAVIOURAL STUDY 179 
APPENDIX H: CONSENT FORM FOR BEHAVIOURAL STUDY 182 
APPENDIX I: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR BEHAVIOURAL STUDY 185 
APPENDIX J: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET FOR HUMAN ELEMENT STUDY 189 
APPENDIX K: CONSENT FORM FOR HUMAN ELEMENT STUDY 192 
18 
APPENDIX L: ALICE'S STORY 
APPENDIX M: ALICE'S OBSERVATION CHART 
19 
195 
207 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
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1.1 Introduction 
1.1.1 . Setting the Scene 
"Alice's provisional diagnosis, made earlier in the Emergency Department on Saturday 
21st March 2009, was mycoplasma pneumonia, noting positive Epstein Barr Virus and 
erythema multiforme. Her condition continued to deteriorate throughout Saturday and all 
of Sunday. As her mother I will never forget that Sunday. My daughter was so very ill 
and I felt completely powerless to have someone, anyone do anything other than simply 
look at the monitor and walk out of the room and leave me with her. I was anxious and 
fearful. It was not until I asked "does my daughter have to have a respiratory arrest 
before someone will do something?" that action was taken" 
" ... I still believe that either someone or something failed my daughter on that weekend. 
In looking back later on the Saturday and Sunday as the hours passed, I should have 
insisted that she be reviewed with a view to intervention and much sooner as I most 
certainly had presided over copious monitoring and review but a seemingly total lack of 
clinical assessment and decision making affording early intervention in order that her 
deterioration was halted" 
The mother of Alice, a 16-year-old school girl, wrote a ten page article on. her daughter's thirty six hour 
journey on a general ward in a tertiary, university affiliated teaching hospital in Australia following 
admission for an acute pneumonia. The article describes missed opportunities in the management of 
her daughter acutely deteriorating on a general ward . The deterioration eventually led her to an 
unplanned, out of hour's admission to an intensive care unit (ICU), a scenario associated with an 
increased risk of hospital death (Bhonagiri et al. , 2011 ). Alice's story is one local example of the 
apparent. failure of healthcare professionals to recognise and respond appropriately to deteriorating 
patients and provides a compelling reason why this failure of healthcare professionals needs to be 
understood and addressed. 
1.2 Definition of the "Deteriorating Patient" 
The d~finition of a health care professional in the context of this doctoral thesis includes a medical 
practitioner, nurse or an allied health care worker that is licensed and regulated to provide some type 
of health care. 
In contrast, there is controversy over the precise definition of a deteriorating patient (McQuillan et al., 
1998; Hillman et al. , 2001 ; Parr et al., 2001 ; Whitehead et al. , 2002). This lack of precise definition 
provides challenges in a number of ways because until healthcare professionals and researchers are 
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working from the same definition, it will be difficult to study and design a consistent appropriate system 
to recognise and respond to "deteriorating patients". 
For the purposes of this thesis, the definition of a deteriorating patient will be taken as a general ward 
patient at risk of developing critical illness often with signs of deranged vital signs and organ 
dysfunction usually caused by inadequate tissue oxygenation leading to eventual exhaustion of cellular 
energy in the form of adenosine triphosphate (ATP). If inadequate oxygen delivery continues, organs 
will fail, increasing the mortality (Knaus et al., 1985). If patients with inadequate tissue oxygenation are 
identified prior to organ dysfunction, treatments are available that can improve the outcome of these 
patients (Shoemaker et al., 1988; Boyd et al., 1993; Rivers et al., 2001) but if the treatments are 
delivered late in the disease process there is an observed increase in mortality (Hayes et al., 1994; 
Chernow, 1996; Kirschenbaum, 1998). However, if the patient is not identified until they undergo a 
cardiac arrest, they have an even worse prognosis (So et al., 1994). Treatments for patient 
deterioration often include an admission to an ICU, which can provide intense monitoring of their 
physiology (Bennett et al.; Harrison et al., 1999). This helps identify haemodynamic instability (Pinsky, 
2007) and potentially inadequate oxygen delivery to the tissues, with the aim that these can be 
corrected; however, if not corrected they can lead to a worse outcome (Hayes et al., 1994; Chernow, 
1996; Kirschenbaum, 1998). 
1.3 The Importance of Patient Deterioration 
On a general ward, intense monitoring of haemodynamic parameters, such as heart rate, respiratory 
rate, blood pressure and urine output, does not occur and so early identification of patients with 
haemodynamic instability and inadequate oxygen delivery is less likely to occur. The inability to detect 
inadequate oxygen delivery on the general wards early in the disease process is reflected by the fact 
that patients admitted to the ICU from the general ward are more likely to have had a respiratory or 
cardiac arrest (Goldhill et al., 1998), a late sign of inadequate tissue oxygenation and loss of adequate 
sources of cellular energy. These patients are known to have a poor outcome (Schein et al., 1990). 
1.4 Aims of the Thesis 
Undoubtedly Alice's deteriorating patient experience is one of many. Three aims to improve the care of 
deteriorating patients are proposed: 
1. To improve the understanding of the clinical processes and influences involved in managing 
patient deterioration. 
2. To examine the effect of a deteriorating patient intervention on clinical processes and patient 
outcome. 
3. .To determine if the effects of a deteriorating patient intervention are sustainable 
In answering these aims, it is hoped that deteriorating patient care can be advanced to improve patient 
outcome and experiences like those of Alice can be reduced . 
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2.1 Introduction 
If a deteriorating patient is managed inadequately, the potential for a poor outcome is high. To find 
future strategies to ensure deteriorating patients are managed adequately, it is critical to understand: 
1. The epidemiology of patient deterioration 
2. The current clinical processes that are engaged to manage patient deterioration 
3. The specific hospital systems that have been developed to facilitate and improve the 
management of patient deterioration. 
2.2 Epidemiology of Patient Deterioration 
2.2.1 The Incidence of a Deteriorating Patient? 
The incidence of a deteriorating patient on a general ward is difficult to quantify given that there is no 
standard definition of patient deterioration. If using abnormal vital signs as the marker of a deteriorating 
patient, only a few researchers have examined all admissions to general wards patients. Buist et al 
(Buist et al. , 2004) reviewed over 6 000 general ward patients and only 8.9% (564/6303) of patients 
(564/6303, 8.9%) had abnormal vital signs and the majority (66.7%) resolved without critical care 
intervention. In contrast, another study of 3160 admissions to general wards in five hospitals found that 
55.3% of patients had abnormal vital signs (Harrison et al. , 2005). 
Importantly patients with abnormal vital signs had an higher hospital mortality (146/564, 26%) than the 
general ward population although patients with a "do not resuscitate" order were included (Buist et al., 
2004). Similarly, a more recent study of 27 772 adult patients in Canada, found an hospital mortality 
rate of 23.6% if the patient had one or more significantly deranged vital sign (Bleyer et al. , 2011 ). 
Variations in the incidence of abnormal vital signs are also found depending on which high risk group is 
being studied and vary from 28% (125/447) in patients prior to a hospital death (Hillman et al. , 2001), 
80% (61/76) in unplanned admissions to intensive care (Goldhill et al. , 1999) to 91 .5% (54/59 patients) 
in patients undergoing a cardiac arrest (Schein et al., 1990). There is no consistency in the study 
duration ranging from 15 minutes to 48 hours prior to an adverse event. This lack of consistency also 
changes the incidence of abnormal signs from 60% (383/627 patients) occurring at least once in a 24 
hour period prior to an unplanned admission to intensive care, cardiac arrest or hospital death to 4.4% 
(17/383) if occurring for a four hour duration, to 2.3% (9/383) occurring for an eight hour duration and 
only 0'.8% (3/383) occurring for a total of 24 hours (Kause et al. , 2004). In addition, the inclusion or 
exclusion of patients not for resuscitation is inconsistent. This is important since it remains essential to 
identify patients who are likely to benefit from critical care management and presumably, patients who 
are not for resuscitation would not benefit from critical care management. 
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2.2.2 Can the "Deteriorating Patient" be Detected? 
A deteriorating patient is a patient that is at risk of developing critical illness, which in turn is due to 
inadequate oxygen delivery to the tissues. Thus, it is important to understand the relevance of oxygen 
to life, the concept of how oxygen is delivered to tissues and what mechanisms exist to ensure that 
oxygen delivery to tissues is maintained. 
Intra cellular energy in the form of ATP, is used by regulatory and structural proteins, including those 
involved in biosynthetic reactions, motility and cell division. ATP is an essential component to 
maintaining cell function and a critical requirement to life. The most efficient method of producing ATP 
is through the aerobic metabolism of a substrate molecule, such as glucose, a process called oxidative 
phosphorylation. During this process, there is the production of between 30 to 36 ATP molecules from 
one molecule of glucose, compared with only two ATP molecules if glycolysis occurs in the absence of 
oxidative phosphorylation. During oxidative phosphorylation, electrons are transferred from electron 
donors to electron acceptors such as oxygen (redox reactions) and this releases energy in the form 
ATP (Hall, 2011 ). Oxygen delivery to the cells is a critical part of maintaining cellular function and any 
disruption can lead to inadequate energy production, in the form of ATP, and the production of lactic 
acid can lead to cellular dysfunction and eventual death (Hall, 2011 ). 
Oxygen delivery requ ires oxygen to be transported to the cells. This requires an adequate 
haemoglobin concentration (the transporter) in an adequate volume of fluid to be pumped from the 
heart (cardiac output) and an adequate gaseous exchange allowing oxygen saturation of the 
haemoglobin molecule. Any disruptions to these three elements can lead to a reduction in oxygen 
transportation to cells unless compensatory mechanisms are engaged. -
The compensatory mechanisms utilised to · maintain oxygen delivery to the tissues depend upon the 
primary insult and duration or severity of inadequate oxygen delivery (Table 1 ). 
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Table 1: Compensatory Mechanisms to Differing Types of Insults 
Insult Compensatory Mechanism Physical Sign 
Fall in Stroke Volume 
Stimulation of sympathetic nervous 
system: 
~1 : Positive inotropy 
Positive chronotropy Increased HR 
0( Peripheral vasoconstriction Narrow pulse 
pressure 
Pallor 
Peripheral cyanosis 
Cool peripheries 
Fall in Gaseous Exchange 
Stimulation of chemoreceptors in Increased RR 
medulla oblongata 
A rise in CO2 following inadequate 02 
supply 
-
Fall in Hb Concentration Stimulation of sympathetic nervous 
system 
~( Positive inotropy 
Positive chronotropy Increased HR 
. 01 : Peripheral vasoconstriction Narrow pulse 
pressure 
Pallor 
Peripheral cyanosis 
Cool peripheries 
Failing Compensatory 
Mechanism 
. 
Inadequate cardiac output Reduction BP 
Lactic acid production Increase RR 
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Physical signs for the compensation in reduction in oxygen delivery include pallor, peripheral cyanosis, 
sweating, tachypnoea, tachycardia, and hypotension. If organ failure ensues; oliguria and altered 
mental state may occur. Historically, oliguria and altered mental state have become the markers or 
antecedents of "the patient at risk of critical illness" or "the deteriorating patient" and are included in the 
classical "vital sign" set (Evans et al., 1999). The classical vital sign set is heart rate, blood pressure, 
temperature, respiratory rate and more recently, pulse oximetry has been included. 
Determining and applying hard and fast criteria for identifying or detecting the "at risk" patient for 
critical illness to every ward patient are unlikely to work, as ward patients are generally a 
heterogeneous group of patients. There will be situations where one patient is demonstrating physical 
signs of compensatory mechanisms for inadequate oxygen delivery whilst another will not, despite 
similar oxygen delivery values, because the amount of oxygen that cells need vary depending on their 
requirements and their environment. There are times when classical signs of patient deterioration are 
not present, e.g. hypotension, because the peripheral vasoconstriction is so efficient at maintaining 
normotension. 
The compensatory mechanisms for inadequate oxygen delivery, probably partly explain why expert 
clinicians do not just rely on "classical signs" but are still able to identify deteriorating patients by "just 
knowing" or having a "sixth sense" (Cioffi, 2000) long before the patient exhibits these physiological 
cues. However, in being able to do this, past experiences are essential (Cioffi, 2000) and lack of 
experience may explain why some nurses (Fuhrmann et al., 2008) and doctors are unaware of 
deteriorating patients even with physiological abnormalities. There will be some doctors, despite their 
seniority and experience, who struggle to recognise deteriorating patients and reasons for this are 
unclear. 
Whilst there are some nurses and doctors who may be able to identify a deteriorating patient early in 
the course of their disease, it is even harder to know which patients will benefit from the treatment to 
improve oxygen delivery and how long the window of reversibility is present (Pinsky, 2007). Equally, 
the implied assumption is that by restoring normal haemodynamic values, reflected by normalising vital 
signs, further organ injury is prevented and associated with reduced mortality. This argument may not 
be valid as the vital sign derangements only indicate systemic oxygen delivery values, which may not 
reflect oxygen delivery at the microcirculation of organs (Pinsky, 2007). 
In order to detect patient deterioration accurately and to respond appropriately, the clinical staff are 
depencfont upon a number of critical factors: 
• The identification of a sensitive and specific bedside tool for detection of patient deterioration 
• The accurate measurement and documentation of the predictive bedside tool 
• _The interpretation of the bedside tool 
• The appropriate and timely communication of the abnormalities detected 
• Timely and appropriate response to the communication made 
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These requirements for the detection and response to a deteriorating patient are discussed, in turn 
below. 
2.2.3 Bedside Tools for Detecting Patient Deterioration 
2.2.3.1 Vital Signs 
Although global oxygen delivery can be measured in a critical care environment, there are neither the 
tools to measure these values or interpret them on the general ward . The only measurements that 
have been accessible and utilised by healthcare professionals on the general wards are vital signs 
(such as heart rate, blood pressure, temperature, respiratory rate) and clinical markers of organ failure 
(altered mental state and oliguria) to detect deteriorating patients. These measurements are surrogate 
markers for adequate oxygen delivery to tissues. 
In patients admitted to acute hospitals, vital signs have been measured routinely and regularly for over 
a century (Evans et al., 1999; Zeitz et al., 2006) . Despite the duration of time in use, there are very little 
data on the normal ranges of vital signs, the optimal frequency of measurement and their usefulness in 
maintaining a patient's well-being. 
Using different values for determining an abnormal vital sign, varying the types of vital signs included in 
analysis, inconsistent time periods used in only small cohorts, some with the similar data sets (Hillman 
et al., 2001; Hillman et al., 2002) and a limited number of studies assessing all comers, there is no 
consensus on the optimal predictive vital sign for detecting patient deterioration. Some have even 
stated that vital signs are limited in their capacity to detect physiological changes that are relevant to 
inadequate oxygen delivery (Evans et al., 1999). 
2.2.3.2 Normal Ranges of Vital Signs 
In order to detect patients at risk of a critical illness, it is imperative to have some knowledge of the 
normal values of vital signs in acute hospital patient populations. In knowing the normal values, it is 
possible to detect patients who have deranged values, which may reflect compensatory mechanisms 
for inadequate oxygen delivery. 
Data are sparse but in a small study 3500 hours of data were collected (Tarassenko et al., 2006) of 
150 al'ready at risk patients (post-acute myocardial infarction, severe heart failure, acute respiratory 
problems and elderly patients with a ·fractured neck of femur). This study found the normal mean 
values. to be - heart rate: 83.8 beats per minute, systolic-diastolic pressure: 94.7 mmHg, peripheral 
oximetry: 95.2%, skin temperature: 36° C and respiratory rate: 18.3 breaths per minute. Even though 
this study set out to determine "normal" vital sign values for ward patients, the patients studied were 
already at risk of clinical deterioration and may not reflect all general ward patients. Indeed, a normal 
value for one patient may not be normal for another, as many patients receive medication that may 
alter their compensatory response and an abnormal value may be normalised with treatment, such as 
the delivery of supplemental oxygen. This highlights the difficulties of setting normal ranges for vital 
signs across hospital patient populations. 
28 
2.2.3.3 Optimal Frequency of Measurement of Vital Signs 
There is very limited evidence to determine the optimal frequency of measurement of vital signs 
(Evans et al., 1999) in acute hospital wards. Thus, many of the recommendations on the frequency of 
vital sign measurement are based purely upon expert nursing opinion with some consultation with 
medical colleagues and then ratified by a hospital executive committee (Zeitz et al., 2006). In a survey 
of 47 hospitals of post-operative regimens for vital sign measurements, the most common regimen was 
hourly for four hours and then four hourly for a further 16 hours. Interestingly, there was no difference 
whether the patient had had a major or minor operation (Zeitz et al., 2006). Even in hospitals where 
there was no policy for the frequency of measurement of vital signs, the recording frequency was 
similar to those with policies, suggesting that the frequency of measurement is based upon long 
established nursing routines and therefore not patient centred . 
Despite the lack of literature on the optimal frequency of measurement of vital signs, recommendations 
are being made for acute care settings by National (Australian Commission for Quality and Safety in 
Healthcare, 2010) and expert (De Vita et al., 2010) organisations for vital signs to be measured at least 
every 12 hours but individualised where necessary. 
2.2.3.4 Other Consequences of Measuring Vital Signs 
To date, there is a paucity of evidence to support that measurement of vital signs, early detection of 
abnormalities and subsequent restoration to normal values to prevent further organ injury can reduce 
mortality. The statement appears to be logical and measuring vital signs does give the bedside nurse 
an opportunity to spend up to 3.5 hours per day with the patient allowing an overview of the whole 
patient (Zeitz et al., 2006). This may be useful to determine whether the patient was at risk of critical 
illness (Cioffi, 2000), and the human interactions themselves may also promote healing (Kaplan et al., 
1989). 
2.2.3.5 The Ability of Vital Signs to Detect Patient Deterioration 
Despite the paucity of evidence it seems reasonable to assume that vital sign measurements would 
detect deteriorating patients and predict those likely to require further treatment to restore adequate 
oxygen delivery to tissues. However, it is important to recognise that some abnormalities in vital signs 
are not secondary to an event but may reflect a primary event such as a cardiac dysrhythmia, which 
may lead to compensatory mechanisms to ensure adequate oxygen delivery at all times. 
The greatest challenge is to find an ideal vital sign for detecting patient deterioration in all general ward 
patients. This reflects that only a few studies have. assessed vital signs on all ward patients throughout 
their length of hospital stay and related these measurements to patient outcome (Buist et al. , 2004; 
Harrison et al., 2005) . Most studies have focussed on patients that have either arrested (Nurmi et al. , 
2005), have had an unplanned intensive care admission (Goldhill et al. , 1999; Hillman et al., 2002), 
(Goldhill ·et al., 1999), have died in hospital (Schein et al., 1990; Hillman et al., 2001) or have 
undergone a clinical adverse event (Zeitz et al., 2006). By preselecting relatively small high risk 
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groups, sensitivity and specificity for vital signs to be used to detect patient deterioration on all ward 
patients cannot be determined with any certainty. 
Those studies that have studied vital signs and their relationship with patient outcome have also used 
different values for determining abnormal vital signs and included and excluded different vital signs 
collected (Table 2) . 
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Table 2: Studies Reviewing Vital Sign Abnormalities and Patient Outcome 
Number Type of Study Period HR BP RR (brpm) GCS uo SaO2 
of Ward (bpm) (mmHg) (mis) (%) 
Patients Patient 
(Buist et 6303 All Hospital Stay <50 and <90 and <5 and > Decrease 2>:2 - <90 
al. , 2004) >130 >200 30 orGCS 3 or 
Seizures 
(Hillman et 496 Pre ICU 0-8h, 8-48h <40 and <90 <5 and Decrease 2>:2 -
al., 2002) Admission Pre ICU >140 
> 36 or seizures 
Admission 
(Goldhill et 76 Pre ICU 24 hours Pre <70 or MAP <70 <12 or >24 <15 - FiO2 
al. , 1999) Admission ICU >109 or >109 >=0.5 
Admission 
(Nurmi et 110 Pre Cardiac 24 hours Pre >130 <90 <6 and Any unexplained <90 
al., 2005) Arrest Cardiac Arrest >30, decrease in 
airway consciousness, 
threatened, agitation, 
respiratory delirium, seizures 
distress 
(Fuhrmann 877 Actively Between 1600 <50 or <90 or <6 and - <90 
etal. , treated and 2130, not >130 >200 >30 
2008) visited every 
day but 
studied all 
admission 
(Lighthall 1089 All Hospital Stay <40 or <90 <8 or >26 - <90 
etal., >110 
2009) 
(Hillman et 447 Actively 0-8h, 8-48 <40 and <90 <5 and> fall 2>:2 or -
al. , 2001) treated >140 36 seizures 
(Harrison 4617 All 42.3% 40-49, 80-100, 5-9, 31-40 <9-11, or <200 90-95 
etal. , Hospital Stay 121-140 181-240 GCS>2, 
2005) alteration in 
mentalion, any 
seizure 
(Harrison 4617 All 42.3% <40, <80 or <5,>40 < or=8, <200 <90 
etal. , Hospital Siay >140, >240 unresponsive to in 8 
2005) cardiac verbal hours 
arrest*, commands, two 
or more 
seizures* 
(Schein et 64 Pre Cardiac 24 hours pre VT or VF Apnoea or Acute 
al. , 1990) Arrest arrest agonal neurological 
respiration impairment 
before cardiac 
arrest 
-
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2.2.4 The Consequences of Failing to Detect and Respond to Patient Deterioration 
The reason why deteriorating patients do badly when poorly managed is that prolonged and 
inadequate oxygen delivery to the patient's organs leads to organ failure, which is associated with a 
higher mortality (Knaus et al., 1985). Although there are no direct data to support this theory, there is 
indirect evidence that delays in admitting deteriorating patients to an ICU are associated with an 
increase in hospital mortality. 
In a review of 100 unplanned admissions to two IC Us (tertiary and metropolitan) (McQuillan et al., 
1998), it was found that in 54/100 (54%) patients there was suboptimal care prior to admission to 
intensive care. In 37/54 (69%) of these patients the admission to intensive care was thought to have 
been delayed. Patients with suboptimal care, including those that had delays getting to intensive care, 
had a significantly higher hospital mortality (30/54, 56%) than those with optimal care prior to 
admission to intensive care and whose admission to the ICU was not delayed (7/20, 35%, p<0.0001). 
Similar studies have found that delays in admission to intensive care from the ward leads to sicker 
patients, i.e. they require a more prolonged stay in intensive care or die quickly (Goldhill et al., 1999). 
There is other indirect evidence to suggest that failure to attend to or delay in attending to the 
physiological components of oxygen delivery, such as an inadequate management of a patient's 
airway and the failure to apply supplemental oxygen when needed, can lead to adverse events in 
hospital and preventable deaths (Dubois et al., 1988; Tarassenko et al., 2006; Calzavacca et al., 
2008). 
The following paragraphs summarise the current literature on individual vital signs and their ability to 
detect deteriorating patients as this provides important information to underpin the studies undertaken 
in this thesis. 
2.2.4.1 Summary of Individual Vital Signs' Ability to Recognise Patient Deterioration 
2.2.4.1.1 Respiratory Rate 
Respiratqry function is important prior to any adverse event as evidenced by patients having a high or 
low respiratory rate prior to an unplanned intensive care admission (Hillman et al., 2002), hospital 
deaths. (Hillman et al., 2001) and cardiac arrests (Schein et al., 1990). In one study of 76 unplanned 
admissions to an ICU, a respiratory rate of more than 25 breaths per minute was the commonest 
physiological abnormality (Goldhill et al., 1999). Some have suggested that a respiratory rate of more 
than 25 breaths per minute is the best warning sign prior to an intensive care admission (Whitehead et 
al., 2002). However, the sensitivity to predict a ·cardiac arrest in the preceding 72 hours in ward 
patieAts is low (0.54) (Fieselmann et al., 1993). In another study, a high (respiratory rate greater than 
30 breaths per minute) and low respiratory rate (respiratory rate less than six breaths per minute) were 
associated with an high odds ratio for risk of mortality 7.2 [3.9-13.2] and 14.4 [2.6-80] respectively 
(Buist et al., 2004). 
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In summary, although a high respiratory rate is a commonly occurring sign in patients who undergo a 
hospital death, cardiac arrest or unexpected intensive care admission, its ability to fulfil the ideal vital 
sign criteria is poor. 
2.2.4.1.2 Blood Pressure 
In studying all ward patients, the incidence of hypotension (systolic blood pressure less than 90 
mmHg) varies from 17.3% (1 090/6 303) (Buist et al., 2004) to 20.6% (651/3160) (Harrison et al. , 
2005). 
Limiting the study of blood pressure to selected groups, the incidence of hypotension eight hours prior 
to all non ICU deaths (excluding cardiac arrests) has been reported to be only 19.2% (86/447) (Hillman 
et al., 2001 ). However, hypotension is the commonest antecedent to unexpected deaths, cardiac 
arrests and unplanned admissions to intensive care (148/485 patients, 30.5%) (Kause et al., 2004). 
Another study found hypotension to be the third most common antecedent (14/59 patients, 23.7%) of 
an admission to an ICU (Hillman et al., 2002). 
The duration of hypotension prior to death appears to be short, given that it was present in only 8.9% 
(37/447) for the 48 hours before death but the odds ratio for risk of mortality in hypotensive patients 
during hospital is significant (OR 2.5 [1.6-4.1]) (Buist et al. , 2004) . 
In summary, although hypotension is a commonly occurring sign of patients who undergo a hospital 
death, cardiac arrest or unexpected intensive care admission, its ability to fulfil the ideal vital sign 
criteria is poor. 
2.2.4.1.3 Heart Rate 
Tachycardia is seen before unplanned admissions to intensive care (Hillman et al., 2002; Kause et al., 
2004), unexpected deaths (Hillman et al., 2001) and cardiac arrests but it is not the most common 
abnormal vital sign occurring on the ward (Harrison et al., 2005). Tachycardia is not associated with an 
increase in hospital mortality (Buist et al., 2004). Reasons behind this may include that tachycardia is a 
normal r~sponse to inadequate oxygen delivery and so may allow adequate oxygen delivery to be 
maintained, in doing so reducing the risk of organ failure and increased likelihood of death (Knaus et 
al., 19~5). 
2.2.4.1 :4 Temperature 
There is insufficient evidence to demonstrate a clear relationship between high or low temperature and 
patients being at risk from critical illness. Howeve_r, fever is a marker of infection, which is associated 
with an increase risk in hospital mortality (Osmon et al., 2003). 
2.2.4.1.5 Arterial Oxygenation 
Arterial oxygen saturation is one of the core components that determine how much oxygen is delivered 
to ti~sues and any reduction below the normal value may reflect inadequate oxygen delivery. 
Traditionally, arterial oxygenation has not been part. of the vital sign set but with the advent of portable 
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peripheral oxygen saturation monitors on wards and operating theatres, there have been calls for its 
inclusion into the classical vital sign set (Evans et al., 1999). 
The reported incidence of a low arterial oxygen saturation (<90%) varies from 51% (3215/6303) (Buist 
et al., 2004), to 31.1% (Harrison et al., 2005) in general ward patients. However, evidence that 
supports its use in detecting patient deterioration includes Cuthbertson et al (Cuthbertson et al., 2007) 
who noted that an arterial oxygen saturation <96% 48 hours prior to admission to intensive care, was a 
better discriminator in determining which high dependency patients would need intensive care than 
either heart rate or respiratory rate. Associations of low arterial oxygen saturations with unexpected 
admissions to intensive care (Goldhill et al., 1999) and unexpected death in hospital (Bowton et al., 
1994) have also been seen. 
In summary, a low arterial oxygen saturation is associated with unexpected admissions to intensive 
care and hospital deaths but its ability to detect patient deterioration depends whether an unexpected 
admission to intensive care or unexpected death is used as a marker of patient deterioration. From the 
available literature, a low arterial oxygen saturation is not as good as predicting an unexpected hospital 
death (Buist et al., 2004; Goodacre et al., 2006) as it is in predicting those that will need an admission 
to an ICU (Cuthbertson et al., 2007). 
2.2.4.2 Non Vital Sign Parameters' Ability to Recognise Patient Deterioration 
2.2.4.2.1 Mental State 
A fall in conscious level can suggest that the brain is receiving inadequate amounts of oxygen to 
function at full mental capacity. A fall in conscious level increases the risk of not being able to maintain 
an airway, which reduces the ability to allow adequate oxygen into the lungs to maintain adequate 
oxygen delivery. Direct depression of the respiratory centre can further suppress respiratory function 
and arterial oxygenation may fall leading to inadequate oxygen delivery. Thus, any change in mental 
function can suggest either oxygen delivery is inadequate or may lead to it being inadequate. 
Although the incidence of a fall in Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) is low in general ward patients (5%, 
. . 
315/6303) (Buist et al., 2004), it is a common trigger for the call out of a medical emergency team from 
intensive care (Parr et al'. , 2001 ; Bellomo et al., 2003) although not in all studies of the medical 
emergency team triggers (Konrad et al., 2010). It is a strong independent predictor of hospital mortality 
with a decrease in conscious level having an odds ratio of 6.4[2.6-15.7] (Buist et al., 2004). 
In summary, although a fall in GCS is strong independent predictor of hospital mortality, because it 
does not occur frequently it has a low sensitivity but high specificity for detecting patient deterioration. 
Therefore, it is not an ideal detector of patient deterioration. 
2.2 .. 4.2.2 Urine Output 
Urine output is frequently measured in hospital patients particularly if the patient has had a surgical 
· procedure or if there is a reason to maintain a close observation on fluid balance. As urine represents 
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the well-being or function of the kidneys, it can provide additional information to determine whether 
there is adequate oxygen delivered to the kidneys. 
In summary, there is inadequate information from studies to determine whether urine output can 
predict patient deterioration and, as it is frequently inadequately documented in hospital patients, it is 
unlikely ever to be useful. 
2.2.4.2.3 Base Excess 
The base excess and base deficit refers to an excess or deficit, respectively, in the amount of base 
present in the blood. If there is a deficiency of base in the blood, this may represent an excess of acid, 
which could be lactic acid from tissue ischaemia .. Intensive care patients with a base excess of<- 4 
had a hospital mortality of 57% and climbed to 75% if not corrected to < -2 within the next 24 hours 
(Smith et al., 2001). 
In summary, base excess is a useful tool to detect deteriorating patients but it does require an invasive 
procedure. As there is no available literature on the distribution of base excess in ward patients, its true 
ability to discriminate those patients with and without deterioration remains unknown. 
2.2.4.2.4 Presence of Pre Existing Chronic Illness 
The APACHE II system (Knaus et al., 1985) has long been used to predict death in intensive care 
patients and includes the weighting of prior illness, a common finding in unexpected ICU admissions 
(Goldhill et al., 1999), as part of its logistic regression equation. This suggests that the presence of a 
chronic illness prior to an admission to an ICU increases the likelihood of death. Of more relevance to 
ward patients, it was identified several decades ago that patients with a chronic illness are at risk of 
deterioration in hospital (Sax et al., 1987). 
In summary, underlying chronic illness in patients who are admitted from the ward to ICU is associated 
with an increase in hospital mortality and so its presence could be used to identify those patients on 
the ward who are at risk of deterioration. 
2.2.4.2.5 Advancing Age 
The APACHE II logistic regression equation for the prediction of hospital mortality in patients who have 
been admitted to ICU also includes a weighting for age (Knaus et al., 1985). A study of 9 987 ward 
patients found that for each specific derangement in physiology there was an increasing hospital 
mortality with increasing age (Smith et al., 2008). lncre~sing age was also an independent predictor of 
hospital death in patients admitted to hospital via an ambulance (Goodacre et al., 2006). 
Summarising, increasing age in patients who are admitted from the ward to ICU is associated with an 
increase in hospital mortality. Increasing age can be used to identify those patients on the ward who 
are -at risk of deterioration alongside the Frailty Index (Jones et al., 2004), which is associated with an 
increasing risk of death. 
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2.2.4.2.6 Summary 
To date there are no parameters that completely fulfil the ideal test to allow healthcare staff to detect a 
deteriorating patient. There are numerous reasons why this is the case. Vital signs do not have 
uniformly high sensitivity and specificity to detect patients with clinical deterioration. Depending on the 
vital sign patients will either be incorrectly identified as deteriorating when they are not deteriorating 
e.g. heart rate or too many deteriorating patients will be missed e.g. GCS . In the lnterventional Study, 
seven of the clinical signs described above (respiratory rate, arterial oxygen saturation, blood pressure, 
heart rate, urine output, conscious level, temperature) were used to detect patients who were 
deteriorating. 
2.2.5 Clinical Processes to Manage Patient Deterioration 
The two major clinical processes that are needed to manage patient deterioration are the ability to 
recognise patient deterioration and the ability to respond to patient deterioration. Each necessitates 
prerequisites to ensure that they occur seamlessly to reduce harm to the patient. 
2.2.5.1 Recognition of Patient Deterioration 
The prerequisites for recognising patient deterioration are the accurate and frequent vital sign 
measurement and their documentation and the ability to interpret the vital sign measurements. 
2.2.5.1.1 The Documentation of Vital Signs 
As discussed above, vital signs are not the ideal diagnostic test for patient deterioration. However, vital 
signs have been measured and documented to reassure healthcare workers that all is well (or not) with 
their patients and the documentation of vital sign measurements has become part of everyday practice 
in hospital wards. Although the accuracy of vital sign measurements, particularly respiratory rate 
remains unknown, a number of studies has found that the frequency of vital sign documentation is 
inadequate (Goldhill et al., 1999; McBride et al., 2005; Nurmi et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2009) . One 
study demonstrated that only 19% of patients had complete vital sign sets recorded 15 minutes prior to 
an extreme marker of patient deterioration (unplanned admission to intensive care, cardiac arrest and 
unexpected death) (MERIT Study Investigators, 2005) . The most commonly omitted vital sign 
measurement is the respiratory rate (Nurmi et al., 2005; Van Leuvan et al., 2008). One study has found 
that respiratory is . up to three times more likely to be missing than heart rate and systolic blood 
pressure and is the least frequently documented sign in the 24 hours prior to a medical emergency 
team call (MERIT Study Investigators, 2005). Unfortunately, many clinicians, including nursing staff 
(Considine, 2005) underestimate the importance and usefulness of respiratory rate monitoring 
(McBride et al., 2005). 
The documentation of vital signs has occurred, for decades, onto observation charts but until recently, 
there has been very little research into the design of observation charts and so many different . 
observation charts have emerged. Over the last ten years, the healthcare community has increasingly 
focussed on the ward observation chart being critical in the detection of patient deterioration. To 
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improve their effectiveness to detect patient deterioration, it has been recognised that further research 
is required to increase their ease of use and decrease the chance of clinical error and that 
standardisation of observation charts is necessary (Chatterjee et al., 2005). The limited work done in 
this area has found that there are large differences in the ability of healthcare professionals to detect 
patient deterioration and this suggests the need for consolidation of skills and retraining in 
documenting observations (Chatterjee et al., 2005). 
Although vital signs have been the mainstay of detecting patient deterioration, their documentation has 
been sub-optimal reducing their ability to detect deteriorating patients further. The main reasons for 
poor documentation can be summarised as follows: 
• Inadequate hospital policy development and dissemination for vital sign measurement and 
documentation 
• Lack of standardisation of policy for vital sign measurement and documentation from 
institution to institution 
• Inadequate review and audit of the application of the policy for vital sign measurement and 
documentation 
• Inadequate understanding of why vital sign measurement and documentation is relevant to 
patient care 
• Inadequate and confusing ward observation charts for the documentation and interpretation of 
vital signs. 
In appreciating the potential reasons for inadequate documentation of vital signs, it is possible to 
consider solutions to address these deficiencies to improve the detection of patient deterioration. 
These deficiencies are addressed through the in:iplementation of a multifaceted intervention for the 
early detection and response to the deteriorating patient, which was employed and described later in 
Chapter 5. 
2.2.5.1.2 Interpretation of Vital Signs 
It is difficult to know whether a healthcare professional can interpret a ward observation chart properly, 
as there is no adequate measure for whether an healthcare professionals is able to interpret 
observation charts. Methods used are largely reliant upon the documentation of this information, 
usually identified as concern for the patient, in the patient's clinical record and can only provide a 
surrogate for their interpretative ability. Unfortunately, documentation of any kind is often poorly 
performed and so it is likely that any recorded, relevant information in the medical record will 
underestimate the correct interpretation of the ward observation chart. 
The incidence of documenting concern by healthcare professionals over a deteriorating patient prior to 
an extreme marker of patient deterioration (death; unplanned admission to an ICU) varies depending 
on the length of study period. In the eight hours prior to admission to an ICU, the documentation of 
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concern has been reported to be 70% but dropped to 43% in the 48 hours prior to the unplanned 
intensive care admission (Hillman et al., 2002). However, in another study of unplanned admissions to 
an ICU, the concern was only documented in 25% of cases (Hillman et al., 2001). The uncertainty here 
is whether this is inadequate documentation or inadequate recognition that the patient was critically ill 
prior to the unplanned intensive care admission. Therefore, if it is argued that interpretation is the 
issue, the clarity and usefulness of nursing communication to the doctor regarding a patient's 
deterioration will be reduced (Daly et al., 2007), an issue demonstrated later as being critical in 
intervening with the deteriorating patient. 
In contrast to the above observation, it is not infrequent that patients are recognised to be unwell, as 
determined by patients being monitored and receiving oxygen (Goldhill et al., 1999), prior to any 
documented evidence on the observation chart (Goldhill et al., 1999). In part, this may be explained by 
the ability of some nurses to detect deteriorating patients by experiential intuition (Kruse et al., 1988; 
Cioffi, 2000; Day, 2003). Experiential intuition tends to rely on other criteria other than classical vital 
signs such as the patient complaining of feeling "not right" , the patient's colour changing , the patient 
being agitated or a marginal deterioration in vital signs (Cioffi, 2000). An experienced nurse's lack of 
reliance on classical vital signs may explain why medical and nursing staff are unable to agree on 
common clinical signs for the detection of deteriorating patients (Day, 2003). 
Research suggests that, in an age where both medical and nursing student and trainees spend less 
time at the bedside, experience has been identified as being critical to the detection of the deteriorating 
patient, (Kruse et al., 1988; Cioffi, 2000; Day, 2003) methods need to be used to bridge these 
deficiencies. It is likely that education has to play an increasing role in providing the skills for the 
detection of the patient at risk of critical i[lness. Indeed, detection and managing patient deterioration 
has not been, until recently, a core part of nursing or medical education education and training 
(Harrison et al., 1999; Cook et al., 2004).Education programs have now been designed solely for the 
detection and response to patient deterioration (Smith et al., 2002) including one (ACT Health, 2007) 
that was developed specifically for the use in the multifaceted intervention for the early detection and 
response· to the deteriorating patient, which was undertaken and described later in Chapter 5. 
2.2.5.2 Response to Patient Deterioration 
2.2.5.2 .. 1 Appropriate and timely communication 
Curren~ly, the traditional pathway of managing deteriorating patients is for the ward nurse to interpret 
the clinical signs, including vital signs, and symptom's and then to call for further help to ensure 
appropriate management is initiated. This usually entails the calling of a patient's doctor and for the 
doctor to review the patient to initiate appropriate management, which may include the seeking of 
advice from more experienced doctors. Unlike the frequency of measurement and documentation of 
vital signs, this traditional process is rarely part of a formal standard operating procedure or hospital 
policy_ (Day, 2003) but has become accepted practice over the last century. 
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However, there are examples that the activation of medical management in the event of patient 
deterioration is not always timely enough to ensure timely, appropriate action. One example of delayed 
activation of medical management is the delay in calling the Medical Emergency Team (MET) where 
up to 22% are delayed MET (Crispin et al., 1998; Calzavacca et al., 2010) . Nurses are the prime 
requester for METs (Parr et al., 2001) and instead of requesting a MET review, nurses are more likely 
to seek a more junior medical staff review (Crispin et al. , 1998; Buist, 2008) rather than a senior 
medical officer, including the MET (Crispin et al., 1998). This often leads to the "clinical futile cycle" in 
that there is much clinical activity but does not allow for appropriate management of the deteriorating 
patient (Buist, 2008). The reasons for nurses and junior medical doctors not calling for appropriate 
advice and help is complex and illuminates the challenges of the centuries old hospital structure and 
hierarchy. This is explored later on when groups of nurses and doctors were interviewed to understand 
these challenges. 
Cited reasons for nurses not calling a timely MET review include their need to tell themselves that they 
are doing the right thing and that they do not wish to feel like "an idiot" (Cioffi, 2000). They also fear 
retribution from the MET doctors when they arrive to review the patient (Crispin et al., 1998) and cite 
hierarchy as a major barrier to calling a MET review (Tee et al., 2008). However, there will be some 
who do not recognise the clinical urgency (McQuillan et al., 1998) and some will have inadequate 
experience to call for further help including a MET realising that it is a complex decision (Cioffi, 2000). 
At times, delays arise from the nurses' belief that the patient is inappropriate for acute resuscitation 
from the MET and instead seek advice from the patient's parent team to provide clarity on the end of 
life care. In the event they are unable to seek clarity a delayed MET review is sought (Crispin et al., 
1998). 
Reasons for inexperienced junior medical officers for delaying or not calling for more experienced 
advice are that they are also often too inexperienced to recognise the clinical urgency of the situation 
(Day, 2003), which leads to inadequate articulation of the clinical scenario that lies in front of them 
(McArthur-Rouse F, 2001) and mismanagement (McGloin et al., 1997) of the deteriorating patient. For 
junior medical officers to call for help, they need a constructive relationship with their supervisor. In the 
absence of a constructive -relationship, junior medical officers are reluctant to call for help for concern 
over their evaluation and assessment if they believe it is a clinical skill that they should have mastered 
at their ·level (Kennedy et al., 2009). Other non~clinical reasons is the lack of physical proximity and 
availability of the supervisor, the desire for the trainee to be independent clinicians and believing that 
they db not need help, exacerbated by their lack _of expertise to realise ttiat they do need help (Day, 
2003; Kennedy et al., 2009). A suggested framework for improving communication for junior medical 
officers with their supervisors has been developed but not tested (Kennedy et al., 2009) during this 
thesis as it was deemed too big, which in hindsight was an error. The framework includes: 
1. Planning before calling for help 
2. Targeting the questions appropriately 
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3. Providing the junior medical officer with an explicit scope of practice 
4. Increasing the numbers of times of day that supervisors and trainees meet and improve 
proximity 
Delays in a medical review by a ward doctor or MET may also be due to nursing reports on patients 
being inadequate. This can result in an inability to convey the seriousness of the patient's situation to 
the medical staff and therefore the patient is deemed a lower priority by the medical staff (Day, 2003), 
which delays initiating appropriate management. Other factors that might influence whether doctors 
call for expert critical care help or not is the perceived or real lack of intensive care beds (Goldhill et al., 
1999) such that they believe it to be a worthless task in seeking further guidance. 
The clinical process for managing patient deterioration has multiple deficiencies and includes the 
usage of vital signs, which may not allow accurate detection of patient deterioration, the inadequacy of 
documentation of vital signs, the inadequacy of knowledge and experience to interpret vital signs and 
poor communication, both in timeliness and content. A solution to these many deficiencies was trialled 
in the lnterventional Study described in Chapter 5. 
2.2.6 Systems for Recognising and Responding to Deteriorating Patients 
As outlined above, the process for the detection and response to patient deterioration is complex. 
Systems to improve this process are likely to be multifaceted (McQuillan et al., 1998) so that any 
advances in the care of deteriorating patients would not only improve the state in which patients arrive 
in the ICU (McQuillan et al., 1998) but also reduce the mortality of patients before and after intensive 
care (Bion, 1995). Although there has been no globally accepted system~ national frameworks for the 
management of patient deterioration have begun to appear (Department of Health, 2001; Australian 
Commission for Quality and Safety in Healthcare, 2010) . 
The following paragraphs summarise the interventions that have occurred to date to improve the 
recognition and response to patient deterioration. The interventions, have tried to accommodate and 
improve the deficiencies in the clinical processes involved in the management of the deteriorating 
patient. 
2.2.6.1 Documentation of Vital Signs 
The mo.nitoring of a patient's well-being using vital sign documentation has been recognised as a 
vulnerable part of the rapid response process for the management of the deteriorating patient (Institute 
for Healthcare Improvement, 2005). This has been identified in a number of studies (Goldhill et al., 
1999; McBride et al., 2005; Nurmi et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2009) . 
Until recently, most efforts aimed at improving the detection and response to patient deterioration have 
not directly targeted the improvement of documentation of vital sign measurements. In particular, little 
research ·has been carried out to determine the best design for a ward observation chart to detect 
patient deterioration. However, one study has suggested the following attributes of an "ideal" ward 
observation chart for the detection of patient deterioration (Chatterjee et al., 2005): 
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• Temperature points should always be joined together and not obscured 
• Heart rate values should be joined together if to be written on the same axis as blood 
pressure 
• Values should be joined together in a straight line 
• Record percentage of inspired oxygen 
• Respiratory rate should not be approximated and be plotted and written 
• All values should be plotted 
These suggestions for the design of an observation chart were considered for the lnterventional Study. 
More recently, based on an Australian human factor research group (Horswill et al., 2009), the 
Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care has published a framework for 
developing observation charts (Australian Commission for Quality and Safety in Healthcare, 2010) . 
This work allows the healthcare staff cognitive abilities to match the chart development. These 
attributes should enhance the ease of documentation of vital signs and their interpretation. 
From the literature, it would appear that any system that attempts to improve the detection and 
response to deteriorating patients, increases the documentation of vital signs, including respiratory rate 
(McBride et al., 2005; Mitchell et al., 2010) but respiratory rate to a lesser extent in some cases (Chen 
et al., 2009). What drives the increase is unclear but the need to assign a score for each individual vital 
sign according to its degree of derangement (the modified early warning score) (Morgan et al. , 1997) 
appears to be associated with an improvement in the documentation of vrral signs (Dobbs et al. , 2002; 
Ryan et al., 2004; Odell et al., 2007). The documentation appears to improve further if introduced with 
associated teaching for the calculation of Modified Early Warning Score (MEWS) (McBride et al. , 2005; 
Mitchell et al. , 2010). Other modalities that have been used to improve the documentation of vital signs 
are various hand held devices to record the vital sign digitally .(Patientrack, 2006; Smith et al. , 2006; 
Jones et al., 2011). 
Although there are technologies available to monitor patients continuously and remotely from their 
ward bed (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2009), removing the need for nurses or nursing assistants 
to measure and document the vital signs, these technologies are still in development. Mathematical 
prediction systems have also been developed to interrogate data from continuously monitored patients 
on the ward or step down units to -allow for earlier detection of patients risk of critical illness but these 
have not been used outside of their developmental sites (Hravnak et al. , 2008) and do not necessarily 
decr~ase the lead time to clinically useful levels (Tarassenko et al., 2006). 
The above examples suggest that any system that uses vital signs to trigger a medical review of a 
dete·riora~ing patient needs to focus its efforts on improving the documentation of vital signs. It is likely 
that the system will need to provide an understanding why staff measure and document vital signs, 
and install either a paper chart that is easy to use and can readily detect a patient's deterioration, or a 
digital system that can do the same things. 
41 
2.2.6.2 Specific Deteriorating Patient Education 
Although there have long been courses available for managing patients who have had a cardiac arrest 
(Resuscitation Council (UK), 2008; Australian Resuscitation Council, 2010), it is only in the last decade 
that there have been education programs dedicated to deteriorating patients (Smith et al., 2002; ACT 
Health, 2007; Buist et al., 2007; NSW Clinical Excellence Commission, 2010). The development of 
these education programs is probably important in light of the reduction in the hours that healthcare 
professionals are currently by the bedside. Reduction in clinical exposure to deteriorating patients has 
been demonstrated to be an important contributor to detecting deteriorating patients (Kruse et al., 
1988; Cioffi, 2000; Day, 2003) and training and education may fill this void . 
The courses are mostly similar in content and mode of delivery. The majority are aimed at all 
healthcare professionals (Smith et al., 2002; DeVita et al., 2005; ACT Health, 2007; NSW Clinical 
Excellence Commission, 2010) but some have a greater emphasis on patient management rather than 
detection of the deteriorating patient (Smith et al., 2002; DeVita et al., 2005; Buist et al., 2007). Some 
of the programs require attendees to participate for a day (Smith et al., 2002; Buist et al., 2007) whilst 
others are more flexible, varying both the content and the time required to suit the delivery environment 
and the type of healthcare professional being taught (ACT Health, 2007; NSW Clinical Excellence 
Commission, 2010). Although some of these education programs have been part of a multifaceted 
intervention to facilitate the detection and response to patient deterioration (Buist et al. , 2002; Buist et 
al. , 2007; Mitchell et al., 2010), it is not possible to determine the extent that education played on the 
outcomes of these studies. As yet, many of the programs have not been adapted for undergraduate 
education, which is an issue as it has been identified that fifth year medical students, the last year in an 
undergraduate medical program, do not have the skills to allow them to identify and manage 
deteriorating patients safely (Harrison et al., 1999). Essential building blocks include an understanding 
of the pathophysiology of the patient at critical illness and is as important for nurses (Considine, 2005) 
as it is for doctors. 
Indirect education on the recognition of the deteriorating patient has probably occurred through the 
introduction of systems that facilitate the recognition and response to deteriorating patients. These 
systems include the introduction of a MET (Hourihan et al., 1995; Lee et al., 1995; Bristow et al. , 2000; 
Bellomo et al., 2003; Bellomo et al., 2004; DeVita et al., 2004; MERIT Study Investigators, 2005; 
Konrad et al., 2010), early warning scores (Morgan et al., 1997; Day, 2003) and critical care outreach 
teams (Priestley et al. , 2004). All have introduced the Pi:ltient deterioration systems with some training, 
the content of which inevitably includes subject matter pertaining to the deteriorating patient. The time 
alloc~ted for the delivery of the education as well as the audience of the education has varied between 
studies, and the education programs have had varying degrees of success in ensuring that the content 
reaches awide range of health care workers and knowledge maintained. 
An often neglected part of any healthcare education curriculum has been the provision of a structure to 
help communicate meaningfully to peers and other healthcare professionals. This is particularly crucial 
when the time for a doctor to review a deteriorating patient is limited. This means that the person 
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receiving the information needs to understand the information delivered and its urgent nature. One 
method utilised for structuring communication between healthcare professionals for situational briefing 
has been the adaptation of a military and aviation industries method, the "SBAR" (Situation, 
Background, Assessment and Recommendation) method. This method allows for the description of the 
current situation, the background to the situation, the assessment by the healthcare practitioner and 
the recommendation made by the healthcare practitioner. The original adaptation for healthcare was 
by Kaiser Permanente in Colorado, USA (Leonard et al., 2004) and used in a general health care 
setting and provided a standardised communication process for healthcare professionals. More 
recently, it has been embedded into education programs for the recognition of the deteriorating patient 
(Day, 2003; ACT Health, 2007; NSW Clinical Excellence Commission, 2010) and systems to improve 
the recognition and response to the deteriorating patient (Daly et al., 2007). 
2.2.6.3 Detection of Patient Deterioration 
The introduction of deteriorating patient education programs (Smith et al., 2002; ACT Health, 2007; 
Buist et al., 2007; NSW Clinical Excellence Commission, 2010) and systems to facilitate the 
recognition and response to a deteriorating patient (Hourihan et al., 1995; Lee et al., 1995; Morgan et 
al., 1997; Bristow et al., 2000; Bellomo et.al., 2003; Day, 2003; Bellomo et al., 2004; DeVita et al., 
2004; Priestley et al., 2004; MERIT Study Investigators, 2005; Konrad et al., 2010) are likely to 
improve the interpretation of vital signs required to detect patient deterioration. The difficulty is being 
able to identify definitively that these education programs facilitate the understanding of vital signs, as 
there is only a surrogate marker, the occurrence of timely and appropriate intervention and 
documented in the clinical record. 
2.2.6.3.1 Early Warning Scores 
With the advent of a diminishing exposure to clinical experiences in the United Kingdom through the 
European Working Directive, efforts have been made to simplify the interpretation of vital signs. An 
early warning score was developed to help nurses and doctors to identify patients at risk of developing 
critical illness (Morgan et al., 1997) and subsequently modified by various institutions in the United 
Kingdom (Stenhouse et al., 1999; Subbe et al., 2001; Day, 2003; Pittard, 2003; Subbe et al., 2003; 
Odell et al., 2007) (Appendix A). 
The early warning scores are derived from scoring individual vital signs according to their degree of 
derangement from "normal" values. The individual scores are then totalled for each set of observations 
and the higher the score, the greater the likelihood of developing critical illness (Goldhill et al., 2005) . 
On this basis, those healthcare professionals taking the vital sign sets do not necessarily need to 
interpret deranged vital signs or have any experience of recognising patients at risk of critical illness. 
Instead, a simpler approach is to understand that the higher the early warning score, the sicker the 
patient and the necessity for further medical intervention. It also allows healthcare professionals to 
track _ deterioration or improvement in the patient's condition and should a certain score be 
experienced, as set out by hospital policies, it should trigger the nurse at the bedside to activate an 
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appropriate management pathway as determined by hospital policy. These policies often determine 
that a medical review is required, the level of medical review required, the frequency of vital sign 
measurements and whether a patient requires an escort to an area outside of the ward area e.g . to 
medical imaging (ACT Health, 2007). 
As stated previously, early warning scores improve the often inadequate frequency of documentation 
of vital signs and reduce the time for a medical review of a deteriorating patient (Day, 2003). The 
scores also provide substantiating evidence for nurses to call doctors for a further medical review 
(Andrews et al., 2005). Advantages of this system also include a policy that avoids the need to rely on 
medical hierarchy to ensure that a more experienced doctor review the patient should the need arise. 
Nursing staff can call for an experienced doctor if a patient reaches a high enough score, and in doing 
so reduce the time for a more experienced doctor to review the patient. 
However, little research has been conducted to determine the effect of early warning scores on patient 
outcome. One study demonstrated a significant improvement in hospital mortality (Pittard, 2003) with 
the use of early warning scores but is a small before and after study and the results difficult to interpret 
in light of the risk of regression to the mean (Moran et al., 2005). One other study failed to demonstrate 
a difference in hospital mortality with the introduction of early warning scores (Subbe et al., 2003). 
The reasons for early warning scores not impacting upon hospital patient mortality appreciably are 
multiple. An early warning score necessitates the measurement and documentation of a full set of 
observations, a task that has already been identified as vulnerable. Superimposed on this task is the 
correct assignment of the score for each individual sign and subsequent summation of the scores to 
reach a correct total early warning score. Indeed, some staff claim that this work is too onerous. 
Evidence suggests that early warning scores are frequently inaccurate (Prytherch et al., 2006; Smith et 
al., 2006) but that the accuracy improves with recording the vital sign values into a personal hand held 
device for the computer calculation of the score (Prytherch et al., 2006). Interestingly, a recent analysis 
of whether it was nurses' assignment of the individual scores or the ability to summate the individual 
scores found that it was the assignment of the individual scores not their ability to summate the 
individual scores (Edwards et al., 2010). This may be amenable to further education and training. 
All the .early warning scoring systems appear to lack sensitivity; thereby patients who are likely to be at 
risk of critical illness are not detected (Cuthbertson et al., 2007; Gao et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2008). 
An example of this lack of sensitivity is a review of 2568 medical patients, where 26 patients underwent 
a card\ac arrest, but only 6 (23.1%) had early warning criteria (Rothschild et al., 2010).. This may 
explain why early warning scores have not improved outcome of ward patients as they are not either 
identifying deteriorating patients early enough, or at all. New early warning score systems have been 
developed to try to improve their sensitivity and specificity (Cuthbertson et al., 2007; Cuthbertson et al., 
2010) but are probably not suitable as bedside tools unless used with a personal hand held device, as 
they are too complex and time consuming. More recently, simplification of an early warning score 
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(ViEWS™) has been successfully undertaken by reducing the number of variables and has both high 
sensitivity and specificity for determining those patients likely to die (Prytherch et al., 2010). 
Despite the inadequate data for or against early warning scores, there have been calls for caution over 
their general use (Cuthbertson et al., 2007; Fletcher et al., 2010) in the face of national calls for their 
widespread introduction in some countries (National Confidential Enquiry into Patient Outcome and 
Death, 2005). The risk of using early warning scores is that staff may be further deskilled in their 
. interpretation of vital signs by relying on a summative score of vital sign derangements rather than 
interpreting each individual sign. Equally, early warning scores may not necessarily imply an early 
appropriate response. 
2.2.6.3.2 Rapid Response Teams 
A different approach to the early warning score track and trigger system, which depends upon ward 
staff triggering a "parent team" medical review to ensure adequate management of the deteriorating 
patient, is bringing a critically care trained rapid response team to the ward patient (Lee et al., 1995; 
Goldhill et al., 1999; DeVita et al., 2004; Priestley et al., 2004; Daly et al., 2007). This approach, 
developed in the late 1980s, was in response to inadequately trained, inexperienced ward staff caring 
for the acutely unwell patient. Rapid response teams are called to the ward following a specific single 
physiological criterion being met or if ward staff are worried about a patient that does not fulfil specific 
criteria. Of the many systems used (Gold hill et al., 1999; Bristow et al., 2000; Parr et al. , 2001; Buist et 
al., 2002; Bellomo et al., 2003; Bellomo et al., 2004; DeVita et al., 2004; MERIT Study Investigators, 
2005; Buist et al., 2007; Santamaria et al., 2010) most have based their tdggers on those used by Lee 
et al (Lee et al., 1995) (Appendix B) . 
These triggers, like the early warning scores, have a low sensitivity and may not provide adequate 
confiderice for all deteriorating patients to be identified (Smith et al., 2008). 
The philosophy behind a rapid response team is to provide early critical care intervention in response 
to a physiological abnormality, which might prevent further deterioration (MERIT Study Investigators, 
2005) and improve functional outcome or mortality rate of ward patients (Garcea et al., 2004). The 
rapid response team may· also provide other roles, including education of ward staff, review of the 
management of deteriorating patients in institutions, and feedback through review systems to advance 
patient care and end of life decisions (Parr et al., 2001 ). 
Similar'to the early warning score, ·the introduction of a-trigger system, albeit a single trigger, removes 
the need for ward staff to understand the reasoning behind the derangement of the vital sign(s) and 
whether or not further intervention is required. It also provides a mechanism to override the ward 
medical hierarchy to ensure experienced medical and nursing staff review and manage the patient at 
risk ·of critical illness. However, ward staff probably under call for a MET review (MERIT Study 
Investigators, 2005) because of the perceived fear of retribution from the medical staff (Cioffi, 2000) 
and inadequate education (Jones et al., 2006). These cultural barriers have probably been 
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underestimated and need to be addressed if a rapid response team system is to be installed into an 
institution (DeVita et al., 2004) with a positive outcome. 
Early studies of the rapid response teams on clinically meaningful outcomes (unexpected cardiac 
arrests, hospital deaths and unplanned admissions to intensive care) demonstrated significant 
reductions in these events (Lee et al., 1995; Buist et al. , 2002; Bellomo et al. , 2003; Bellomo et al. , 
2004). These studies were often criticised for being single centre, before-and-after studies (Moran et 
al., 2005) and to answer critics multi centre studies were conducted (Bristow et al., 2000; MERIT Study 
Investigators, 2005). These failed to demonstrate a significant difference in their primary measure, 
namely the number of hospital deaths or a composite measure of unexpected cardiac arrests, hospital 
deaths and unplanned admissions to intensive care. In the largest trial , the MERIT study (MERIT Study 
Investigators, 2005), a cluster randomised controlled trial of hospitals randomised to establishing a 
MET or delivering care as usual, failed to identify a significant difference in the primary outcome (a 
composite number of the incidence of cardiac arrests without a pre-existing do not resuscitate order, 
unplanned intensive care admissions and unexpected deaths defined as deaths without a pre-existing 
do not resuscitate order. The reasons for this include an under calling of MET and the fact that the 
study was underpowered. There is now a number of longitudinal studies of METs installed into 
hospitals, which are able to demonstrate over time, an improved outcome for deteriorating patients 
(Buist et al., 2007; Jones et al., 2007; Santamaria et al. , 2010). These results have been supported by 
a recent systematic review of the randomised trials (Chan et al. , 2010). However, the longitudinal 
studies, stress the importance of on-going teaching and education on the utilisation of the MET (Buist 
et al., 2007; Jones et al., 2007; Santamaria et al., 2010) and it may also be important to develop 
triggers specific to institutions to improve the outcome of patients at risk (Konrad et al., 2010). 
The instalment of rapid response systems into institutions undoubtedly improves the understanding of 
deteriorating patients (Bellomo et al., 2003), the documentation of vital signs (Chen et al., 2009) and 
not for resuscitation status (Chen et al., 2008). Rapid response systems also provide a means for ward 
staff to engage experienced medical practitioners to care for the deteriorating patients that they might 
otherwise feel reluctant in doing (Cioffi, 2000; Cooper, 2001). The success of a rapid response system 
resides in changing the culture of an institution to ensure an adequate number of calls to achieve the 
best from the system as it is recognised a·critical number of calls made per 1000 hospital admissions 
provides most benefit to patients (Chen et al., 2009). 
The major challenge for rapid response systems is to hqve a political, legal and an economic climate to 
allow intensive care providers to direct the care of patients on medical and surgical wards 
indep_endently and effectively (Szalados, 2004). If all these were a given, the sustainability for these 
systems is through good governance and expert leadership (Daly et al. , 2007; Hillman, 2008; 
Santamaria et al. , 2010). 
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2.2.6.3.3 Other Patient Deterioration Trigger Systems 
A neural network signal for patient deterioration using continuous monitoring of vital signs (heart rate, 
blood pressure, respiratory rate and arterial saturation) has detected deteriorating patients on average 
6.3 hours earlier than standard MET trigger criteria (Hravnak et al., 2008). Whilst this is important 
information, continuous monitoring is not standard practice on general wards. 
2.2.7 Summary 
Despite the lack of an agreed definition of the deteriorating patient, much work has been done over the 
last twenty years to improve the process of care delivered to deteriorating patients in general. These 
changes include the development of human factor designed observation charts, specific deteriorating 
patient education and the introduction of systems to facilitate the interpretation of abnormal vital signs 
and bringing about a more timely medical review. Some of these developments have eventuated since 
the commencement of the work in this thesis and some have been picked up in the lnterventional 
Study. The identification of the interventions needed for improving the management of patient 
deterioration at the Canberra Hospital was elucidated from performing a small observational study of 
deteriorating patients, which picked out the major deficiencies in the clinical processes. This 
Observational Study is described in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODS 
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3.1 Project Design 
3.2 Purpose of the Project 
1. To improve the understanding of the processes involved in the care of the deteriorating 
patient 
2. To examine the effect of a deteriorating patient intervention on clinical processes and patient 
outcome 
3. To determine if the effects of a deteriorating patient intervention are sustainable 
3.3 Project Structure 
This chapter describes the methods used in examining the human behaviour of healthcare 
professionals managing patient deterioration and measuring the outcome of adult patients who were 
admitted to acute general hospital wards following the initial and subsequent introduction of a 
deteriorating patient solution. It · explains the experimental design, using both qualitative and 
quantitative methodology, to understand the three foundations of the thesis (improve the 
understanding of the clinical processes and influences involved in managing patient deterioration, 
examining the effect of a deteriorating patient intervention on clinical processes and patient outcome 
and determining if the effects of a deteriorating patient intervention are sustainable) and is answered 
by undertaking five projects: 
i. An observational study of patient deterioration: "The Observational Study" 
ii. A prospective, before and after multifaceted intervention study for recognising and responding 
to patient deterioration: "The lnterventional Study" 
iii. A qualitative study to understand behavioural changes with the multifaceted intervention: "The 
Behavioural Study" 
iv. Are changes to behaviour and patient outcome sustainable in everyday clinical practice? "The 
Sustainability Study": 
v: The human element of managing patient deterioration: "The Human Element Study". 
Details ,df the specific methods used for each project are contained at the beginning of each relevant 
chapter. 
3.3.1 An Observational Study of Patient Deterioration: "The Observational Study" 
The aim of this study was to provide a baseline of which clinical processes were undertaken at The 
Canberra Hospital in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) for recognising and responding to patient 
deterioration. To establish baseline data, a retrospective observational study was undertaken on all 
patients undergoing a medical emergency team (MET) review in one month at the Canberra Hospital. 
The MET review identifies a deteriorating patient and the study investigated the management of a 
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deteriorating patient up to the moment a patient deteriorated. Data collected included the frequency of 
documentation of vital signs, the communication processes and hospital outcome. 
3.3.2 A Prospective Controlled, Before and After Multifaceted Intervention Trial for 
Recognising and Responding to Patient Deterioration: "The lnterventional Study" 
In assimilating baseline data for patient deterioration from the observational study a multifaceted 
intervention was chosen that encapsulated all the available solutions from the literature at the time and 
trialled at the Canberra Hospital and Calvary Healthcare ACT. The study undertaken was a 
prospective before and after multifaceted intervention trial in two wards at The Canberra Hospital and 
two wards at Calvary Hospital in the ACT. Data collected included the frequency of documentation of 
vital signs, the timeliness of communication following patient deterioration and clinically meaningful 
outcomes such as unexpected admissions to intensive care, unexpected hospital deaths and 
unexpected cardiac arrests. This study differs from previously published studies by encapsulating all 
elements of the available deteriorating patient solutions into its intervention. 
3.3.3 A Qualitative Study to Understand Behavioural Changes with the Multifaceted 
Intervention: "The Behavioural Study" 
In any multifaceted interventional study aimed at changing the behaviour of healthcare workers, it is 
difficult to determine which element(s) of the multifaceted intervention is believed by the healthcare 
workers to have influenced their behaviour. The study involved the interviewing of healthcare workers 
who had experienced the multifaceted intervention. In-depth, semi _ structured interviews were 
conducted using open-ended, one-on-one interviews using a semi flexible interview guide. The 
transcripts were analysed for emergent themes using the grounded theory method whereby 
progressive coding phases (open and axial) occurred. The final coding structure was applied to the 
datasets and a model of why behaviour changed following the implementation of the multifaceted 
intervention was generated. 
3.3.4 .Are Changes to Behaviour and Patient Outcomes Sustainable? 
Engaging clinicians and embedding patient safety strategies into everyday practice has proved to be 
extremely difficult and is now the focus of a number of patient safety agencies (Reinertsen et al., 2007; 
lmprovement4Health, 2008; Healthcare Improvement Scotland, 2012) . The aim of this study was to 
determine whether the improvement in behaviour and patient outcome seen immediately following the 
multifaceted intervention for patient deterioration were sustained two years later. The study was a 
retrospective observational study in the two original pilot wards at the Canberra Hospital in ACT. Data 
collected included the frequency of documentation of vital signs, the timeliness of communication 
following patient deterioration and clinically meaningful outcomes such as unexpected admissions to 
intensive care, unexpected hospital deaths and unexpected cardiac arrests. This study differs from 
previously published longitudinal studies as all elements of the process of managing patient 
deterioration are included. 
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3.3.5 The Human Element of Managing Patient Deterioration: "The Human Element 
Study" 
Whilst systems have been designed to improve patient care in the healthcare workplace, it is unknown 
whether the healthcare workers can use these systems to deliver what was intended. The deteriorating 
patient literature suggests that well intentioned systems have not always been taken up by the 
healthcare workers. If deteriorating patient care is to improve it is essential to try and get a better 
understanding of why healthcare workers act and behave in the way that they do when confronted with 
a deteriorating patient. This study engaged four focus groups (nursing, senior medical officers, junior 
medical officers, combined group) to explore and understand what affects healthcare professionals to 
manage deteriorating patients appropriately. I used Alice's mother's story as the springboard for free 
flowing discussion to try and understand why the child was allowed to deteriorate to the extent an 
unplanned admission to the ICU was required . The focus groups were allowed to continue their 
discussions until there was no new information forthcoming. Grounded theory was utilised to analyse 
the data. Interviews were analysed for emergent themes using the grounded theory method whereby 
progressive coding phases (open and axial) occurred. The final coding structure was applied to the 
datasets and a model of the influences on healthcare professionals in managing patient deterioration 
was generated. 
3.4 Statistical Analyses 
All statistical tests were two-tailed. P-values <0.05 were used to indicate statistical significance. 
Descriptive statistics are presented using medians and interquartile ranges where data were skewed or 
as means standard deviations, counts and percentages. Comparisons of binomial proportions between 
two nominal periods were performed using the Pearson Chi squared statistic or Fisher's Exact Test 
where the numbers were small. Odds-ratios for each pre- to- post intervention comparison and their 
95% confidence interval (Cl) are reported. Adjusted analysis for sensitivity purposes was undertaken 
using multivariate logistic regression analysis adjusted for strata used in minimization, i.e. age. 
Hospital length of stay between the two periods was compared using a log rank test. The relationships 
between hospital outcome, the multifaceted intervention and other variables were determined using a 
multiple logistic regression analysis model ·using hospital outcome as the response variable. Patients 
who died were censored at the time of death. For comparing three time period group ordinals, one way 
analysis of variance (AN OVA) with post hoc Bonferroni correction was used. If the overall three sample 
log-rank test was statistically significant post-hoc comparisons between the pre- and each post-
intervention period were compared using a two sample log rank test and analyses were adjusted for 
the same predictors as the primary outcome and were based on a linear, logistic or Cox regression as 
appropriate. STAT A/IC 10 and SPSS v19.0.1 computer statistical packages were used in the analyses. 
Each of the five projects was approved by ACT Health . Human Research Ethics Committee. Patient 
consent was waived, in accordance with National Health and Medical Research Council (NMHMRC) 
51 
Audit Guidelines but consent was gained from healthcare workers who were interviewed for the 
qualitative studies. 
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CHAPTER 4: AN OBSERVATIONAL 
STUDY OF PATIENT 
DETERIORATION 
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4.1 Introduction 
The key to understanding the clinical processes of managing a deteriorating patient was to determine 
the key elements of the clinical processes occurring in the environment at Canberra Hospital in which 
potential solutions for improving deteriorating patient care would be tested. 
4.2 Aim 
To delineate the key clinical processes occurring prior to patient deterioration as detected by the 
patient undergoing a MET review. 
4.3 Method 
A retrospective, observational inception cohort study was performed on patients undergoing a MET 
review during a one month period. 
4.3.1 Setting 
The Canberra Hospital. 
4.3.2 Clinical Processes for the Recognition and Response to Patient Deterioration 
4.3.2.1 The Ward Observation Chart 
Vital signs were documented graphically with up to three variables being_ superimposed on the y-axis 
with different scales for each variable. They were placed without reference to relationships to each 
other on the ward observation chart (Appendix C). There were no hospital policies relating to frequency 
of measurement and documentation of vital signs other than for patients with an epidural catheter in-
situ (hourly), patients receiving patient controlled analgesia (hourly) and patients undergoing recent 
surgery (hourly for six hours following the intervention). 
4.3.2.2 Medical Review and Management 
There was an informal two tiered medical response to patient deterioration. In the first response, ward 
nursing staff requested review by the patient's team of doctors. In the second response, a MET was 
activated once the patient fulfilled specific calling criteria (MERIT Study Investigators, 2005). After the 
MET review, if the patient was not admitted to a critical care area, the care was handed back to the 
patient's team of doctors with an appropriate verbal and written handover and suggestions on further 
care . . 
4.3.3 Study Period and Subjects 
An apriori decision was made to undertake the observational study during a one month period. All 
adult 'patients who were admitted to The Canberra Hospital and underwent a MET review were 
studied. 
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4.3.4 Data Collection 
Data collected included patient demographic data and whether they were admitted as a medical or 
surgical patient. All study patients were followed up until death or hospital discharge. Unexpected 
deaths were determined by the absence of a limitation order for resuscitation . During follow up length 
of hospital stay was recorded . Data collection also included all vital sign measurements, 
communication episodes between nursing and medical staff and whether the patient had triggered 
specific physiological MET criteria in the 24 hours prior to the MET review. Physiological triggers 
reached prior to the actual MET being called were deemed "delayed MET reviews". The physiological 
trigger type and the MET review outcome were also collected. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Patient Demographics 
During the study period , 34 patients underwent 45 MET reviews. Patients were predominantly male 
(19/34, 55.9%) and most usually admitted as a medical patient (20/34, 58.8%) and as an emergency 
admission (27/34, 79.4%). Their median length of stay was 7.3 days (IQR 1.8 to 27.1 days) and the 
hospital mortality rate was 26.5% (9/34), including three were unexpected deaths, Table 3. 
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Table 3: Patient Demographics of 34 Patients undergoing a MET Review 
Total Number of Patients 34 
Total Number of Hospital Deaths 9 (26.5%) 
Unexpected Hospital Deaths 3 (8.8%) 
Gender: Male 19 (55.9%) 
Age, years (IQR) 70 (50.3, 77.0) 
Median Length of Hospital Stay (IQR) 7.3 days (1.8, 27.1) 
Elective Admission 7 (20.6%) 
Emergency Admission 27 (79.4%) 
Medical Admission 20 (58.8) 
Surgical Admission 14 (41.2%) 
Table 4: Vital Sign Measurements of 34 Patients undergoing a MET Review 
Vital Sign Measurement per Day 
Blood Pressure 9.2 (4.8, 18.3) 
Heart Rate 9.1 (4.3, 31.6) -
Temperature 2.8 (0.1, 7.2) 
SpO2 8.5 (1.4, 15.1) 
Respiratory Rate 1.6 (0.0, 7.1) 
4.4.2 Documentation of Frequency of Observations 
Differe11ces in the frequency of documentation for different vital signs in the 24 hours prior to a MET 
review w_ere found. The most frequently documented vital sign measurement was blood pressure (9.2 
[IQR 4.3 to 18.3] measurements/day) and the least documented vital sign measurement was 
respiratory rate (1 .6 [IQR 0.0 to 7.1] measurements/day)', Table 4. 
4.4.3 MET Reviews 
' Of the 45 MET reviews, the commonest trigger was a fall in the GCS of more than two points (13/45, 
28.9%) fol_lowed by a systolic blood pressure of< 90 mmHg (8/45, 7.8%), Table 5. The majority of MET 
reviews occurred out of hours (31/45, 68.9%). The death of a patient occurred during the time of four 
MET reviews (8.9%) but a further five patients died subsequently and prior to hospital discharge of 
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which three were unexpected deaths, Table 3. In over half of the MET reviews, the patient remained 
on the ward (26/45, 57.7%) but 15 patients were transferred to critical care areas (11 to the coronary 
care unit, 4 to the ICU), Table 5. Eight patients underwent multiple MET reviews, the majority occurring 
out of hours (15/19, 79%). An increase in the number of MET reviews was associated with increased 
hospital mortality (One Review: hospital mortality 5/26, 19.2% [1 unexpected]; Two reviews: hospital 
mortality 2/5, 40% [2 unexpected]; Three reviews: hospital mortality 2/3, 66.7% [none unexpected]), 
Table 6. 
Table 5: Medical Emergency Team Reviews of 34 Patients 
Number of MET Reviews 
Total Number of MET Reviews 45 
Incidence of Triggers for MET Call 
Fall in GCS >2 13 (28.9%) 
Systolic Blood Pressure< 90 mmHg 8 (17.8%) 
Worried 6 (13.3%) 
Cardiac arrest 6 (13.3%) 
Airway threatened 6 (13.3%) 
Heart rate <40 beats per minute 2 (4.4%) 
Respiratory rate >36 breaths per minute 1 (2.2%) 
-
Respiratory arrest 3 (6.7%) 
Outcome of MET review 
Remained on ward 26 (57.8%) 
Transferred to coronary care unit 11 (24.4%) 
Transferred to ICU 4 (8.9%) 
Died at MET calls 4 (8.9%) 
Table 6: Number of Medical Emergency Team Reviews of 34 Patients and Hospital Outcome 
MET reviews/patient Number of Patients Hospital Deaths Unexpected Deaths 
One 26 5 (19.2%) 1 
Two 5 2 (40%) 2 
Three 3 2 (66.7%) 0 
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4.4.4 Delayed MET Review 
Twelve of the 45 MET reviews (26.7%) were delayed with a median delay of 4.77 hours and 10 (83%) 
of these occurred out of hours. The most commonly "ignored" trigger was a systolic blood pressure of 
<90 mmHg (8/12, 66.7%). Prior communication between the patient's doctors, including the patient's 
consultant on two occasions, and the patient's ward nursing staff was associated with a delayed MET 
review (prior communication episodes: delayed METs 11/12, 91 .7% and non-delayed METs 18/33, 
54.5%, p=0.03) . The hospital mortality for patients undergoing a delayed MET review was high (5/11, 
45.5%) and two were unexpected deaths, Table 7. 
Table 7: Delayed MET Reviews of 34 Patients Undergoing 45 MET Reviews 
Delayed MET Review Non Delayed MET Review 
Number of MET Reviews (No. of Patients) 12 (11) 33 (23) 
Out of Hours MET Review 9 (75%) 21 (63.6%) 
Number of Patients Died 5 (45.6%) 4 (17.4%) 
Number of Unexpected Deaths 2 (18.2%) 1 (4.3%) 
Median Delay (hours) 4.77 (0.91 , 8.47) Not Applicable 
Prior Communication 11 (91.7%) 18 (54.5%)* 
Median Number of Communications 2 (1, 3) 1 (0, 2) 
Consultant Communication 3 (25%) 5-(15.2%) 
*p<0.05 
4.4.5 Communication Prior to MET Review 
In 16 of the 45 MET reviews (35.6%), there was no documented. communication between the patient's 
doctors and nurses prior to a MET review but only one was a delayed MET review, Table 8. In the 
remaining·29 MET reviews, the most frequent communicator was the nurse (37 calls prior to 22 MET 
reviews) and the most frequent recipient of communication was the intern or resident (24 calls prior to 
13 MET reviews), Table 9. The consultant caring for the patient prior to a MET review was consulted 
on the telephone on only eight (17.8%)' occasions (Table 8). This did not appear to be related to the 
day or the time of day or whether the patient died, or if the death was unexpected. 
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Table 8: Documented Evidence of Communication 24 hours prior to a Medical Emergency Team 
Review in 34 patients undergoing 45 MET reviews 
No Communication Communication 
Number of MET Reviews (No. Patients) 16 (16) 29 (18) 
Number of Deaths 3 (18 .8%) 6 (33.3%) 
Number of Unexpected Deaths 0 3 (16.7%) 
Delayed MET Review 1 (6.3%) 11 (24.4%)* 
Out of Hours MET review 9 (56.3%) 22 (75.9%) 
Home Consultant Communication 0 8 (17.8%) 
*p<0.05 
Table 9: Communication between Hospital Staff 24 hours Prior to Medical Emergency Team 
Review in 34 patients undergoing 45 MET reviews 
Source of Nurse JMO Ward ICU Specialist Total 
Communication Registrar Registrar Episodes 
Recipient of 
Communication 
Nurse 5 0 1 0 0 6 
-
JMO 20 6 0 1 0 27 
Ward Registrar 8 4 1 0 0 13 
ICU Registrar 2 1 2 1 0 6 
Specialist (Other) 1 2 2 2 0 7 
Specialis.t (Home) 1 fr 2 0 0 9 
Other 3 . . 3 0 1 0 7 
Total Episodes 37 24 8 5 0 74 
No. MET Reviews 22 13 7 3 0 29 
4.4.6 Out of Hours MET review 
Over two thirds of the MET reviews occurred out of normal working hours of the week (31/45, 68.9%) 
and were .more likely to contain the delayed MET reviews (9/12, 75%), or repeat MET reviews (7/8, 
87.5%) and had a higher hospital mortality (7/23, 30.4%), two being unexpected deaths, Table 10. 
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Table 10: Out of Hours MET Reviews in 34 Patients undergoing 45 MET Reviews 
0800 - 1759 hours 1800-0759 hours 
Number of MET Reviews 14 31 
(No. patients) 13 23 
No. Hospital Deaths 2 7 
No. Unexpected Deaths 1 2 
Consultant Communication 2 6 
No Communication 7 9 
Delayed MET Review 3 9 
Multiple MET Reviews/Patient 1 7 
4.5 Discussion 
A retrospective observational study was conducted detailing the clinical processes occurring prior to a 
MET review, a marker of patient deterioration. The principal findings were that MET reviews were 
associated with a high hospital mortality rate and there was a trend to increased hospital mortality with 
an increasing number of MET reviews. The majority of MET reviews occurred out of hours, which were 
more likely to include the delayed and multiple MET reviews. Those MET reviews with prior parent 
team communication were more likely to be delayed and documented consultant involvement prior to a 
MET review was minimal. There was also a deficiency in the documentation of vital signs, particularly 
the respiratory rate. These findings have potential implications for developing processes that might 
improve the care and outcome of deteriorating patients. 
4.5.1 Documentation of Vital Signs 
In this small study, the frequency of documentation of many of the vital signs was higher than standard 
protocols (Zeitz et al., 2006) and may reflect an underlying concern, the "gut feeling" (Kruse et al. , 
1988; C_ioffi, 2000), that the nursing· staff had about the patient. However, despite the nurses' apparent 
concern regarding the patient, the documentation of respiratory rate was still significantly lower than 
the other vital signs and reflects that found in other studies (Nurmi et al., 2005; Van Leuvan et al., 
2008). This finding is disappointing given the potential usefulness of respiratory rate in identifying 
deteriorating patients (McBride et al., 2005; Rothschild et al., 2010). 
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4.5.2 Communication and Medical Review 
Appropriate and timely treatment for a deteriorating patient is important (Pinsky, 2007) and requires the 
engagement of a suitable medical review with senior medical input (McQuillan et al., 1998). This study 
demonstrates there was prior communication with the consultant caring for the patient in only eight 
MET reviews. The low engagement of consultants prior to a medical emergency is not new. 
Researchers have found low involvement of consultants prior to unplanned intensive care admissions 
(McQuillan et al., 1998) and other researchers have found that nursing staff are more likely to seek a 
junior rather than senior medical opinion regarding a deteriorating patient (Crispin et al., 1998; Buist, 
2008). Reasons why consultants are not called are complex but given that the majority of the METs 
called were out of hours, it is likely that the consultant caring for the patient was not present in the 
hospital. This is known to reduce the likelihood of calling a consultant about patient care (Kennedy et 
al., 2009). Other reasons for junior doctors not calling consultants include the lack of approachability of 
their consultant, their desire for independence and a belief that their credibility was under threat if they 
chose to seek advice (Kennedy et al., 2009). 
Another finding of this study is the apparent ineffectiveness of communication, decision making and 
response between the ward doctors and ward nurses, reflected by the relationship between delayed 
METs and prior communication and associated high patient mortality. This "clinically futile cycle" is well 
intended clinical activity but does not allow for appropriate management of the deteriorating patient 
(Buist, 2008) with failure to recognise_ the clinical urgency of the situation (Day, 2003). The MET 
reviews with no documented evidence of prior communication were more likely to be in hours, less 
likely to be delayed and were associated with no unexpected deaths. The -lack of delay for METs with 
no prior communication could be explained by the presence of more senior and more experienced 
nurses during these "in hours" who are more likely to recognise the seriousness of the patient's 
condition (Kruse et al., 1988; Cioffi, 2000; Day, 2003) and are more willing to call for help. 
4.5.3 Patient Related Outcomes 
The hospital mortality following a MET review in this study was significantly higher than that found in 
the general hospital (MERIT Study Investigators, 2005). The hospital mortality appeared to be higher if 
the patient underwent more than one MET review or if the MET review was delayed. This was in 
keeping with other studies (Downey et' al., 2008; Quach et al., 2008; Calzavacca et al., 2010). Of 
concern, in this study population, none of the patients who underwent a MET review had a treatment 
limitation order at the time of the MET review despite six patients having expected deaths. This 
emphasises the need for improved end of life care (General Medical Council, 2010), which may involve 
the MET(Parr et al., 2001) as well as the patient's doctors. 
Although this was a small observational study in a single tertiary hospital, the low consultant 
engagement and delay in calling for appropriate help triangulates well with previous qualitative studies 
(Cioffi, -2000; Day, 2003) and suggests that the findings can be generalised. The findings also provide 
innovative opportunities for new models of healthcare to try and breakdown some of these 
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communication barriers and low engagement of consultants in the care of their patient during a 
medical emergency. The retrospective nature of the study, whilst avoiding the influence of the 
Hawthorne effect, may have underestimated the number of communication episodes as the data 
collection was reliant upon the healthcare professionals to write in the clinical record. Whilst this study 
was meant to reflect clinical processes leading up to all deteriorating hospital patients, it is likely, to 
have only captured a proportion of deteriorating patients as the sensitivity of MET criteria for detecting 
all deteriorating patients is not ideal (Smith et al., 2008). 
Despite the shortcomings of the study, it does identify that there are a number of deficiencies in the 
clinical processes of caring for a deteriorating patient. An improvement in the care delivered to 
deteriorating patients necessitates a multifaceted approach. This would need to be aimed at improving 
the documentation of vital signs particularly the respiratory rate (McBride et al., 2005) and 
communication processes. Improvements in the communication process would need to overcome 
medical hierarchy (Kennedy et al., 2009), provide an understanding of the usefulness of the 
communication (Leonard et al., 2004) and a specific communication structure (Thompson et al., 2011 ). 
The apparent lack of the ward consultant caring for the patient requires harder decisions that are likely 
to driven by politics, resources (Szalados, 2004), contactablity and willingness to be contacted. 
First and foremost, whichever model of care is adopted for appropriate care for the deteriorating 
patient, it needs to be available at all times, including out of hours and weekends so that the patient is 
at the focus of care rather than suiting the needs of healthcare workers. Once the new model of care 
has been adopted it would be important to review patient care and outcome to ensure that patients are 
receiving timely, appropriate care and this will require good governance and leadership (Santamaria et 
al., 2010). 
4.6 Conclusion 
Through this small observational study it was possible to determine that there were significant 
deficiencies in the management of th~ deteriorating patient at the Canberra Hospital, particularly in the 
arena of documentation of vital signs, communicating with senior doctors and delaying appropriate 
intervention despite engaging junior medical officers in the initial medical review. 
Despite the shortcomings of this study it is likely is that any improvements in the care of the 
deteriorating patients would need a trial of a multifaceted intervention. This is "The lnterventional 
Study". 
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CHAPTER 5: A PROSPECTIVE 
CONTROLLED BEFORE AND AFTER 
MULTI FACETED INTERVENTION 
FOR RECOGNISING AND 
RESPONDING TO PATIENT 
DETERIORATION 
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5.1 Introduction 
It is evident that if earlier intervention is to prevent further patient deterioration and improve patient 
outcomes, a series of steps are required including: 
i. Timely measurement and documentation of vital signs 
ii. Accurate interpretation of vital signs and any derangements 
iii. Timely and appropriate communication of vital sign derangements 
iv. Timely and appropriate management of the deteriorating patient 
The definition of timely cannot be quantified as every patient needs will be different but it is the time in 
which there are physical signs of deterioration, namely physiological sequelae of inadequate oxygen 
delivery, but prior to irreversible organ damage from inadequate oxygen delivery. Appropriate 
communication of the vital sign derangements requires the engagement of a senior, experienced 
clinician who is able to provide advice on the clinical management of the deteriorating patient, which 
will halt and improve the condition of the deteriorating patient. 
From the observational study, reported in the previous chapter, it was possible to identify the following 
deficiencies in the clinical processes of recognising and responding to patient deterioration at The 
Canberra Hospital prior to calling for a medical emergency team review namely: 
i. Low documentation rate of vital signs, particularly respiratory rate, despite its probable 
relevance in recognising a deteriorating patient 
ii. Poor communication content prior to activation of a MET between nurses and doctors caring 
for the patient given the significant relationship between MET delays and prior 
communication 
iii. Lack of timely communication with senior doctors caring for the patient 
iv. Inappropriate clinical management of deteriorating patients by junior medical staff given that 
patients who .fulfilled MET criteria but had a delayed MET review underwent clinical 
management during this time· period, which in the end did not prevent the patient from 
continuing to fulfil MET criteria. 
In recognising that the deficiencies cut across a number. of clinical processes, the observational study 
informed the need to develop and trial a multifacete9 intervention to improve the delivery of care of the 
deteriorating patient, "The Intervention al Study". 
It was hypothesised that by applying a multifaceted intervention for the management of patient 
deterioration this would increase the frequency of documentation of vital signs and the frequency of a 
skilled , experienced medical review of a deteriorating patient and _ also decrease the number of 
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unplanned admissions to ICU and hospital deaths. The multifaceted intervention included three 
important strategies to improve the management of the deteriorating patient:-
1. A newly designed ward observation chart 
2. Installation of a track and trigger system, which used a modified early warning score (MEWS) 
adapted from Morgan et al (Morgan et al., 1997) to detect deteriorating patients and to 
trigger communication by the bedside nursing staff to request a medical review at 
specific trigger points 
3. Introduction of an associated education program, COMPASS@ (ACT Health, 2007) 
This hypothesis was tested by conducting a prospective before-and-after controlled trial comparing the 
outcome measures with the introduction of the multifaceted intervention. 
5.2 Aim 
To determine the effect of a multifaceted intervention on the number of unplanned admissions to 
intensive care from four hospital wards. 
5.3 Methods 
5.3.1 The Hospitals 
Four study wards were identified (two from the Canberra Hospital and two from Calvary Hospital) and 
were chosen for their varied medical and surgical case mix and their high acuity reflected by receiving 
the highest number of MET reviews pre-intervention in each institution. 
5.3.2 The Multifaceted Intervention for Managing Patient Deterioration: 
5.3.2.1 Development of a New Ward Observation Chart 
The observational study, reported in the previous chapter, highlighted the need to develop new ward 
observation chart to facilitate the recognition of abnormal vital signs and consequently patient 
deterioration. 
5.3.2.1.1 Current Ward Observation Chart 
In collecting the data for analysis for the observational study, it became apparent that interpretation of 
the ward general observation chart (Appendix C) was made more challenging by superimposed 
variables, different scale usage, and the placement of variables, each of which is discussed below. 
•· Superimposed Variables 
Variables being superimposed upon one another, e.g. temperature, heart rate and blood 
pressure made it difficult to discern which pen mark applied to which variable and so it 
was hard to establish the physiological status of the patient. 
• Different Scale for Variables on Same Axis • 
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Three variables on the same axis were superimposed upon each other: blood pressure 
and heart rate had the same scale (each small square represented 5 units) and 
temperature had a different scale (each small square represented 0.5 units) . This made 
documentation and interpretation potentially confusing. 
• Placement of Vital Signs on the Chart 
The respiratory rate was placed at the bottom of the chart adjacent to bowel action and 
did not allow for immediate focus on abnormalities in the frequency of respiratory rate or 
for easy association with other respiratory function markers, e.g .: arterial oxygen 
saturation or inspired oxygen concentration. 
• Digital Display 
The small box for writing the respiratory rate frequency made the number hard to read 
and therefore difficult to interpret. Being placed in a horizontal line there was also no 
ability to visually trend the value, reducing the ability to recognise increasing or 
decreasing respiratory rates. 
To try and address these deficiencies, I led the working group for the deteriorating patient project to 
change the ward observation chart. At the time of development there was little in the literature but 
there had been some work reported on developing a chart to detect patient deterioration (Chatterjee et 
al., 2005). The key features of their chart was to record an early warning score, a measure of 
physiological deterioration, on the reverse of the chart, to record digitally and graphically the 
respiratory rate and heart rate and to increase the spread of the temperature graph. 
Taking Chaterjee's comments and what had been learned from findings in Chapter 4 into account, the 
following themes were adopted into the new chart. Although there was no formal attempt to engage 
experts in human factors, our ward observation chart changes were largely adopted by a human factor 
research team at the University of Queensland (Horswill et al., 2010) for the Australian Commission for 
Quality and Safety in Health Care. 
5.3.2.1 .2 Features in the. New Observation Chart 
5.3.2.1.2.1 Clarity . 
The aim of designing this new observation chart was to increase the clarity of the observation chart to 
facilitate_ interpretation of abnormal vital signs by allowing for clear trending of data. This was done by 
removing variables that had a different scales yet were superimposed upon each other (temperature 
and HR) but keeping those that were related physiologically on the same scale (HR and BP). It was 
also considered that clear trending of data would also improve the handing on of information between 
shifts: 
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5.3.2.1.2.2 Graphical and Numeric Trending 
To facilitate the interpretation of vital signs, it was decided that some variables should be recorded 
numerically and recorded graphically by using the number as the trending item, e.g. respiratory rate. 
5.3.2.1.2.3 Placement of Variables 
The vital sign variables would be placed on the chart in a systematic manner so that they would be 
grouped according to which organ system they were measuring, e.g. arterial oxygen saturation and 
respiratory rate, heart rate and blood pressure. This would allow for organ systems measurements to 
be more easily linked physiologically and interpreted. 
Previously poorly documented but important predictive vital signs for recognising the deteriorating 
patient would be moved to a more prominent position on the chart and have the ability to be trended, 
e.g. respiratory rate. By placing respiratory rate at the top of the chart, it was believed that the 
measurement and documentation would be harder to omit, as it would be obvious to those reading the 
chart that it was missing. It was hoped that this would change the behaviour of those documenting vital 
signs onto the observation chart to include the documentation of respiratory rate. 
5.3.2.1. 2.4 Embedding of the MEWS 
Using the available literature, a decision was made to use a multivariable Modified Early Warning 
Score (MEWS) additionally to track patient deterioration and trigger a nursing team leader to call for 
appropriate medical help over and above the pre-existing MET system. A total of seven variables could 
be assigned a pre-determined score (respiratory rate, arterial oxygen saturation, blood pressure, heart 
rate, urine output, conscious level, temperature) according to its degree of derangement. The 
expectation was that every time a set of observations was performed, all seven would be measured, 
documented ad assigned an individual score. Once the individual scores were completed, a total score 
would be calculated and recorded on the front of the chart. The actions (Appendix D) following the 
summation of the MEWS would be dictated by a hospital policy that had been developed in parallel to 
the development of the new ward observation chart (Appendix E) . The policy (Appendix F) stated that 
if a patient scored a MEWS of four or more, the nurse had to call for a medical review. 
5.3.2.1.2.5 Embedding of the Colour Coding of Vital Sign Derangement 
All the vital sign variables, except blood pressure, were colour coded according to the level of their 
MEWS. The colours were chosen to minimise the impact_of those workers that were colour blind and to 
use a colour (pink) in the most severely deranged r~nge that might enhance the concern of the person 
filling in the observation chart. The use of colour coding for each MEWS would ease the calculation of 
each individual vital sign, which in turn would help the total summation of the total MEWS. 
The new chart (Appendix E) was reviewed by two of the wards that were going to be part of the pilot 
study for the multifaceted intervention. The nursing staff were asked to comment on the chart and to 
trial the chart to determine if there were any practical issues with its use. Comments were received , 
and following consideration the chart was redesigned to accommodate the points raised. The 
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predominant comment related to increasing the number of temperature ranges to allow greater 
trending. 
5.3.2.2 A Specific Deteriorating Patient Education Package "COMPASS©" 
As part of delivering the intern orientation program, there was a suggestion that newly qualified 
doctors' knowledge of basic physiology and how it related to the deteriorating patient was extremely 
limited, confirming previously published findings (Harrison et al., 1999). This deficit in knowledge is not 
necessarily limited to junior doctors. In setting up of the new ANU Medical School and developing the 
new curriculum, 15 senior medical academics were asked if they understood the reasons for 
measuring blood pressure so regularly in the ward environment. Their responses suggested that they 
too had a poor understanding of why blood pressure was measured as often as it was in the ward 
environment. With this in mind, education of why vital signs were being measured was going to be 
important to underpin the new ward observation chart. It was also realised that the education package 
would need to be for all healthcare professionals, both senior and junior. 
The elements of the education package would provide a reason as to why it was relevant to the 
everyday work of the study participants. It would also provide a physiological explanation as to why 
vital signs were important to collect and interpret and the reasons for their derangement. Information 
would be provided on how to determine the MEWS and how to structure communication between one 
healthcare professional and another. 
Although the education package aimed to encourage deep learning, the time allowed for both the 
development of the package and the time to deliver the education face to face limited its capacity to do 
so. The package comprised of four elements: 
i. The manual 
ii. The DVD 
iii. The quiz and 
iv. A three hour face to face low fidelity simulation session 
Another deteriorating patient education package was available on the market (Smith, 2000; Smith et 
. . 
al. , 2002) but it was deemed to be orient_ated toward medical education and to be too time consuming 
for a busy hospital environment under tight fiscal and time restraints. Under my editorial control the 
COMPASS@ package (ACT Health, 2007) was developed.and its objectives were to provide: 
. • a physiological basis of the generation of vital signs 
• a link between oxygen delivery, vital signs and the deteriorating patient 
• the basic tools to recognise and respond to the deteriorating patient, including: 
• use of rapid response systems -
• patient management, and 
• a communication structure 
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5.3.2.2.1 The Manual 
The manual was divided into eight chapters and was aimed at helping healthcare professionals gain an 
understanding of the physiological principles behind the generation of vital signs, the physiological 
reasons for deranged vital signs and the possible implications of vital sign derangement. It provided an 
explanation why vital sign measurement was important to patient care and provided information both 
on how to calculate a total MEWS and a chapter on how to structure communication when faced with a 
deteriorating patient. It was likely that the manual would impart declarative knowledge (Biggs et al., 
2007) and provide the readers with an opportunity to know about the important facts in recognising and 
responding to patient deterioration. A subsequent quiz was used to test participants understanding of 
the physiological elements of the manual. The quiz was mandatory prior to undertaking the face to face 
low fidelity simulation session. 
5.3.2.2.2 The DVD 
It was envisaged that there would be time to deliver face to face lectures on the physiology behind vital 
signs but the time allotted to teaching was too limited to do so. As a way of obviating the need for 
lectures on physiology, a script was developed to underpin simple moving pictures of the physiology 
involved in the deteriorating patient and recorded onto DVD. The DVD lasted 15 minutes and was 
interactive to facilitate the understanding of the physiology behind cardiovascular and respiratory vital 
signs. The interactive DVD allowed participants to draw upon their declarative knowledge in a 
simulated context by asking the participants to answer questions that were related to physiology, which 
was embedded into the observation chart on the screen. 
5.3.2.2.3 The Quiz 
As it was going to be difficult to mandate staff to read the manual and watch the DVD, it was thought 
that if people had to gain 100% in an associated quiz prior to undertaking the face to face session, it 
would encourage them to do the prior-learning for the face to face teaching . The quiz would largely be 
physiologically based and a testing of declarative knowledge. As the quiz was on line, the participants 
could take the test anywhere, including at home and the trainers could track the participants' scores. A 
philosophy of open access to the questions was also established, as it was believed that it was 
important-for the participant to read the · relevant parts of the manual. However, this would have the 
disadvantage that the participant might only review the parts of the manual relevant to the quiz. 
5.3.2.2.4 The Face to Face Learning 
The face to face learning was delivered as an interactive lecture summarising the physiology, the 
method for calculating the MEWS and the communication strategy. This was then followed by low 
fidelity simulation case scenarios provided by COMPASS® trainers. It consisted of four clinical cases 
relevant to ward care and patient deterioration. Each case was role played by participants in the group, 
which was no larger than six participants. During the -low fidelity simulation participants would act out 
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the skills needed to recognise and respond to patient deterioration. This would test their knowledge 
and allow them to · put it into a simulated clinical context. It was anticipated that this low fidelity 
simulation education session would provide functioning knowledge (Biggs et al. , 2007) and would allow 
the student to operate at the ward level, where situations are complex and wide ranging, allowing them 
to recognise and respond to patient deterioration. Initially, the groups were multidisciplinary but it 
became impossible to get the professional groups in the same classroom at the same time. However, 
the multidisciplinary teaching principles remained whereby the structured learning provided 
opportunities for "shared learning" and enabled learners to acquire knowledge, skills and importantly 
professional attitudes. 
5.3.2.3 The Track and Trigger System 
Both the Canberra Hospital and Calvary Hospital already had a MET system for managing patient 
deterioration following participation in the MERIT trial (MERIT Study Investigators, 2005). The MET 
system, a single track and trigger system (Lee et al., 1995), was designed originally at Liverpool 
Hospital, Sydney. The MET system could be triggered by either a predetermined single physiological 
criterion or if the staff were worried enough to call for a MET. Despite the presence of the MET system 
in both hospitals, repeated episodes of failure to recognise patient deterioration were identified by the 
newly established Clinical Review Committee (Mitchell et al., 2008). Thus, ACT Health deemed that 
another system was needed to facilitate the recognition and response to a deteriorating patient. 
Following in the footsteps of the United Kingdom's recommendation from the National Confidential 
Enquiry into Patient Outcome and Death "An Acute Problem?" (National Confidential Enquiry into 
Patient Outcome and Death, 2005), a multi parameter track and trigger system (Morgan et al., 1997) 
was chosen to be part of the pilot intervention for improving the recognition and response to the 
deteriorating patient. It was thought that this multi parameter system might identify deteriorating 
patients earlier than the single parameter system and might encourage the ward medical staff to 
engage in the early care of their acutely unwell patients having been called by the nursing staff caring 
for their patients. 
5.3.3 Study Design 
The study design was a prospective, controlled before and after multi-faceted intervention trial. All 
adult patients admitted to the four wards were considered for participation. 
5.3.4 Study Principles 
The principle underlying the multifaceted intervention was that physiological instability identifies 
patients at risk of adverse events. The provision of a framework for nurses and doctors for the rapid 
identification, assessment and treatment of patients with physiological instability should prevent further 
deterioration and reduce adverse events. 
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5.3.5 Study Periods 
The duration of the control period was four months during which outcome measures were studied 
under normal operating conditions. This was followed by an eight month preparation and education 
period during which a new ward observation chart, new hospital policy (Appendix F) for vital sign 
measurement and new education program, COMPASS®, were developed. This eight month period 
allowed for development of the new strategies and provided a period for new learning and a washout 
period to reduce false negatives. Ward focus groups and information sessions for all hospital staff were 
held to minimise problems during the intervention period. The duration of the intervention period was 
four months during which the outcome measures were studied under the new operating conditions. 
5.3.6 Subjects 
Analysis included all adult subjects who had been admitted to the four wards during the two study 
periods. Subjects excluded from the study were those who were specifically admitted to the four wards 
for palliation, aged less than 18 years of age and those being readmitted to the four wards during the 
study periods to minimise contamination between periods and allow accurate calculation of 
unexpected deaths. Approximately 25% of patients were randomly selected by a computer program as 
a subgroup for an in depth analysis of vital sign measurements and associated communications. 
5.3.7 Data Collection 
Data collected on admission to the ward included demographic data, admission diagnosis and whether 
they were medical or surgical patients. All study patients were followed up. to either death or hospital 
discharge. During follow up data on length of hospital stay and predefined adverse events were 
obtained. In a randomly selected subgroup of patients data collection included all the vital sign 
measurements documented, the MEWS recorded during the intervention period and any 
communication documented between nursing and medical staff following clinical instability, defined as 
a MEWS of four or more and subsequent medical review. 
5.3.8 Outcome Measures 
The primary outcome measure was the incidence of unplanned admissions to ICU. The secondary 
outcome ~easure for the whole cohort- was the incidence of adverse events. In the subgroup of 
patients, the secondary outcome measures were the daily documented frequency of vital sign 
measurements, the incidence of documented communication and documented medical review 
following clinical instability. 
This study was registered, number ACTRN12609000808246. 
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5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Study Processes 
The COMPASS@ program was undertaken by 177 of the 195 (90.8%) ward nursing staff, 28 of the 34 
(82.3%) ward junior medical officers and all of the five physiotherapists prior to the intervention period. 
However despite being invited, no senior medical officers undertook the COMPASS@ program. 
5.4.2 Patient Demographics 
During the control period, 1157 patients were studied compared with 985 patients during the 
intervention period (97 and 44 readmissions were excluded, respectively). The demographics were 
similar between the two periods (Table 11) but there was a significant increase in the proportion of 
patients from the Canberra Hospital during the intervention period (820/1157 [70.9%] and 747/985 
[75.8%] p = 0.01) and significantly more medical admissions during the intervention period (418/1157 
[36.1%] and 397/985 [40.3%] p = 0.05). The demographics of the randomly selected subgroup of 
patients were similar to the whole patient cohort (Table 11 ). 
72 
Table 11: Baseline Demographics of Study Patients in a Multifaceted Intervention for Managing 
Patient Deterioration 
All Patients Randomly Selected Patients 
Period Control Intervention Control Intervention 
Numbers 1157 985 427 320 
Hospital A(%) 820 (70.9) 747 (75.8)** 233 (56.3) 191 (60.3) 
Hospital B (%) 337(29.1) 238 (24.2) 190 (44.5) 129 (40.3) 
Male(%) 644 (55.7) 540 (54.8) 243 (56.9) 168 (52.5) 
Age, yrs, (SD) 58.6 +/- 19.7 57.4 +/-19.8 60.4 +/-20.4 59.4 +/-19.8 
Type of Admission 
Medical(%) 418(36.1) 397 (40.3) 183 (42.9) 158 (49.4) 
Surgical(%) 604 (52.2) 498 (50.6) 187 (43.8) 137 (42.8) 
Other(%) 135 (11.7) 90(9.1)* 57 (13.3) 25 (11.0)* 
Surgical Admissions(%) 
General 176 (29.1) 131 (26.3) 61 (32.6) 34 (24.8) 
Orthopaedic 62 (10.3) 49 (9.8) 12 (6.4) 7 (5.1) 
Vascular 55(9.1) 45 (9.0) 15 (8.0) 17 (12.4) 
Hepatobiliary 35 (5.8) 57 (11.5) * 10 (5.4) 19 (13.9)* 
Urology 56 (9.4) 33 (6.6) 19 (10.2) 12 (8.8) 
Medical Admissions(%) 
Gastroenterology 91 (21.8) 91 (22.9) 32(17.5) 29 (18.4) 
Renal · 55 (13.2) 58 (14.6) 19 (10.4) 14 (9.8) 
Hepatology 35 (8.4) 59 (14.9) * 14 (7.7) 21 (13.3) 
Rheumatology 28 (6.7) 18 (4.5) 12 (6.6) 7 (4.4) 
Respiratory 26 (6.2) 21 (5.3) 19(10.4) 17 (10.8) 
*p < 0.05, ***p=0.01 
5.4.3 Patient Outcomes 
During the intervention period there was a significant reduction in the number of patients requiring an 
unplanned admission to ICU (21/1157 [1.8%] vs. 5/985 [0.5%] relative risk ratio 0.28 [0.11-0.74], p = 
0.005) and unexpected deaths (11/1157 [1 .0%] vs. 2'/985 [0.2%] rate risk ratio 1.57 [1.24-1 .99] p = 
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0.03). There was a significant increase in the number of patients receiving one or more MET reviews 
(25/1157 [2.2%] vs. 38/985 [3.8%], Relative Risk Ratio 1.79 [1.09-2.94], p = 0.03) . There was also an 
increase in hospital length of stay during the intervention period (4.0 [1 .8-8.3] vs. 4.8 [2.2-9.8] p = 
0.03) but no other significant changes in patient related outcomes {Table 12). 
Table 12: Comparing Patient Outcomes and Incidence of Adverse Events between Control and 
lnterventional Groups in a Multifaceted Intervention for Managing Patient 
Deterioration 
Number of Patients(%) Control Period Intervention RRR (95% Cl) p value 
Period 
Patients 1157 985 
Unplanned ICU Admissions 21 (1.9) 5 (0.5) 0.28 (0.11-0.74) 0.005 
Unexpected Hospital Deaths 11 (1.0) 2 (0.2) 1.57 (1 .24-1.99) 0.03 
All Hospital Deaths 30 (2.6) 6 (0.6) 1.56 (1 .34-1 .81) <0.001 
Hospital length of stay (days) * 4.0 (1.8, 8.3) 4.8 (2.2, 9.8) 0.02 
Acute Myocardial Infarction 1 (0.1) 2 (0.2) 0.6 
Pulmonary Embolus 4 (0.4) 2 (0.2) 0.69 
Respiratory Failure 7 (0.6) 1 (0.1) 0.08 
Acute Renal Failure 1 (0 .1) 0 (0.0) 1.00 
Cardiac Arrest 4 (0.4) 0 (0.0) 0.13 
MET Referrals 25 (2.2) 38 (3.9) 1.79, (1 .09- 2.94) 0.03 
p-values for comparing frequencies were based upon Pearson Chi-squa~ed tests or Fisher's Exact 
Test. p-value for hospital length of stay was based upon a log rank test. Patients who died were 
censored at the time of death. 
*Median (interquartile range). 
5.4.4 Vital Sign Measurements 
The. average daily frequency of documentation of all the vital sign measurements (blood pressure, 
heart rate, respiratory rate, oxygen saturation and temperature) significantly increased during the 
intervention period (3.4 [SE 0.22] vs. 4.5 [SE 0.17], p = 0.001) including respiratory rate (2.3 [SE0.21] 
vs. 4.7 [SE 0.20], p < 0.001) . 
5.4.5 Communication and Medical Review followjng Clinical Instability 
There was no significant difference in the number of documented communication episodes between 
nursing staff and medical officers following an episode of clinical instability (133/297 [44.8%] vs. 79/191 
[41 .4%], p=0.38). However, there was a significant increase in the number of medical reviews following 
communication (58/133 [43.6%] vs. 55/79 [69.6%], p<0.001 ). 
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5.4.6 MET Review following fulfi lment of MET Criteria 
In the pre-determined subgroup, the number of times MET criteria were fu lfilled was greater in the 
control period ( 166 vs. 138) but there was no difference in the number of times the MET was activated 
(11/166 [6.6%] vs. 10/138 [7.2%]). 
5.5 Discussion 
A two centre before and after study of the introduction of a multifaceted ward based intervention to 
improve the detection of patients with clinical instability and timely and appropriate intervention to 
improve their acute care was conducted. A decrease in unexpected admissions to ICU and a decrease 
in hospital mortality was found. This was associated with an increase in medical review (patient parent 
team or MET} on a background of increased documentation of vital signs. These findings have 
potential implications for attempts aimed at improving the quality of care for clinically unstable hospital 
patients. 
5.5.1 Documentation of Vital Signs 
This study found a significant increase in the frequency of documentation of all vital sign 
measurements including respiratory rate, which is often poorly recorded despite its significance 
(Fieselmann et al., 1993; Goldhill et al., 1999). The potential reasons for this finding are numerous. 
The provision of vital sign education (Franklin et al., 1994) within a clinical context (Ramritu et al. , 
2001) may have provided more reason to document vital signs. The hospital policy mandating the 
calculation of a total MEWS every time a set of observations was performed-(McBride et al. , 2005) may 
have provided nurses with personal consequences if they did not follow the policy. The need to 
perform a complete vital sign set for a MEWS may have increased the documentation of the vital signs 
(McGain et al., 2008). Lastly, the Hawthorne effect during the intervention period may have increased 
vital sign documentation. Minimisation of the Hawthorne effect through a blinded randomised 
controlled study would have been impossible in this setting given the inability to blind the observation 
. charts. Furthermore, a cluster randomised controlled study would probably have been contaminated by 
"educated" staff rotating from the intervention wards. 
5.5.2 Communication and Medical Review 
The monitoring of a clinically unstable patient must be associated with an appropriate treatment to 
improve care, which can only occur following an appropriate medical review triggered by a meaningful 
communication by the bedside nurse to medical offi'cer. During the intervention period although there 
was no change in the rates of contacting the patient's parent team, there was an improvement in the 
number of times a medical officer came to review a clinically unstable _patient. Although there was an 
increase in _the number of times a MET review was activated during the intervention period, there was 
still a significant number of episodes when the MET was not activated in the control subgroup (n=155) 
and in the intervention subgroup {n=128). The reasons for such failures include inability to think 
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appropriately for the clinical scenario (Daffurn et al., 1994), inability to prioritise patient care (Cioffi, 
2000), and the patient being deemed suitable for palliation by the nurses but not by the doctors. 
The improvement in the frequency of a medical review (MET or parent team) may have occurred by 
the provision of a framework for the nurses, which not only mandated the reporting of a physiological 
deterioration and a request for medical review, but also provided a methodology and structure for 
communicating the clinical instability (Andrews et al., 2005). Other possible reasons for the increase in 
MET reviews include the additional documentation of vital signs providing more MET trigger points 
(MERIT Study Investigators, 2005), the empowerment of nurses and junior doctors through improved 
education and the underutilisation of the MET prior to the intervention. However, improvements in 
number of medical reviews may reflect an improvement in medical documentation, although MET data 
were collected independently pre and post intervention. 
5.5.3 Patient Related Outcomes 
The introduction of the multifaceted intervention for the detection of the clinically unstable patient led to 
a 72% relative reduction (21/1157 [1 .8%] vs. 5/985 [0.5%]) in unexpected admissions to the ICU and 
an 82% relative reduction in unexpected deaths in a general medical and surgical population (11/1157 
[1 .0%] vs. 2/985 [0.2%], risk ratio 0.42 [0.19, 0.95] p=-.037, adjusted for age, gender and hospital). 
This was the first ward based intervention and rapid response system that has decreased unplanned 
admissions to an ICU without any adverse effect on the unexpected hospital deaths. An important 
limitation to the interpretation of patient related outcomes is the absence of a concurrent control group 
and the increased likelihood that the observed improvements merely reflect a regression to the mean 
(Moran et al., 2005), given that the control group had a higher rate of unplanned admissions to the ICU 
compared with other studies (Chen et al., 2009) . Similarly, data were not collected to determine 
whether decisions were made to limit patients' admission to the ICU. Another limitation to the 
understanding of the patient related outcomes is whether the two patient cohorts were matched. There 
were a higher proportion of medical patients in the intervention group but these patients are more likely 
to have a h_igher not lower incidence of unexpected admissions to the ICU and have a higher mortality 
(Hillman et al., 2002) . Moreover, multivariable regression analysis did not detect any differences 
between.the two groups to account for the differences in hospital outcome. 
The reas~ns for the reduction in hospital mortality cannot be explained by a reduction in individual 
patient adverse events. However, the increased medical review (parent team and MET) or increasing 
dose response may explain some of the positive differences seen in patient outcome, which has been 
similarly seen in other studies (Buist et al., 2002; Bellomo et al., 2004; Priestley et al., 2004) . The 
usefulness of the track and trigger system for inexperienced junior medical officers and nurses may 
have aided their early identification of clinical deterioration. Given the MET is likely to have been 
underutilise.d or delayed; it is possible that a further improvement in patient outcome could have been 
realise~ if each trigger had led to appropriate activation. Generalisability of the study may be limited 
due to the small sample size, number of centres and t~e exclusion of readmissions into the study. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
This prospective study of a simple, practical ward based intervention that has included the majority of 
current solutions aimed at recognising and treating adult deteriorating ward patients from a tertiary and 
metropolitan institution had a positive impact on patient outcome. It had also had a significant impact 
on the behaviour of both doctors and nurses managing patient deterioration. What is unknown is which 
of the interventions instituted had the greatest impact on the healthcare workers and whether these 
behaviours could be maintained once the project moved from research mode to program mode. The 
former is explored in "The Behavioural Study" and the latter explored in "The Sustainability Study". 
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CHAPTER 6: A QUALITATIVE STUDY 
TO UNDERSTAND BEHAVIOURAL 
CHANGES WITH THE 
MULTIFACETED INTERVENTION 
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6.1 Introduction 
The results from the multifaceted intervention for the recognition and response to patient deterioration 
suggested that there was a significant improvement in the documentation of vital signs and also an 
improvement in the number of medical review episodes following the intervention. These changes in 
behaviour were associated with a significant reduction in the number of delayed activations of the 
MET, unplanned admissions to the ICU and unexpected hospital deaths. However, the study was not 
able to determine why the healthcare professionals' behaviour changed. 
The behaviours that were investigated were associated with multifaceted intervention for managing 
patient deterioration, both during the interventional study and following the hospital wide roll out. The 
behavioural components to timely recognition and appropriate response to a deteriorating patient can 
be broken down into: 
i. Accurate measurement of vital signs 
ii. Documentation of vital signs 
iii. Accurate documentation of vital signs 
iv. Interpretation of vital signs and any derangements 
v. Timely and appropriate communication of vital sign derangements 
vi. Timely and appropriate management of the deteriorating patient 
From the observational study performed prior to the interventional study, it was determined that a 
number of the components were not occurring (documentation of vital signs, timely and appropriate 
communication, timely and appropriate management) whilst others were not investigated (accuracy of 
measurement of vital signs, accuracy of documentation of vital signs). A number of these findings 
concurred with the literature including poor documentation of vital signs, particularly respiratory rate 
(MERIT Study Investigators, 2005; Van Leuvan et al., 2008) reasons for which included poor 
observation chart design (Oakey et al., 2006) and a deficiency in the understanding of why vital signs 
. are measured (Smith et al., 2002). Additionally there appeared to be a failure to communicate 
adequately (Franklin et al., 1994), which delayed appropriate medical management (Jacques et al. , 
2006) . 
In appreciating that the process of timely recognition and timely and appropriate response to a 
deteriorating patient was complex, the solutions needed to address many of the bedside behaviours. 
In the literature, the strategies to improve the behaviours required for recognising and responding to 
patient deterioration that had been reported were limited. These included increasing respiratory rate 
documentation (McBride et al., 2005) by embedding a multi parameter track and trigger system into a 
ward observation chart and improving the timeliness of medical review by installing a single parameter 
track and trigger system (Lee et al., 1995). However, in these studies there was not an explanation of 
why behaviour changed. Through a multidisciplinary group discussion, a number of potential solutions 
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were identified to improve the recognition and response to a deteriorating patient, based on the 
literature review and the clinical experience of the clinicians. Nevertheless, it was unclear whether the 
following solutions listed would change the behaviour of those caring for deteriorating patients: 
a. A modified observation chart; removing any ambiguity in the interpretation of the observation 
chart. 
b. The installation of a track and trigger system; providing objective evidence for determining 
that a patient was deteriorating and providing a trigger to communicating for help. 
c. An education package (COMPASS©) addressing the perceived knowledge deficit for the 
recognition and response to the deteriorating patient. 
d. The development of a policy framework to ensure that vital signs were completed, which then 
generated a MEWS to provide a forcing function to make the nurses communicate with 
the doctor and the doctor to come to the bedside within a specified time frame, when a 
predetermined MEWS was reached . 
Through the outcome of the interventional study, it was possible to identify that some of the behaviours 
required to recognise and respond to a deteriorating patient did change namely increased 
documentation of vital signs and increased medical review, similar to the experience of other groups 
(Lee et al., 1995; McBride et al., 2005). However, what was not clear from the literature or the 
interventional study was why behaviour changed. 
6.2 Aim 
To determine which factors infiuenced the change of behaviour observed following the introduction of a 
multifaceted intervention to improve the management of patient deterioration. In examining the positive 
behavioural influences on the care of the deteriorating patient, the findings could be utilised in further 
studies of patient deterioration. 
6.3 Method 
6.3.1 The Setting 
The multifaceted intervention, described earlier was introduced into two pilot wards at the Canberra 
Hospital uhder research conditions for four months and subsequently continued in a "business as 
usual" process. Following the success of the pilot study, a hospital wide roll out of the intervention 
occurred. 
A a theory which explained why behaviour had changed in the face of patient deterioration could not 
be identified and so developing a theory following analysis of interview data was required. This ground-
up or data driven theory making, the grounded theory methodology of data analysis· (Strauss et al., 
1998), is a research method intended to develop a theoretical explanation of a social phenomenon that 
is "grounded in" naturalistic data (Strauss et al., 1998). The exploratory study reported below used 
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interviews to investigate the experiences of nurses and junior doctors involved in the original pilot study 
and the hospital wide roll out of the intervention. The source of these healthcare professionals, were 
two wards, a mixed medical/surgical ward chosen to reflect the research environment and the 
haematology/oncology ward, chosen to reflect "business as usual" conditions. 
6.3.2 Data Sources 
Sampling of the healthcare professionals was purposeful (Strauss et al., 1998) to achieve a sample of 
participants within each clinical craft group including those that had had enough experience with the 
intervention to describe their experiences in enough depth to construct a theory. Registered nurses 
and junior doctors from wards in the hospital who had experienced the new multifaceted intervention 
for patient deterioration and likely to have been exposed to significant numbers of deteriorating 
patients (gastroenterology/general surgical/haematology patients) received study information sheets 
inviting them to participate in the study (Appendix G). Informed consent (Appendix H) was obtained 
from seven nurses and five junior doctors who volunteered to join the study. Participants were coded 
numerically to maintain their anonymity. 
6.3.3 Collection of Data and Analysis 
In depth, semi structured interviews were conducted using open ended, one on one interviews with the 
use of a semi flexible interview guide (Appendix I). Domains of the interview guide were based on the 
introduction of the multi-faceted intervention and each element of the multi-faceted intervention 
(observation chart, education package including the communication strategy and the track and trigger 
system). Interviews were conducted until no new information was forthcoming (Strauss et al., 1998). 
Interviews were transcribed verbatim for five nurses (N1-5) whereas for the five doctors (D1-5) and the 
remaining two nurses (N6 and 7) key points were transcribed during the interviews. The transcripts 
were analysed for emergent themes using the grounded theory method whereby progressive coding 
phases (open and axial) occurred. Datasets were read recursively to develop a preliminary coding 
structure (Strauss et al., 1998). My supervisor and I discussed, refined and confirmed this coding 
· structure. The final coding structure was applied to the datasets, using NVivo software (QSR 
lnternati~nal, Cambridge, MA) to facilitate cross-referencing. A model of why behaviour changed 
following the implementation of the multif~ceted intervention for recognising and responding to patient 
deterioration was generated by repeatedly going back to the data to clarify the theory generated. 
6.4 Results 
The 12 health care workers who volunteered to join the study (seven nurses and five junior doctors) 
were interviewed and all their data were used in the analysis. The median number of years of 
experience _as a registered nurse was 18 (4.5, 18) and the median number of years of experienced as 
a medical practitioner was 1 (IQR 1-1) (Table 13). 
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Table 13: Demographics of Participants in the Behavioural Study 
Gender Years Post Graduation Ward 
N1 Male 29 Haematology 
N2 Female 28 Haematology 
N3 Female 38 Haematology 
N4 Female 3 Haematology 
N5 Female 6 Haematology 
EN1 Female 27 Haematology 
N6 Female 2 Haematology 
D1 Female 1 Mixed Medical/Surgical 
D2 Male 1 Surgical 
D3 Male 1 Mixed Medical/Surgical 
D4 Female 1 Mixed Medical/Surgical 
D5 Female 1 Mixed Medical/Surgical 
N Registered Nurse 
EN Enrolled Nurse 
D Medical Practitioner 
From the data it was possible to extract four key influences on the change of behaviour by the 
. healthcare professionals: 
i. The sense of being obligated to behave in a certain manner following patient deterioration 
ii. Being provided with objective evidence of patient deterioration 
iii. A sense of confidence for the nurses to communicate with doctors following patient 
deterioration 
iv. Being provided with a structure of care for managing patient deterioration 
6.4.2 A Sense of Obligation 
A sense of obligation appeared to have influenced many of the actual and perceived changes by the 
healthcare workers in behaviour including: 
i. Nurses communicating to the doctors regarding patient deteriorations 
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ii. Nurses completing the ward observation chart 
iii. Medical review of the patient occurring 
6.4.2.1 Nurses Communicating to the Doctors regarding Patient Deterioration 
6.4.2.1.1 Pre Instalment of the Intervention 
The data revealed a sense of reluctance by the nurses to call the doctor regarding patient 
deterioration, which was often related to previous negative experiences with communication . The 
reasons for this were complex but revolved around the perceived hierarchy between doctors and 
nurses whereby doctors assumed that nurses neither had the knowledge nor the understanding of 
when a patient was deteriorating. In the event that the nurse did call the doctor, the doctor was often 
unreceptive to their concerns: 
N 1: "We have had no choice but to call the consultant and they get very annoyed 
with both you and the registrar because they have been called at home" 
Or forthcoming in coming to see the deteriorating patient: 
N3: " .. because often in after hours there was a frustration that if the patient was 
deteriorating they [the nurses] would be ringing people, ringing people and 
nothing would be happening" 
It is not surprising these negative experiences sometimes led nursing staff to delay calling for 
appropriate help although this appeared to be related to the individual person as there were some 
doctors that nurses would be happy to call: 
N2: "Oh yes, I find its different who calls, it's different who's on doctor_wise, and its 
difficult because I work nights and you just don't have them [our own ward 
doctor]." 
And the quality of the response was dependent upon whether the call was in hours or out of hours 
reinforcing the idea that the model of care delivered is centred around the staff and not the patient: 
N1: "It depends on the time of the day in a lot of the cases. Like at night time you 
have your evening RMO on and they can be young and tied up and not really 
know especially in haematology you know the whole circuit, but during the day 
Monday to Friday its pretty good because you have your registrars around, you've 
got everyone on board" 
From the negative experiences before the installation of the multifaceted intervention, the need for 
improvements in calling for the doctor were evident from the data from this qualitative study. However, 
it is interesting, that the quantitative data in the interventional study revealed no change in the 
incidence_ of communication episodes related to patient deterioration following its introduction. 
6.4.2.1.2 Post Instalment of the Intervention 
The intervention provided the nurses with a sense of obligation to do something including calling the 
doctors in the event of a patient deterioration: 
N1 : "Once you have a figure you know you have. to do something" 
83 
In response to the sentiments that the nurse had to "do something"; the doctors felt the pressure from 
the nurses to call the doctor: 
D1: "Nurses pressured more [by CNCs] to call the doctor'' 
However, despite the intervention there continued to be some reluctance among nurses to call for 
appropriate help. At times it seemed it was not until the arrival of a more senior, experienced nurse that 
appropriate action would be taken: 
N3: "Some people .... didn't follow the algorithm and there has been times .. . I 
would say you call a MET now and they would say but, but and I would say no 
buts call one now." 
This reluctance of nurses to call for further medical help from either the parent medical team or the 
MET may explain why there were no changes in the instances of nurse to doctor communication 
episodes following the introduction of the multifaceted intervention. What is not explained is why 
nurses were reluctant to call for help. This is explored further in "The Human Element Study". 
The trigger for the nurses to call for medical help necessitated the nurses to complete observation 
charts to generate a MEWS (Morgan et al., 1997), which, when the score was high enough (four or 
more) the hospital policy dictated that the nurses had to call for medical help. From the data reported in 
"The Observational Study" and "The lnterventional Study" it was evident that observations, particularly 
respiratory rate, were not documented frequently enough prior to the intervention and reasons why 
observations were so poorly documented were unclear. 
6.4.2.2 Nurses Completing the Ward Observation Chart 
6.4.2.2.1 Pre-instalment of the Intervention 
From the data, it was clear that the old ward observation chart was difficult to complete because of its 
confusing layout: 
N3: "Some people found it hard whether to put the 100 on that line or the line 
above it, so they would write it in," 
. It was also confusing to interpret the vital signs: 
N3: "[The old chart] was sort of all over the shop sometimes you had your temp 
arid your heart rates in the same colours, you had to study it closely to look at 
whether you were reading a heart rate or a temperature, the blood pressure lines 
you still had to put arrows in" 
Observations did not appear to be an important part of the role of the nurse because whilst the 
observation chart was populated, the actual observations were not necessarily performed : 
N4: "with the old ones [charts] some people didn't even bother do the obs and just 
fill them in" 
Throug_h these data it was evident that there were not only issues with performing the observations and 
documenting the observations but also with interpretation of the observations entered on the old ward 
observation chart. 
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6.4.2.2.2 Post-instalment of the Intervention 
In contrast to the old ward observation chart, the new ward observation chart installed with the 
multifaceted intervention was greeted more favourably and the new ward observation charts were filled 
in with greater due diligence: 
N3: "I think they have been a little bit more careful now, they actually document 
them, they don't just throw a little dot somewhere they have to actually make sure 
the obs are reasonably accurate" 
Perhaps this was due to the need to end up with a total MEWS, which necessitated that all vital signs 
had to be completed: 
N2: "[I] do it [completing the ward observation chart] more diligently because it's 
all there to be done because you have to end up with a score that should reflect 
all of them." 
The data suggest that the reasons for the greater diligence in completing the observation charts 
probably was not as a result of a greater understanding of the importance of measuring and 
documenting vital signs but more that if they did not complete the chart there were negative 
consequences: 
N3: "Because they have to score it, I mean if you are going to fudge it once you 
don't want to make a whole big fool of yourself on your scoring do you because if 
you make it up and the next person and further down and the score was dramatic 
you could actually get caught out and I suppose there is a bit of that" 
A higher completion rate of the ward observation chart seemed to be driven not only by the different 
design and the need to arrive at a total MEWS, necessitating all vital signs to be measured, but also 
because the nurses had a sense of accountability for their actions. 
N1: "Yeah .... , we are more accountable now and I sort of like that and for me when 
I don't do some obs the next lot I do." 
The reason for the latter is unclear but unlike the. old ward observation chart there was now an 
obligation for the nurses to sign for their observation set. Alongside the nursing staff changing their 
behaviour in documenting vital signs, the junior doctors who were being contacted by the nursing staff 
to review deteriorating patients appear to have realised the change in nursing behaviour following the 
introduction of the multiface.ted intervention, which in turn changed their way of dealing with the 
information and the feeling of the need to review patients. 
6.4.2.3 Medical review of the patient 
With the introduction of the intervention there was a greater sense that the junior doctor was obligated 
to review the patient: 
D3: "Forces [me] to review the patient" 
and that they could no longer ignore the calls from the nurses regarding -patient deterioration: 
D3: "Could not ignore it [call from nurses]" 
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The provision of a framework for recognising and responding to patient deterioration that became 
embedded in a hospital policy appeared to obligate the nurses to complete the observation chart, to 
generate a MEWS, and to call a doctor who, in turn, felt obliged to review the patient. The generation 
of an objective score for measuring patient deterioration appeared to provide supporting evidence for 
the nurse to call the doctor. 
6.4.3 Provision of Objective Evidence of Patient Deterioration 
Nurses reported that they often felt the need to provide supporting information to highlight the urgency 
or the importance of the clinical situation to justify their reasons for calling a doctor to review a patient. 
The instalment of a MEWS provided the nurses with objective, supporting evidence that a patient was 
deteriorating and warranted further medical intervention. This score could neither be challenged or 
refuted by the doctor and given the policy underpinning the intervention, which stated that a doctor had 
to review the patient within 30 minutes following the first telephone call, the call could no longer be 
ignored by the doctor. 
N5: "I think the new MEWS score has been absolutely wonderful in getting 
doctors to understand because now there is a concrete score and they have to do 
something about it and we can ring" 
Again the empiric nature of the score facilitated the nurse calling for the doctor: 
N5: "I think it is a really good tool as I have said to it allows the junior nurse to get 
an empiric score of what is happening and be able to communicate that to the 
doctor that are then all aware of what needs to be done" 
The limited clinical exposure of the junior doctors interviewed in managing patient deterioration might 
have meant that deteriorating patients were not detected nor managed appropriately. By being given 
objective evidence for patient deterioration, the MEWS provided the doctor with an appreciation that 
they were now caring for a sick patient: 
D4: '.'MEWS was good at night if you could not think or were scared, it helped me 
realise that I had a sick patient" 
For some of the junior doctors the request to review a patient with a high MEWS created confusion, 
. given their limited clinical experience. They were still unable to prioritise acute medical emergencies 
that did not necessarily trigger a review from a deranged MEWS: 
D2: "Worries me that I have to prioritise between MEWS and chest pain" 
There were also some comments that the nurses would not provide any information as to why the 
MEWS was elevated such that they would be unable to f_ormulate a plan of action prior to arriving to 
review the patient: 
D3: "Communication worsened because only MEWS was handed over but not 
with an explanation of what the problem was" 
Of note, at the time of interview the junior medical staff did not appear to use the MEWS as a 
foundation for building a case for more senior doctors to come and help care for their deteriorating 
patients~ 
D1: "Never used MEWS communicating with my consultant or registrar" 
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These data suggest that nurses and doctors appreciated having some form of objective evidence and 
as the following section outlines, and therefore, one of the benefits of this evidence was increased 
confidence in calling the MET. 
6.4.4 A Sense of Confidence by the Nurses to Communicate with Doctors 
The interaction between medical and nursing staff regarding deteriorating patients has not necessarily 
been a positive experience as highlighted in the commentary above. The introduction of the 
intervention provided confidence particularly to nursing staff in their day to day activities in a number of 
ways. 
The education package, COMPASS®, provided background knowledge to the recognition and 
response to the deteriorating patient but it was difficult to tease out the effect of the education package 
had on behaviour from the algorithm that they were provided with to call the doctor: 
N3: "Because you have done the course, they have been taught. They have been 
part of COMPASS® training, that has reinforced it all for them and they feel far 
more confident and you have given them algorithm and that says you call a MET 
and they don't feel they have to run out and find somebody to tell somebody" 
The MEWS also provided confidence to some of the nurses that they were now "allowed" to call for a 
medical review 
N1: "It (the MEWS) provided me with more confidence to call the doctors and 
more responsibility on my part to call one especially a sudden hike up the scale 
or nothing has happened and I can say 'look they have been running, what are 
we doing here?"' 
The confidence that was perceived by the nurses appeared to override- the issues with medical 
hierarchy, which were reflected as negative interaction experiences when they spoke with their junior 
and medical colleagues, allowing the nurses to call for help. 
6.4.5 Provision of a Structure of Care for Managing Patient Deterioration 
As hospitals care for increasingly complex patients, it has become more challenging for them to 
. prioritise the care of their patients. Following the installation of the intervention, the nursing staff used 
the MEWS to prioritise and structure the care of their patients. This prioritisation, in turn, allowed staff 
to prioritise their care to deteriorating patients in preference to other patients that were being cared for 
at the same time: 
N5·: "It definitely reorganises your day plan and your time management. I came 
onto the ward and found a high MEWS score that wasn't handed over or had 
happened since they went to hand over and · it definitely more orientates you to 
that particular patient so as in charge you have to say 'I'm really sorry but 
someone is going to have to pick up on my other three patients because I have 
this picture'" 
It also allowed medical staff to prioritise the care of the patients too: 
D2: "Does allow me to see the patient in a more timely fashion" 
The provision of a framework for recognising and responding to clinical deterioration influenced 
behaviour by allowing the nurses and doctors to feel obligated to perform the various tasks required. 
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This was underpinned by a feeling of confidence by using an objective number for determining the 
extent of patient deterioration and providing a structure and certainty in the ensuing actions. 
6.5 Discussion 
In this qualitative study, ward nurses and doctors described changes in behaviour in relation to the 
introduction of the multifaceted intervention to recognise and respond to patient deterioration. The main 
behavioural changes that were confirmed by the quantitative data included the nurse completing and 
documenting a set of patient observations and the doctor coming to see a deteriorating patient. In this 
study, there was also a perceived increase in the bedside nurse calling the doctor with the installation 
of the multifaceted intervention but this was not corroborated by the quantitative data in the 
interventional study. Underpinning these changes in behaviour were four major influences: a sense of 
being obligated to perform various components of the task of recognising and responding to patients' 
deterioration, providing objective evidence to the doctor that the patient was deteriorating, and 
providing the nurse with confidence to call the doctor and the new policy framework in which 
management of the deteriorating patient operated under. 
Few interventions for patient deterioration have included a multi-pronged approach specifically 
designed to improve the management of a deteriorating patient from a ward perspective. The 
approach included a dedicated education program for patient deterioration with the introduction of a 
track and trigger system and a new ward observation chart. However, some other studies have 
introduced some of these elements to improve care of the deteriorating patient including a single 
parameter track and trigger system (MERIT Study Investigators, 2005; Chen et al., 2009), a multi 
parameter track and trigger system (Odell et al., 2007) or a ward observation chart with an embedded 
multi-parameter track and trigger system (McBride et al., 2005). All these studies have noted an 
increase in the documentation of vital signs particularly respiratory rate although none appeared to 
have designed their study to specifically increase the documentation of vital signs. Examination of the 
reasons for increased completion rates has not been well described and so an important finding from 
. our study was the sense of increased · obligation to complete the observation chart. This may have 
been driven by the introduction of the policy stating the responsibilities of both the nurse and the doctor 
when a patient is noted to be deteriorating . The introduction of this policy for the recognition and 
response to patient deterioration could be described as an extrinsic motivational factor with negative 
consequences (Sherman et al., 1984) for not completing the observation chart. 
As previously noted, the interventional study demonstrated a significant improvement in calling for a 
MET review rather than calling the parent team, although according to the data from this study, the 
nurses perceived that there been an improvement in calling for the doctor. Reasons for the nurses 
calling for a MET review could be due to a feeling of confidence in calling for further medical help. This 
increase in confidence may be due to the removal of uncertainty around whether they should be calling 
a doctor-or not, through the new deteriorating patient policy framework and the provision of objective 
evidence that their patient was sick, confirmed by th·e MEWS, which could not be ignored by the 
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doctor. Reasons why there may not have been quantitative evidence of improving the calling of the 
parent team doctor may be similar to the results of a study which examined why nurses did not call for 
a MET (Cioffi, 2000) and found that the reasons included being too afraid (Cioffi, 2000). However, this 
finding was in the absence of supporting evidence such as MEWS. So, it may be that the nurse at the 
bedside is either reluctant to call for a parent team doctor due to their lack of knowledge (McQuillan et 
al., 1998) compared with a dedicated medical team specialising in acutely unwell patients (Lee et al., 
1995) or that they needed further evidence of patient deterioration to give them greater confidence to 
call for the parent team doctor. 
One finding from the interventional study was the increase in medical reviews occurring once the 
doctors had been contacted by the nurses on the wards. The doctors in this study confirmed that they 
felt a change in pressure from the ward staff to review these patients, which may have been due to the 
desire to comply with policy framework, rather than the desire to ensure the patient was safe. 
During the interventional study the attendance at an education program specific to patient deterioration 
was deemed mandatory in association with the instalment of the track and trigger system and new 
ward observation chart. However, attendance at the educational program was incomplete (8/12, 75% 
read the education manual but only 4/12, 25% had attended the face to face teaching sessions) by the 
healthcare professionals. Those that did attend the education program, in part or in whole, viewed it 
positively but with some qualifying factors: 
EN 1: "Education was useful in that it re-educated me and reminded me of the basics" 
N2: "I thought the manual was good. It was very comprehensive and very good because 
it went through all the different systems that we required" 
D2: "I did not mind doing it [education package] and resolved questions but did not help 
improve my understanding and importance of observations" 
Reasons for non-attendance at the sessions were not examined in detail due to time constraints but 
may have reflected inadequate time to attend the sessions or undertake the pre-learning, poor 
programming by the COMPASS@ organisers with respect to shift work (although a number of night 
sessions were delivered to night staff) and participant disinterest. 
It was not possible to discern clearly whether the education package had influenced behaviour, or not 
due to the absence of comments relating to the education package. Being taught about the algorithm 
for contact!ng the doctor in the event of -patient deterioration did appear to influence behaviour and 
provided an element of confidence for the nurses to call the doctor. Further reference to the education 
program for patient deterioration was minimal and may 'be as a result of the method in which the 
education information was conveyed. The educatio'n package was designed to promote functional 
knowledge but the limited amount of time available to teach interactive face-to-face sessions reduced 
its capacity to encourage deep learning and development of a functional knowledge. The interactive 
DVD and the clinically relevant quiz questions were an attempt to overcome these limitations. 
The use_of low fidelity simulation was aimed to provide an educational immersive, safe environment to 
allow participants to integrate and apply their prior COMPASS@ knowledge to inform their clinical 
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decision making. Low fidelity simulation was chosen as a compromise on both time to develop the 
scenarios and cost to the institution recognising that high fidelity simulation sessions have been 
extensively used in the healthcare environment with demonstrated favourable outcomes on patient 
outcomes (Wayne et al., 2008). However, they are prohibitively expensive (Beaubien et al., 2004). 
Given the large scale training that was required, low fidelity simulation was selected and has been 
used in health extensively (Morey et al., 2003) but it did minimise the opportunities for developing 
behavioural skills. The limitations of the low fidelity simulation and the other limiting modes of delivery 
of information may have been the reason why education did not appear to influence behaviour. 
A somewhat surprising finding from this study was the absence of discussion about the patient and 
their welfare during the interviews with the healthcare workers. The semi structured interview questions 
did not specifically ask about patients, which may have influenced the answers. Nevertheless, the fact 
that no participant considered the patient during their interviews was odd particularly when patients are 
central to all their work. Although there is no evidence from the data, it perhaps reflects the inability of 
healthcare professionals' inability to step into the shoes of patients and their relatives to appreciate the 
impact of failing to recognise and respond to clinical deterioration both upon the patient and their 
relatives. A mechanism of trying to overcome this deficiency has been the use of patient stories 
(Lamont et al., 2009) and may minimise errors in health care. 
6.5.2 Implications for Managing Deteriorating Patients 
This study demonstrates that nurses and doctors do change their behaviour when provided with a tool 
and a framework for when to communicate and review deteriorating patients, underpinned by a 
dedicated education program. Future improvements in communication are still required to encourage 
communication between nurses and doctors but the data do support the concept that providing 
frameworks for care can change behaviour. 
Future studies need to include a wider range of healthcare prof~ssionals, including senior doctors, 
pharmacists and physiotherapists, who are all part of the team to recognise and respond to 
. deteriorating patients. They also need to include questions about how the patient may or may not be 
benefitting from the new system. This raises the question of whether patient deterioration programs 
should include patient stories to allow healthcare professionals to hear from patients and relatives who 
have exper.ienced patient deterioration arid understand what it is like to be on the "otherside", which 
may be more powerful in changing behaviour. This technique is explored when a patient story is used 
to trigger discussion on patient deterioration in "The Human Element Study". 
6.5.3 Limitations 
This study was exploratory with a small group of healthcare professionals interviewed from one 
hospital. The · findings of this study were not intended to be representative of all healthcare 
professiqnals on all the wards in this hospital, or from the other hospitals. Although the nurses were 
both junior and senior, only very junior doctors were in,terviewed. This did not allow for exploration as 
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to whether the behaviour of senior doctors had changed over time following the intervention. This is 
unfortunate as it is likely that senior doctors are more capable of managing patient deterioration by 
virtue of their clinical experience and pivotal to ensuring that appropriate care is delivered when they 
are engaged. Exploration of the influences of "out of hours" behaviour was not undertaken, but this 
would have provided information on any differences of behaviour between "in hours" and "out of hours" 
and is certainly a future study to be undertaken. 
The interviewer was also conflicted by virtue of the fact that she was the leader of the development 
team for the introduction of the multifaceted intervention and this may have influenced the interview 
discussion or interpretation of the data, although this has been minimised by conducting duplicate 
coding for the more complex themes and using a semi structured interview technique. 
6.6 Conclusions 
This qualitative study was undertaken to understand why the changes in behaviour occurred. It was 
important to examine critically the process of recognising and responding to patient deterioration 
following the installation of the multifaceted intervention. The major changes in behaviour reported 
were the improved completion of observation charts by the nurses and the improved review of patients 
following deterioration by doctors. The major influences included a sense of being obligated to 
undertake appropriate actions for managing deteriorating patients and feeling confident to perform 
these actions. From the data it was possible to suggest that within the multifaceted intervention, an 
objective measure for patient deterioration provided participants with a sense of confidence, and at the 
same time provided a sense of obligation. Further study would allow elaboration of these dual 
outcomes that is, confidence and at the same time obligation. Of note, future work would include trying 
to tease out the influence of education including the relevant policies and the sense of obligation 
Future interventions for the management of deteriorating patients need to consider the conceptual 
framework identified but probably also need to address the question as to why nurses were still not 
calling the doctor in the advent of patient deterioration. This is explored further in "The Human Element 
. Study". 
An increa~ingly important component of research today is whether changes in behaviour such as seen 
in "The lnterventional Study" and confirm~d in this behavioural study can be translated into every day 
clinical practice (National Health and Medical Research Council., 2010) . This is examined in "The 
Sustainability Study" in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7: ARE CHANGES TO 
BEHAVIOUR AND PATIENT 
OUTCOMES SUSTAINABLE IN 
EVERYDAY CLINICAL PRACTICE? 
92 . 
7 .1 Introduction 
The use of track and trigger systems to help manage deteriorating patients has been demonstrated to 
improve patient outcome in single centres (Buist et al., 2002; Bellomo et al., 2003; Bellomo et al. , 
2004; Priestley et al., 2004). Although longitudinal studies of track and trigger systems have 
demonstrated on going improvement in patient outcome (Buist et al., 2007; Santamaria et al., 2010), 
none has examined whether the specific behavioural steps required to manage patient deterioration 
are maintained over time. 
Following the implementation of the multifaceted intervention program for patient deterioration to the 
remaining wards in the two ACT public hospitals, it was hypothesised that with on going clinical 
leadership, governance and auditing of the utilisation of the system, the increase in frequency of the 
documentation of vital signs and frequency of a medical review of a deteriorating patient would be 
sustained and these would lead to a reduction in the number of unplanned admissions to ICU and 
hospital deaths. 
This hypothesis was tested by conducting a retrospective, observational study in all consecutive adult 
patients admitted to two medical and surgical wards in the Canberra Hospital. The study was 
performed during three four-month periods; one prior to the intervention ([820 patients) and two 
following the intervention (immediate [750 patients] and two years later [819 patients]). 
7.2 Aim 
To determine if the positive effect of the multifaceted intervention for managing patient deterioration on 
behaviour and patient outcome was maintained two years after it had been introduced as part of 
everyday care on two hospital wards. 
7.3 Methods 
· 7.3.1 The Setting 
The two wards at the Canberra Hospital used for the original interventional study were used for this 
sustainabili_ty study. 
7.3.2 Pre and Post Intervention Systems for Managing Deteriorating Patients 
The pre and post intervention systems .for recognisi'ng and responding to patient deterioration have 
been described in detail previously, in Chapter 5. However, post introduction of the multifaceted 
intervention to the two wards, a governance structure, as sugge_sted now by the Australian 
Commission. for Quality and Safety in Health Care (Australian Commission for Quality and Safety in 
Healthcare, 2010), was implemented to ensure clinical leadership, up to date policy development, 
dissemination of relevant information, and comprehensive, timely data collection to determine if patient 
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deterioration processes were still being followed . The Rapid Response Committee oversaw all these 
activities including providing monthly reports on patient deterioration trend data to the peak clinical 
governance committee in the hospital. These reports are able to identify any areas of concern that 
required a response by the rapid response unit, the ward or the peak clinical governance committee. 
Responses are then monitored to ensure appropriate action has been taken. 
7.3.3 Study Design 
The study design was a retrospective, observational study in all consecutive adult patients aged 18 
years and over, admitted to one combined medical and surgical study ward and one surgical study 
ward at The Canberra Hospital during three four-month periods, one before the intervention and two 
following the intervention. 
7.3.4 Study Principle 
The principle underlying the multifaceted intervention was that physiological instability identifies 
patients who are at risk of adverse events. The addition of a framework for nurses and doctors to help 
them identify, assess and treat deteriorating patients should prevent further deterioration and reduce 
adverse events. 
7 .3.5 Study Periods 
The duration of the control period was four months during which outcome measures were studied 
during pre-intervention normal ward conditions. This was followed by an eight month preparation and 
education period during which a new ward observation chart, new hospital policy for vital sign 
measurement and a new education program (COMPASS@) were developed. The duration of the two 
post-intervention study periods was four months, one immediately post the introduction of the 
intervention and one two years after the introduction of the intervention. 
7.3.6 Subjects 
Analysis induded all adult patients who had been admitted to the two study wards during the three 
study periods. Patients excluded from the study were those readmitted to the two wards during the 
study periods to minimise contamination between the periods and to allow accurate calculation of 
unexpected, deaths. 14-25% of patients from each study cohort were randomly selected by a computer 
program as a subgroup for an in depth analysis of vital sign measurements and associated 
communications. 
7 .3.7 Data Collection 
Data collected on admission to the ward included demographic data, admission diagnosis and whether 
they were medical or surgical patients. All study patients were followed up until to hospital discharge or 
death. During follow up, details of length of hospital stay, unplanned admissions to intensive care and 
MET referrals were collected. In the randomly selected sub group of patients, data collection included 
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all the vital sign measurements documented, MEWS recorded during the intervention period and any 
communication documented between nursing and medical staff following clinical instability, defined as 
a MEWS of four or more and subsequent medical review (Attachment D). 
7.3.8 Outcome Measures 
The primary outcome measure was the incidence of unplanned admissions to ICU. The secondary 
outcome measure for the whole cohort was the incidence of expected and unexpected deaths. In the 
predetermined subgroup of patients, the secondary outcome measures were the daily documented 
frequency of vital sign measurements, the incidence of documented communication and incidence of 
documented medical review. 
7.4 Results 
7.4.1 Patient Demographics 
During the pre-intervention period, 820 patients were studied compared with 750 patients immediately 
post-intervention and 819 patients two years following the introduction of the intervention (97, 44 and 
57 readmissions were excluded, respectively). The mean age of patients two years following the 
introduction of the intervention was significantly higher than for patients in the pre-intervention and 
immediately post-intervention periods (60.1 years [SD 19.0], 57.9 years [SD 19.6] and 57.3 [SD 19.6] 
respectively p=0.006) but other patient demographics were similar, (Table 14). 
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Table 14: Baseline Demographics of 2389 Study Patients before and after a Multi-Faceted 
Intervention for Managing Patient Deterioration 
Pre-Intervention 
Number of Patients 820 
Male(%) 479 (58.4) 
Mean Age, Years 57.9 (19.6) 
(±SD) 
Type of Admission 
Medical(%) 189 (23.0) 
Surgical (%) 631 (77) 
Medical Admissions 
Total(%) 189 (23.1) 
Gastro-lntestinal 88 (10.7) 
Cardiovascular 7(0.01) 
Hepatobiliary 35(4.3) 
Renal 3 (0) 
Male Reproductive 1 (0.5) 
Surgical Admissions 
Total(%) 631 (77.0) 
Gastro-lntestinal 170 (20.7) 
• Cardiovascular 60 (7.3) 
Hepatobiliary 33 (4.0) 
Renal 112(13.7) 
Male Reproductive 34 (4.2) 
A Differences between the three groups 
**p<0.00-1 
7.4.2 Patient Related Outcomes 
Immediate Post- 2 Years Later p value" 
Intervention 
750 819 
440 (58.9) 485 (59.2)** 
57.3 (19.6) 60.1 (19.0) 0.006 
205 (27.3) 222 (27.10) 
545 (72.7) 597(72.9) 
205 (27.4) 222 (27.1) 
89 (11.9) 79 (9.6) 
0 16 (2.0) 
76 (10.2) 60 (7.3) 
6 (0.8) 12 (1.5) -
0 1 (0) 
545 (73) 597 (72.9) 
139(18.6) 149 (18.2) 
46(6.2) 93 (11.4) 
40 (5.4) 48 (5.9) 
67 (9:0} 90 (11 .0) 
37 (5.0) 48 (5 .9) 
Although there was a significant reduction in the . number of patients requiring unplanned ICU 
admissions from the pre-intervention to the immediate post-intervention period (14/820 [1.7%] vs. 
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3/747 [0.4%], p=0.024, relative risk ratio 0.23 [0.05-0.86]), there was no difference in unplanned ICU 
admissions between pre-intervention and two years following the intervention roll out (14/820 [1.7%] 
vs. 15/819 [1.8%], p=0.997, relative risk ratio 1.04 [0.71-1.52]). Similarly, although there was a 
significant reduction in the number of deaths from the pre-intervention and the immediate post-
intervention period (23/820 [2.8%] vs. 8/747 [1.1%], odds ratio 0.37 [0.15-0.88], p=0.022), there was 
no significant difference in the number of deaths between the pre-intervention period and two years 
following the intervention roll out (23/820 [2.8%] vs. 28/819 [3.4%], odds ratio 1.23 [0.86-2.23], p = 
0.566,) and there was no difference even when adjusted for age (odds ratio 1.16 [0.662, 2.041] p=0.6). 
This finding was mirrored in the number of unexpected hospital deaths (pre-intervention: 9/820 [1 .1 %], 
two years following the hospital-wide roll out of the intervention: 8/819 [1 .0], odds ratio 1.04 [0.50-
2.17]). There was no change in the number of MET referrals between all three years. The median 
length of stay in the immediate post-intervention period was significantly higher (5.7 days [2.9, 10.9] 
than that seen in the pre-intervention period (4.7 [2.3, 9.4], p<0.008 (Table 15). 
Table 15: Patient Outcomes of 2389 Study Patients before and after a Multi-Faceted Intervention 
for Managing Patient Deterioration 
Pre-Intervention Immediate Post- 2 Years Later Ap value 
Intervention 
Number of Patients 820 750 819 
Unplanned ICU 14 (1.7) 3 (0.4) 15(1 .8) 0.025 
Admissions 
-
Unexpected Hospital 9 (1.1) 1 (0.1) 8 (1 .0) 0.058 
Deaths 
Hospital Deaths 23 (2.8) 8 (1 .1) 28 (3.4) 0.008 
Hospital Length of Stay 4.7 (2.3-9.4) 5.7 (2.9-10.9) 4.6 (1.9-8.8) <0.001 
(days)* 
Patients with MET 22 (2.7%) 34 (4.6%) 30 (3.7%) 0.144 
referrals 
* Median (ln_terquartile Range) 
A Differences between the three groups 
7 .4.3 Vital Sign Measurements 
The average daily frequency of documentation of all the vital signs (blood pressure, heart rate, 
respiratory rate, oxygen saturation and temperature) measurements increased significantly between 
the pre-intervention and the immediate post-intervention periods (4.6 [SE 0.28] vs. 5.3 [SE 0.24], p = 
0.04, rate ratio 1.12 [1 .02, 1.23],) and although appeared to be an increased in the daily frequency of 
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documentation of vital signs two years following the intervention roll out (5.0 [SE 0.20]) it was not 
significantly different to the pre-intervention period (4.6 [SE 0.28]), rate ratio 1.03 [0 .92, 1.14]). This 
was in contrast to respiratory rate documentation where there was a significant increase in the average 
daily frequency of documentation between the pre-intervention and the immediate post-intervention 
period (3.5 [0.31] vs. 5.7 [0.3] odds ratio 1.5 [1.33, 1.69], p<0.001), and the significant increase was 
maintained between the pre-intervention period and two years following the intervention roll out (3.5 
[SE 0.31] vs. 5.0 [SE 0.21], odds ratio 1.3 [1 .14, 1.50], p<0.001), Table 16 albeit the numbers of 
patients were smaller in the period two years following the intervention roll out. 
Table 16: Mean Daily Frequency of Documentation Vital Signs Measurements in the Subgroup 
of Study Patients 
Pre-Intervention Immediate Post 2 Years Later p value 
Intervention 
237 188 114 
Blood Pressure 5.1 (0 .30) 5.3 (0.22) 5.0 (0.21) 0.47 
Heart Rate 4.9 (0.29) 5.1 (0.23) 4.9 (0.21) 0.46 
Respiratory Rate 3.5 (0.31) 5.7 (0.30) 5.0(0.21) <0.001 
SaO2 4.6 (0.28) 5.5 (0.26) 4.9 (0.20) 0.02 
Temperature 4.7 (0.27) 5.0 (0.22) 4.9 (0.20) 0.36 
Overall 4.6 (0.28) 5.3 (0.24) 5.0 (0.20) 
-
0.04 
7.4.4 Communication and Medical Review following Clinical Instability 
There was a significant increase in the total number of instances when a junior medical officer 
reviewed a patient with clinical instability (MEWS 4 or more) over the sequential three study periods 
(49/122 [40 .-1%], 42/63 [66.67%] and 52/61 [85.2%], p<0.0001). However, there was a significant 
decrease in the total number qf calls from the bed side nurse to the medical officer when a patient was 
clinically unstable (MEWS 4 or more) over the three study periods (122/238 [51.3%], 63/147 [42.9%] 
and 61/207.{29.5%], p<0.0001). The percentage of nursing calls made to doctors regarding a MEWS of 
four or more made per patient was maintained from pre-intervention to two years following its 
intervention ([122/237 [51.5%], 63/188 [33.5%], 61/114 [53 .'5%[). 
Thus, although the nurses were not calling the doctors as often as they should have been, according to 
the hospital policy, there was an overall increase in the number of times the doctors were being called 
per patient. Behaviour by the nurses, defined as the percentage of nursing calls made to doctors per 
patient regarding patient deterioration was maintained at pre-intervention levels but it was 
inappropriate for the patient's clinical condition . Tthe data did not capture whether the doctor was 
already at the bedside when a further observation set was recorded, showing a high MEWS. 
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7.5 Discussion 
This study investigated whether changes seen in a research setting with the installation of a 
multifaceted intervention for patient deterioration are sustained when put into every day clinical 
practice. Two years after the introduction of the intervention, there was no on going benefit to patient 
outcome but there was a sustained increase in the instances of medical review (patient parent team) 
found following the introduction of the multifaceted intervention as well as an increase in 
documentation of respiratory rate. These continued improvements in behaviour that are relevant to the 
improved care of the deteriorating patient, might have had a positive impact on patient outcome, if the 
study population had been larger. 
7.5.1 Patient Related Outcomes 
As in some other deteriorating patient studies (Bristow et al., 2000; MERIT Study Investigators, 2005), 
in this study it was not possible to demonstrate any on going positive effect of a patient deterioration 
system on patient outcome. The reasons for this are complex and multi-factorial but include the 
possibility that the results were merely regressing back to the mean of the pre intervention conditions, 
which complicates the interpretation of before and after intervention trials (Moran et al., 2005). Another 
possibility is that in this study, similar to others (MERIT Study Investigators, 2005), it was 
underpowered to detect changes in adverse event rates, given that the incidence of adverse events, 
such as unexpected deaths were very low. Detecting small changes will require a larger patient sample 
or a study that extends over a much greater length of time. Such studies have tended to detect 
changes at least in single institutions (Buist et al., 2007; Santamaria et al., 2010). 
The lack of an effect on hospital mortality of the intervention seen in the period two years following the 
hospital-wide roll out of the intervention, even when adjusted for age, could be explained by the cohort 
of patients two years following the intervention roll out having significant comorbidities, which increases 
their risk of clinical deterioration. Data were not collected to determine whether or not these patients 
were objectively sicker than the other ti.yo cohorts. However in the sub groups the mean incidence of 
MEWS of four or more was greater in the cohort of patients two years following the intervention roll out 
(1 .0: Pre-Intervention, 0.78: Immediate Post Intervention and 1.8: Two Years Following), which may 
infer that the cohort of patients two years following the roll out of the intervention were more at risk of 
clinical deterioration than those in immediately post intervention and therefore more likely to have a 
worse outcome. 
An additional reason for the lack of effect of, the patient deterioration multifaceted intervention on 
hospital outcome was the relative recency of the introduction of the intervention. Patient deterioration 
systems such as the MET system have often taken years to demonstrate changes both in behaviour 
and patient outcome (DeVita et al., 2004; Jones et al., 2007; Santamaria et al., 2010) . Since the 
introduction of the multifaceted intervention into the tertiary hospital studied, the MET call out rate has 
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gone from 400 per year (2005) to 1800 per year (2012) and there is a trend for a reduction in the 
hospital's standardised mortality ratio. 
Although patients in this study had access to two track and trigger systems to trigger a medical review, 
both the MEWS and MET trigger points are relatively insensitive in detecting all deteriorating patients 
(Smith et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2008) and so despite the two systems appropriate timely care to 
improve patient outcome was not necessarily engaged. More recently, track and trigger systems have 
been developed and subsequently validated in large patient populations with have a much greater 
sensitivity for detecting those at risk of hospital death, which may provide patients with more timely and 
appropriate treatment (Prytherch et al., 201 O; Bleyer et al., 2011 ). 
7.5.2 Documentation of Vital Signs 
This study is one of the first to demonstrate a sustained positive effect on the behaviour of nurses 
documenting respiratory rate on observation charts outside of a research study. Reasons for the 
continued improvement in documentation of respiratory rate have already been explored in "The 
Behavioural Study", (Chapter 6) including the sense of feeling obligated to fill in the ward observation 
chart by the need to complete a total MEWS, which requires all vital signs to be measured and 
documented. This has also been found by other researchers (McBride et al., 2005). There was also the 
feeling of accountability and that there would be negative consequences if the nurses did not complete 
the chart. Other influences are possible and include an on going monthly audit of documentation of 
respiratory rate providing a feedback loop for the two wards, an essential component of any patient 
safety initiative (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2001 ). Other_ possible reasons for the 
increased documentation of respiratory rate is the Hawthorne effect but this is less likely given that two 
years following the intervention, this study was performed under normal operating conditions. 
7.5.3 Communication and Medical Review 
The success of any track and trigger system for managing patient deterioration is dependent on 
whet~er the~e is timely and effective medical care, which necessitates the doctors being aware, 
·through effective communication, of a deteriorating patient. Although there was a trend to increasing 
the referrals to the MET compared with the first cohort period, it was not significant. More worryingly is 
in the sub groups of- patients studied for communication, there was a significant decrease in the 
percentage of instances of when the nurse should have called the doctor in relation to a significant 
MEWS ov~r the three years examined . This may have contributed to the lack of effect of the track and 
trigger system on patient outcome in t~is study: Reasons for the reduction in documented 
communication from the nurse to the doctor include that nurses may have experienced a negative 
interaction with a doctor previously, which was expressed in "The Behavioural Study", which made 
them reluctant to call for help in a similar scenario. This has been seen by other researchers (Cioffi, 
2000). Also, the doctor may have been at the bedside when subsequent high MEWS were recorded so 
that there was no need to call them to the bedside again. An additional reason why the nurses may 
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have not called for the doctor in the face of patient deterioration is lack of education and training 
regarding patient deterioration. Although, this is less likely given that the COMPASS program with 
yearly refreshers had become mandatory for all hospital employees during "The Sustainability Study". 
As in both "The Observational Study" and "The lnterventional Study", the nurses may not have 
documented all conversations with doctors to the same degree that they had done previously, thereby 
under estimating communication with doctors. Reassuringly, when the parent team doctor was called, 
there was a sustained improvement in the doctor reviewing the patient, which concurs with what the 
doctors said in "The Behavioural Study". 
This study measured many of the patient deterioration clinical processes pre and post the installation 
of a multifaceted intervention and is unique in allowing the detailed examination of the activation of a 
medical review for patient deterioration. Whilst there was no improvement in patient outcome, there 
was a sustained improvement in some of the clinical processes necessary for managing patient 
deterioration, which if undertaken in a larger patient cohort study may be of benefit to patients. 
This study also poses an important question as to why, despite two recognition and response systems 
for patient deterioration, behaviour was still suboptimal, which may have a negative impact on patient 
outcome. In the next study, there is exploration as to why some of the clinical processes for managing 
patient deterioration are still not followed despite the installation of a multifaceted intervention for 
patient deterioration. 
7.6 Conclusion 
The multifaceted intervention for improving the management of patient deterioration in every day 
clinical practice did achieve a sustained effect on two important behaviours including increased 
documentation of respiratory rate, a marker of patient deterioration, and an increased frequency of 
medical review following patient deterioration. These behaviours are important for managing patient 
deterioration as deteriorating patients can be identified through changes in respiratory rate. The 
medical review is a significant part of the clinical process that can make a difference to patient 
management. However, there were some previous improvements in the management of the 
deteriorating patient that were not sustain~d and the influences on such behaviour are examined in 
"The Human Element Study". 
101 
CHAPTER 8: THE HUMAN 
ELEMENT OF MANAGING PATIENT 
DETERIORATION 
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8.1 Introduction 
Despite two deteriorating patient systems (MEWS and MET), as outlined earlier, to improve both 
timeliness of recognition and response to patient deterioration, there continued to be deficiencies in the 
care of patient deterioration. These have been highlighted previously in this thesis but included nursing 
staff not always communicating patient deterioration to both the parent team doctors and the MET and 
also junior doctors not communicating with their senior decision maker, leading to delays in appropriate 
treatment. The immediate question is "why is this so?" The behavioural study, reported in Chapter 6, 
was informative of some of the influences on the behaviour of both nurses and doctors but its primary 
aim was to establish why behaviour had changed with the new multifaceted intervention for patient 
deterioration. However, through the work done during this project, it became increasingly apparent that 
the management of the deteriorating patient is more complex than originally thought. The previous 
chapter identified a patient deterioration system can help change some behaviours to affect patient 
outcome but there were still some important behaviours including the reporting of clinical deterioration 
that were not impacted upon by the introduction of a multifaceted intervention for patient deterioration. 
8.2 Aim 
To understand the behaviour of healthcare professionals in managing patient deterioration to inform 
any future projects on patient deterioration to increase their likelihood of improving patient outcome. 
This would be determined by exploring the practices of acute hospital healthcare workers with respect 
to, recognising and responding to, patient deterioration. 
8.3 Method 
8.3.1 The Hospital 
Since 2008 The Canberra Hospital has had both a multi and single parameter track and trigger system 
\ 
for managing patient deterioration. Governance has been provided to these systems to ensure that 
there was clinical leadership and feedback loops to all wards for suggestions aimed at improving the 
ability of st?ff to comply with the systems. 
Due to the l~ck of literature in this area, a theory which explained the behaviours in managing patient 
deterioration could not be identified and so developing a theory, through grounded theory methodology 
of data analysis (Strauss et al., 1998), was required . The exploratory study reported below used focus 
groups to investigate the experiences of nurs_es, senior and junior doctors involved in the management 
of patient deterioration by asking them about their perceptions, opinions, beliefs, and attitudes towards 
managing patient deterioration. 
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8.3.2 Data Sources 
Three focus groups, initially, were convened to investigate the experiences of nurses, senior, and 
junior doctors involved in managing patient deterioration. The choice of the focus group participants 
attempted to be purposeful (Strauss et al., 1998) so that there was representation from each clinical 
craft group. Theparticipants had had a range of clinical experience to enable each person to contribute 
their experiences in enough depth to help elucidate a theory. Registered nurses, senior and junior 
doctors known to the author and the interventional study project officer were approached and asked if 
they would consider taking part in the study. Theywere provided with study information sheets 
(Appendix J) formallyinviting them to participate in this study. Informed consent (Appendix K) was 
obtained from three senior doctors, six junior doctors and six nurses who volunteered to join the study. 
In the nursing group all were female with a median clinical experience of 3.5 years (IQR 3-7). The 
junior doctors' group had a higher proportion of male participants with a median clinical experience of 3 
years (2-6) and with the senior doctors group, two thirds were female with a median clinical experience 
of 18 years (18,-23.5), Table 17. The senior doctors although with varied backgrounds had all 
participated extensively in the management of clinical adverse events in the hospital, including patient 
deterioration. 
Once the three focus groups had been held a fourth focus group was established, including 
representatives of the first three focus groups. Within the representative group there was one senior 
doctor, two nurses and two junior medical officers. 
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Table 17: Focus Groups Demographics of 16 Healthcare Professionals Exploring the 
Behaviours in Managing Patient Deterioration 
Gender Years Post Graduation Ward/Speciality 
Nurses 
Female* 3 Haematology 
Female 3 Orthopaedics 
Female 8 Infectious Diseases 
Female 4 Renal 
Female* 18 General Surgical 
Female 1 Vascular 
Junior Doctors 
Male 9 Orthopaedic Trainee 
Male 10 Physician's 
Advanced Trainee 
Male* 1 Intern 
Female 3 Basic Physician's 
Trainee 
Male* 3 Basic Physician's 
Trainee 
Female 3 Basic Physician's 
Trainee 
Female 1 Intern 
Senior Doctors 
Female* 18 Neonatology 
Female 18 Immunology 
Male 29 Gastroenterology 
* Denotes participation in fourth representative focus group 
8.3.3 Collection of Data and Analysis 
Between December 2009 and April 2010 t~e four focus groups (nurses, junior doctors, senior doctors 
and a representative group of the previous three groups) were held with an external facilitator to 
explore and understand what affects healthcare professionals to manage deteriorating patients 
appropriately. As a spring board for the focus groups' discussion was a mother's description of her 16 
year old daughter clinical deterioration without an appropriate response from the healthcare 
professionals at the hospital, the hospital in which all the healthcare professionals in the focus groups 
worked. The case had been de-identified for use in this study (Appendix L). Verbal consent from the 
mother and patient had been obtained following consultation and in the hope that the patient's 
105 
experience might help avoid similar experiences. The case description was provided to participants 14 
days before the focus group meetings. 
Discussion was unstructured, free flowing with occasional attempts made both by the external 
facilitator, and the researcher to try and understand why the 16 year old in the case study was allowed 
to deteriorate to the extent she did, which resulted in an unplanned admission to the intensive care 
unit. The focus groups were allowed to continue their discussions until no new information forthcoming. 
A fourth representative group was provided with a document that provided extracts from the three 
transcripts (transcribed verbatim) that were representative of the three transcripts combined together 
from the three craft groups (nursing, junior and senior doctors). The external facilitator assisted the 
researcher to work with the representative group using the compiled document as a trigger for further 
in-depth discussion and interpretation to find patterns in the data to reveal further why healthcare 
professionals seemingly struggle with managing patient deterioration despite patient deterioration 
systems in place. 
Interviews were transcribed verbatim for all four focus groups and analysed for emergent themes using 
the grounded theory method whereby progressive coding phases (open and axial) occurred. Datasets 
were recursively read to develop a preliminary coding structure (Strauss et al., 1998). In discussion 
with my supervisor the coding structure was refined and confirmed. The final coding structure was 
applied to the datasets, using NVivo software (QSR International, Cambridge, MA) to facilitate cross-
referencing. Participants were coded into their craft group to maintain their anonymity. A model of the 
influences on healthcare professionals in managing patient deterioration was generated. 
8.4 Results 
From the focus groups, the overriding influence on healthcare professionals' management of patient 
deterioration appeared to be the ability to make the right decision and at the right time; these 
influences operated both directly and indirectly at the time of decision making. The major influential 
categories included the characteristic of the: 
i. patient 
ii. juhior doctor or nurse caring for the patient 
iii. patient's consultant 
iv. healthcare institution rostering 
Within each of these key influences there were subcategories of influence, which are explained below: 
8.4.1 Characteristics of the Patient 
The patient's presenting condition influenced the timing of decision making, even for the inexperienced 
healthcare worker, and this is expanded upon in the following pages. 
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8.4.1.1 Acute Nature of Deterioration 
A healthcare professional's ability to make a decision about an acutely deteriorating patient is not 
always supported by their clinical ability or previous clinical experience. It is sometimes driven by being 
confronted by an acutely deteriorating patient and the inexperienced doctor having the feeling of 
needing "to do something" for fear that the consequences of not doing something would be even 
worse: 
Junior Doctor (JD): "Yes if they are an acutely unwell patient, you think: 'Okay I 
need to do something"" 
If there was no one available who had the appropriate clinical experience to ask for help them in 
making a decision, such as out of hours, the doctors were more likely to do things that they may not 
have done during daylight hours: 
Senior Doctor (SD): "[As a junior doctor] I've had to handle patients on my own 
without other support I had to be able to put central lines into anyone, I could do 
arterial punctures, I could do things in the middle of the night if I had to" 
From the data, it also appeared that some remote healthcare institutions provided experiences for 
doctors, which forced them into making decisions by being the only medical officer on duty: 
JD: "In Scotland where I worked, as well as the teaching hospital in rural 
Scotland, you are it, you're the only MO overnight and you treat everything" 
However, other institutions, for whatever reason, did not encourage decision making and this was 
refiected in the focus groups' hospital: 
SD: "You have to work in hospitals where you actually have control that you're 
put in the situation where you have to make decisions about whether a patient is 
sick or not and what you do with them and if you've got a registrar that has been 
trained from internship right through [the] Canberra Hospital they don't work in 
those sorts of units" 
However d~spite the acute nature of deterioration of the patient out of hours, from the data there 
continued to be a sense of reluctance, predominantly by the junior doctors, to intervene in a patient's 
management plan as devised by the parent team, unless there was a crisis, such as a cardiac arrest. 
JD: "Overnight you really have to be extremely worried overnight to change 
course" 
This sense of the junior doctor's reluctance to "do something" did not appear to be helped even by 
being presented with objective evidence that the patient had significantly deteriorated, such as fulfilling 
the physiological criteria to call for a MET review: 
N: "We've had interns that have felt way out of their depth when they 'Could not 
get hold of their registrar and okay they will agree to call a MET but there's a 
reluctance obviously, a perceived reluctance, of the interns to call a MET and 
that's seen as a secondary choice" 
The junior doctors had to confirm or seek approval from their consultant before calling for a MET 
review: 
N: -"lf you can't get hold of them that will be the way to call a MET but rather than 
calling a MET it's 'hang on I'd better ask my boss.first"' . 
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So even when there was a crisis the junior doctor still did not feel able to change a patient's 
management and so by default left decisions to others thereby delaying the patient from receiving 
appropriate treatment: 
SD: "They Uunior doctors] are just leaving it to someone else to make that 
decision whether that be another junior doctor or another senior consultant" 
So when a patient was clearly in need of intervention, some of the healthcare professionals in the 
study reported that they did not feel confident to make decisions that would be in the patient's best 
interests. The reason for junior doctors needing to seek confirmation before they could call for help, 
such as the MET, is explored in the following section. 
8.4.2 Junior Doctor or Nurse Attributes 
There were two attributes of the junior doctors and nurses that influenced behaviour. 
8.4.2.1 Clinical Experience 
From the data it became apparent that healthcare workers (doctors and nurses) reported that they 
were neither comfortable managing nor recognising acute patient deterioration through their perceived 
or actual lack of clinical experience and adequate training, which was seen as an important component 
of recognising deteriorating patients: 
SD: "I think it's something [skill to recognise sick patients] you get with time" 
In the case of a senior doctor it was the lack of recently caring for acutely deteriorating patients that 
made her feel uncomfortable, which in turn would reduce her ability to advise her junior medical staff 
appropriately: 
SD: "People don't feel comfortable managing sick patients and I don't really know 
if they know how to recognise a sick patient anymore" 
The lack of clinical experience of managing patient deterioration also meant that nurses felt uncertain 
as to whether they should be seeking further help ·such as a MET review, despite the objective 
physiological criteria being reached by the patient triggering decision rules on what to do next, which 
was supported by a hospital policy: 
N: "Yes [my inexperience doubted my decision making], the initial MET that I 
called I thought 'Oh I was an EN for about 10 years before I became an RN but I 
was still inexperienced in that scenario and yes it was my inexperience and I 
thought am I right am I wrong, should or shouldn't I?' and eventually I said 'okay 
that's it I'm calling it"' 
In addition, health care workers' difficulties in managing patient deterioration was thought to be due to 
a lack of exposure to patients brought about by the r~duction in weekly working hours from the "safe 
working hours" (Australian Medical Association, 2003) initiative, intended to improve patient safety: 
SD: "These days there are a lot of doctors .... so their experi~nce is much less 
than it ever used to be. So instead of working 120 hours a week now it's 40. So 
you can see the experience is extremely small" 
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Healthcare institutions' fiscal drive to reduce the working hours in the week and its impact on exposure 
to clinical experiences is discussed further on in this chapter. However, from the data, the senior 
doctors felt that the junior doctors did not get adequately exposed to patient deterioration to be in a 
position to care for these patients: 
SD: "Certainly our registrars don't get trained to recognise sick patients they are 
not ever put in situations where for any length of time where they actually 
manage sick patients" 
The lack of consistent clinical exposure, driven by the frequent rotation of junior medical staff between 
specialities, which although allowed them to have a breadth of specialist experience did not provide a 
depth of clinical experience to facilitate decision making: 
JD: "And especially in medicine you change over probably every week, the 
registrar is changes... a renal registrar today and tomorrow you are a 
haematology registrar" 
An unintended consequence of the frequent rotations of junior medical officers to different wards and 
specialties was the reduction in the time to build team-work amongst the doctors and nurses on 
particular wards. The relationship between the nurses and doctors was felt to be important as it 
appeared to facilitate the care of the patient by understanding their respective limitations and also 
allowed for exchange of knowledge between doctors and nurses providing opportunities to improve 
patient care: 
JD: "But you think they [the experienced nurses] probably know how this ward 
works and the sort of patients that are on this ward and let's see what they have 
to say" 
A common and recurring theme was that it appeared that junior doctors, through their uncertainty from 
clinical inexperience, delayed their decision making in the hope that the patient would improve: 
JD: "It may even be a situation where people just think: 'She'll be right just give 
her some time and everything will be fine' and I think there's a degree of that too" 
However, this delay, as suggested before, would leave the decision making to others including the 
nurses and whilst in some cases the nurses hesitated in calling for a MET review, in most cases, the 
nurses did not have as much_ difficulty as the doctors in calling for a MET review once the patient 
fulfilled thff appropriate criterion . Reasons for this include nurses taking more note of hospital policies, 
being suppqrted by further objective evidence that the patient was deteriorating such as the MEWS 
and realising that the patient needed more help than the doctors were delivering to the patient: 
N: "When doctors sit back and say: 'Well let's just sit on it', is there an e·lement of 
the nurses might know and hopefully they will call a MET anyway?" 
In addition the nurse did not feel personally affronted that "their" management had failed although the 
junior doctors appreciate·d that calling for a MET review was likely to benefit the patient: 
JD: "I've often thought that sometimes although it's kind of like embarrassing 
getting the MET" 
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At times, there was inadvertent delay for help when previous carers of the patient had not acted upon 
deranged vital signs. So instead of the doctors and nurses seeing the abnormal physiological 
parameters as triggers for help, they assumed that if others before them had not acted upon them then 
there was no need for them to call for help. Calling for help only occurred when someone felt able to 
question the abnormality: 
N: "You readjust your own headsets to accept abnormality as normal. The longer 
deterioration goes on for the more acceptable [for] the patient [it] would seem" 
Whatever the reason for the doctor's delay in decision making, it created a sense of frustration in the 
nursing staff who then felt powerless to manage the increasingly deteriorating patient. 
N: "There is the sense of frustration that as you were experiencing you could not 
get a decision out of your junior doctors" 
An important and repeated feature of what resulted from gaining clinical experience was the 
development of a "gut feeling" that the patient was sick, which appeared to facilitate decision 
SD: "Recognition of a deteriorating patient, apart from this numbers thing, is a gut 
feeling, just this gut feeling thinking about Mrs Smith I'd better go in and make 
sure everything is okay" 
This sixth sense did not seem to appear to come from being taught about managing the deteriorating 
patient 
SD: "It's just this gut feeling, I don't know how you teach that to somebody who 
only works eight hours a day, I don't think that person can be taught this" 
Although unaware of these data at the time, "The lnterventional Study" described the installation of a 
system to recognise and respond to patient deterioration which relied on obje~tive patient data and not 
the healthcare workers' "gut feelings", so that even the less experienced healthcare worker should 
have been able to recognise and respond to patient deterioration: 
N: "So again we give the system a tool such as a modified early warning tool that 
is you add up your observations and the greater the number the greater the 
derangement you've got of the patient. It's just another way of confirming that 
you've got a problem" 
However, the potential negative impact of such a patient deterioration system is that healthcare 
workers would rarely develop t_heir thinking processes and skills around actual patient deterioration but 
rely solely on the patient deterioration system to recognise patient deterioration: 
SD: '~The system was put in place because people don't have the experience and 
then because the system is there people don't develop the experience" 
But utilising the "gut instinct" and an objective scoring system for recognising and responding to patient 
deterioration should not be seen as mutually exclusive. 
In summary, respondents suggested that adequate clinical experience was needed to make 
appropriate decisions for managing a deteriorating patient, often with the development of a gut feeling 
or intuition (Hodgkinson et al. , 2008) that the patient was unwell and in need of further intervention. 
However,_ doctors, in particular, with inadequate clinical experience and therefore less able to manage 
patient deterioration did not seek help from their supervisor or the MET. This failure to call for help was 
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either because they were not aware that they needed to seek help or that they did not want to appear 
deficient to their supervisor. An important component of seeking help from a supervisor is the need for 
adequate skills to collate and interrogate the information to allow the junior doctor to communicate 
comprehensively and meaningfully to their supervisor about patient deterioration. 
8.4.2.2 Communication Skills 
Historically, communication skills taught at medical schools (Simpson et al., 1991; Makoul, 2001) have 
predominantly focussed on the doctor-patient relationship so that the doctor can gain as much 
information to gain an understanding of the patient's history. Until recently, little focus has been placed 
upon the doctor to doctor communication in medical schools (Solet et al., 2005) despite communication 
between healthcare workers being a significant source of clinical errors in hospitals (Wilson et al., 
1995). 
The junior doctors in the focus groups appreciated that the decision making made by the senior doctor 
over the telephone would be influenced by the content of their conversation to them: 
JD: "If you were the registrar on call for the night or the weekend the consultant's 
decision over the phone is probably to a certain extent more ... probably the vast 
majority of it is based on your presentation of your recap of the story" 
The senior doctor's response was not only dependent on the content of the conversation but also the 
way, in which conversations were commenced, phrased and the information presented: 
JD: "I think generally they are quite concerned. It might depend on the words you 
use but I tend to start off always and start with what I write in the chart. I'm 
concerned about this patient just to get their attention up front" 
If the junior doctors were direct in their request for advice from their consultant, the consultant usually 
responded to their requests for help: 
JD: "Some of them might have a bit of a different idea but most of them they do 
come [when called] and if you make them and say: 'This [patient] is sick and you 
need to come', they have to come and most of them do" 
An added complexity to communication between the junior and senior doctors in managing patient 
deterioration was the perception by the focus group senior doctors that the junior doctors did not want 
to admit that their patient was sick to their senior doctors. One interpretation of this perceived 
reluctance ·was that the junior doctor feared that they would be seen as having failed to manage the 
patient: 
SD: · "[Discussions should] not [be] registrar to ~egistrar [but] consultant to 
consultant because registrars you often find their messages get turned around 
and downgraded because they [the junior doctor] see it as a faiiure" 
A further challenge for the junior doctors was that, depending upon the situation they were in (face to 
face ward round, presenting cases for examination purposes, over the telephone), would dictate the 
format of the information to be delivered. It was not apparent that the different formats of information 
were ever explicitly articulated prior to the commencement of each job: 
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JD: "In ED [I] tried to work the patient up as we do in other parts of the world and 
then I was almost criticised in the handover or by the consultant: 'No, no, no, no 
cut to the chase, is the patient coming in or not, medical, surgical?"' 
There were also some areas in the hospital that actively discouraged junior doctors from providing 
significant amounts of information about patients at times of handover: 
JD: "I think unless it's very urgent it [handovers] wasn't a priority for me because 
the priorities were these people waiting" 
This inadequacy of information passed from one shift to another shift was not an isolated issue and 
seemed to lead to confusion of the information, the so-called "lost in translation" (Solet et al., 2005), 
when accurate information was necessary for making appropriate decisions: 
JD: "Shift work means that if you're the first person to see the patient then you 
have to hand it on to the second person and then the third person so if you don't 
hear it first-hand it's not quite the same because Chinese whispers kind of 
changes it and the meaning of the history starts to lessen" 
An additional issue that arose from the inadequate transfer of information was the need to take further 
histories from the patient to gain better information, which for the patient was tiring, frustrating and 
repetitive: 
JD: "The patient is presented to you and your assessment is different so you 
wonder 'has [the patient] changed or did that person get it wrong?' so I think 
that's why everyone likes to start from scratch [taking the patient's history]" 
The junior doctor's knowledge of their patients appeared to be worse at the weekends. Perhaps this is 
because they were covering a large number of patients that they were unlikely to know personally and 
yet would still need to pass on information about their patients to other junior doctors, who were also 
unlikely to know the patients: 
JD: "Unfortunately it was a weekend and there was a terrible handover thing like 
one person will come and he will handover to another person so everyone asks 
the same story which is very frustrating to tell" 
Added to the complexity of communication of patient information is the interpretation of the information 
by the receiver so that even if the content of information is inadequate, the receiver is in the position to 
interrogate the provider of inforrriation for more information. It appeared from the data that this was not 
always forthcoming reducing the chances of the receiver picking up an issue: 
N: "EN might just say to the RN: 'I've done the obs' and the RN might say: 'Oh 
good' and not actually question: 'Well were they okay what was the blood 
pressure and these are okay?' What's okay? They don't ask the in depth 
questions" 
In summary, it was recognised by bcith the junior doctors and nurses that the adequacy of 
communication, particularly to senior doctors from the junior doctors, would determine the 
effectiveness of advice to manage a patient. However, there appeared to be a reluctance to speak with 
senior doctors and this is explored below. 
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8.4.3 The Patient's Consultant 
The hospital consultant or specialist in a healthcare environment has two major roles; supervising the 
patient's care, which historically has allowed them to "own" their patient, and supervising the care 
delivered by their junior doctors, which often affords them the role of "supervisor of training". These 
two attributes influenced the management of patient deterioration. 
8.4.3.1 Patient Ownership 
The historical model of care for patients in hospitals is for a patient to be admitted under the care of a 
specific consultant. The decision for a specific consultant to care for a patient is often based around 
the need to fulfil the following three criteria: 
1. The consultant is on call at the time the patient presents to the hospital and the patient's 
presenting condition falls into the consultant's speciality 
2. The consultant has the specific training to care for the patient with a particular disease, which 
assumes that the junior doctor requesting for the patient to be cared for by a specific 
consultant has diagnosed the patient correctly 
3. The consultant has accepted the responsibility to care for the patient 
Once the consultant has accepted the care of the patient, the consultant oversees and takes 
responsibility for the care of the patient and in a traditional model, no other consultant can provide on 
going management without the responsible consultant providing permission for another consultant to 
do so. 
During normal working hours (Monday to Friday, 0800 hours until 1800 hours), the junior doctors often 
work with specific consultants and thus the junior doctors are responsible for the patients that are 
under the care of their consultant. However, out of hours, the junior doctor will often cover other 
consultants' patients. The challenge for patient care is that consultants can become possessive of their 
own patients and not allow others to make decisions on their patients: 
JD: "I mean you are not allowed to step into that boundary [of ownership] without 
permission even if the patient is dying" 
. . 
Nevertheless some senior doctors did not appear to be restricted to the boundaries demarcated by 
consultant ownership: 
SD: "I won't accept boundaries where other people· feel that they have to but I 
think at that point you are then not caring for th~ patient. I think we're quite happy 
to accept the wrath of outside or the parent team" 
To make matters more complicated, if there was more than one consultant involved in the care of the 
patient, it became unclear who was taking responsibility for making the final decision on the care of the 
patient: 
SD.: "And maybe it was this so called shared responsibility that there was no one 
person [taking charge of the patient]" 
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Whilst there was a strong sense of ownership and decision making by the junior doctors if they owned 
the patient, the junior doctors struggled to feel a sense of ownership or responsibility for making 
decisions if the patient did not belong to their team, sometimes delineated by colours: 
N: "There is a team within the hospital that has different coloured teams within 
their team and: 'No I won't look at that patient, I'm the blue team. 'No I won't look 
at that patient, see the red team"' 
This reluctance to make decisions for patients that the junior doctors did not "own" was even more 
common outside of normal working hours when they were covering large numbers of patients, which 
were not their own. This was reflected in comments by the junior doctors and reinforced by comments 
from the senior doctors in the focus groups: 
SD: "At weekends, out of hours it's all about ownership of the patient. 'It's not my 
patient"' 
SD: "Certain treatments aren't followed through or instigated especially during the 
night time or at the weekends because again it's the parent team that's 
responsible for the patient" 
As described previously, if the patient was suddenly deteriorating out of hours, the junior doctor's hand 
was forced into owning the patient and making decisions: 
JD: "It's interesting because [when there are] sick patients you become their 
parent team when you're doing nights" 
In some areas such as the Emergency Department, the junior doctor felt a sense of ownership of 
emergency patients both in and out of hours and probably reflected the different model of care where 
all the patients belonged to the Emergency Department at all hours. However, this sense of ownership 
disappeared as soon as the patient had been accepted by a ward team although the Emergency 
Department continued to be responsible for patient care (Australian College of Emergency Medicine, 
2005), until the patient was transferred out of the Emergency Department. This lack of feeling 
ownership by the Emergency Department medical staff meant that management decisions were not 
made and defaulted to the ward medical staff, who had accepted to care for the patient but were not 
physically present all the time in the emergency department: 
JD: "She was pigeonholed [admitted] and so she was sort of babysat in ED well 
that's the feeling I got rather than anyone [in ED] taking responsibility" 
This lack of ownership and lack of acceptance of responsibility for decision making for patients 
physically i11 the emergency department but accepted by a parent team changed when the patient 
became ac~tely unwell. The sense of ownership and decision making reappeared similar to what was 
described earlier (Page 107) about the nature of the patient's acute deterioration forcing the hand of 
the junior medical staff present to manage acute patient deterioration: 
JD: "Once they are referred [from ED] it's not my problem unless he's dying or 
he's nearly dead" 
In contrast to the tight ownership of the patient and decision making experienced by many of the 
doctors in_ the focus groups, there were occasions when consultants or their team had relinquished the 
responsibility for decision making on "their" patient so th~t other teams would make decisions for them. 
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The reason for this was not clear but may have been because the consultant or team believed that the 
expertise lay elsewhere and they had no need or desire to expand their knowledge or that they 
believed that they were not qualified to make such decisions. 
JD: "You have a patient who is in with haematological problem and has chest 
pain they will refer to a cardiologist it's almost like a standard of care but they are 
also passing it on." 
This relinquishing of responsibility for decision making was not restricted to specific areas of clinical 
expertise but included the management of patient deterioration. At times, it appeared that patient 
deterioration deliberately ignored by teams. This may reflect a number of issues; such as inexperience 
to manage these scenarios as described above, resulting in them being too scared and too fearful of 
showing themselves up, or that there was inadequate structure of the working day that took them to 
other places in the hospital. These consultants or junior doctors also knew that eventually the MET 
would pick up the pieces: 
JD: "I know they're part of the team but their first priority is always: 'We've seen 
them in the morning and if they go downhill well you can call a MET call"' 
Although the impact of the sense of patient ownership on timely decision for managing patient 
deterioration was significant, an even greater challenge on decision making was having to seek advice 
from a senior decision maker. 
8.4.3.2 The Consultant Supervising Care 
In Australia, consultants are either be employed directly by a public hospital as a staff specialist or are 
contracted to provide specialist services as a Visiting Medical Officer (VMO). Both these positions 
require a specialist qualification but the VMO is usually based out of the hospital, in private rooms. The 
traditional model of public hospital care dictates that consultants caring for a patient will have a team of 
junior doctors delivering the care to the patient. Although the care delivered to the patient is not always 
under the consultant's direction as his/her team or others may make decisions without consulting with 
them first, the consultant is still responsible for the patient from time of the hospital admission to time of 
hospit~I disc~arge and ultimately is responsible for the overall care delivered to the patient. 
From the data it has been possible to identify six key components of consultants supervising the care 
delivered to their patients that can impact upon-decision making and ultimately the care of the patient: 
1. The role and expectations of healthcare professionals 
2. Decision making and their consequences 
3. Decision challenging and their consequences· 
4. Admission of knowledge deficits and their c~nsequences 
5. Peerreview and personal reflection related to learning 
6. Individual performance feedback 
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8.4.3.2.1 The Role and Expectations of Healthcare Professionals 
The healthcare professionals in the focus groups were of the view that the role of the consultant was to 
be overall in charge of patient management and the consultant was assumed to have the knowledge to 
be able to care for the patient in its entirety. 
SD: "It is the senior people who should take responsibility" 
However, there appeared to be differences in the role, presence, responsibility and commitment 
between the VMOs and staff specialists over the care of their patients, as alluded to by the nursing 
staff: 
N: "You can have a MET going on and ring a staff specialist and they will be 
straight over. You can have a MET go ring a consultant [VMO] and you will be 
lucky if they pick up the phone because they're too busy in surgery or in rooms" 
In general, there was an expectation that consultant decisions about managing patient deterioration 
would not be questioned and in this was because the consultants did not expect to be questioned: 
SD: "The expectation is that unless you do what I [the consultant] say and I 
expect that they don't question it" 
The staff around them assumed that the consultants would have the knowledge to manage patient 
deterioration whether or not that they had the expertise to do so: 
N: "It's very difficult to actually stand there and go 'no I want to do something' . 
You just assumed the consultant, and especially when I started, I had no idea 
what the consultant does you can say now that they're not seeing acute patients 
but I've got no clue so when they say: 'No don't MET them' I go: 'Okay, you know 
what you're talking about', you take it for granted that they do [know] ana off I go" 
However the expectation of the doctor having superior knowledge to manage patients was not limited 
to the consultant level of doctor: 
SD: "I think there's a certain expectation amongst everyone that a doctor is the 
authority, doesn't matter what level of doctor but probably the doctor has the 
most knowledge, the most experience, the most skills in the healthcare 
environment but unfortunately they are not realised particularly in this setting" 
This concept of the doctor, at any level, knowing best would be more likely if the nurse was junior and 
inexperienced: 
N: "If you don't .have that support [from senior nurses] then you just don't do it 
and you take on board whatever the intern says and you just follow that plan 
without thinking 'hang on what's that going to do and why are we doing this and 
what's the rationale for that? I think it's that underlying culture, the culture that 
they're the doctor and we're the nurses and therefore they know more." 
In contrast, if there were senior, experienced nurses available to help the inexperienced junior doctor, 
the junior doctors would look to these nurses for guidance as opposed to their consultant, confusing 
the traditional role between nurses and doctors: 
N: "And they're saying: 'What do you think' and I say: 'This is what I think but 
yoLJ're the one whose calling the shots here and you need to think about it too'" 
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However, the decisions made by the junior doctors often did not significantly change the course of 
patient management and were either due to the expectation that their role was to leave significant 
decision making to their senior medical staff or that they appreciated that in their role they were too 
inexperienced to make the decision. The distinction between these two was not evident from the data: 
JD: "Refer to someone higher than you to make any fairly substantial decision I 
think like what [another JD] says it's kind of probably bad in a way because it 
prolongs everything you have to talk to the registrar and then if your registrar is 
not certain they should really talk to the consultant before you can go ahead with 
anything" 
Although there was the acknowledgement by the junior doctors that they should force themselves to 
make decisions to gain more experience knowing that they had more experienced doctors around for 
advice if need be: 
JD: "We all need out of our experience to test the waters a bit and make 
decisions on our own and have backup when it's required" 
Sometimes, the junior doctor appeared incapable of making a decision even when it was evident that 
the patient needed help and had to ask for help from their consultant first: 
N: "If you can't get hold of them that will be the way to call a MET but rather than 
calling a MET it's 'hang on I'd better ask my boss first"' 
However, the view of the junior doctors in the focus groups was that the advice provided to them by 
their consultants had allowed them to feel confident in their consultant's decision making ability. In 
contrast, the nurses in the focus group expressed some doubt in their senior nursing decisions despite 
the expectation that they should be in a position to make the right decision: 
-
N: "If I'm not a hundred per cent confident in my team leader I might not be a 
hundred per cent confident in their call which means I'm not confident in my call" 
Not only did the junior doctors feel confident in the advice being given to them by their consultants but 
also that mo_st consultants fulfilled their role of being the ultimate decision maker and were supportive 
of the junior medical staff through this role: 
JD: "I think if you're genuinely worried about a patient and you if you tell them the 
necessary facts about how sick the patients were then I'm sure they would be 
interested" 
Decisions to call consultant staff were often made from their perceived approachability and not always 
based on clinical reasons: 
N: "I don't know why that is but you do feel more comfortable ringing some 
consultants over others" 
In summary, there was a consensus that the consultant's role in managing a deteriorating patient was 
to provid~ over-sight of and guidance to decision making. However there was a mixed response from 
the focus groups as to whether their consultants fulfilled this role or not, which may influence whether 
the junior doctor reports clinical deterioration and seek advice. The reasons for not seeking advice 
was, amongst other things, because of lack of approachability, which may have been preceded by a 
previous negative interactions between the junior and senior doctor described in the data below. 
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8.4.3.2.2 Decision Making and its Consequences 
Decision making requires knowledge, often from previous experience, confidence and the support from 
those not only carrying out the orders from the decision makers, but also from the consultant who is 
ultimately responsible for patient care. 
SD: "[Senior Doctors] have to be giving people confidence to do the right thing 
and it starts with the nursing staff, the intern and resident registrar" 
However, from the data it was evident that there were occasions when decisions required the junior 
doctor to seek advice from the consultant resulted in a negative experience: 
JD: "I think if you call up the consultant and you go: 'I'm very worried about this 
patient because of blah blah blah' they tend to go humph and often you get an 
expletive" 
JD: "To actually bother a consultant to get told: 'You should be knowing this 
[already]"' 
These negative interactions with consultant staff did not provide for a suitable environment for either 
the junior doctors or nurses to engage in helpful exchanges for advice on patient management. What 
also transpired was that there was fear from the junior doctors particularly of looking stupid if they 
made the wrong decision or of looking inadequate: 
JD: "Again the fear, fear of looking stupid, fear of defeat, or fear of looking 
inadequate [if they make the wrong decision]. Doctors, they want to look like they 
know what they're doing" 
Although not explicitly stated, the fear that seemed to pervade the junior doctors could have resulted in 
delays in them seeking advice for making decisions on managing patient deterioration. There was also 
fear from nurses about doctors that someone was going to "check" thei(work, thereby delaying 
medical opinion and management: 
N: "There are [nurses] actually scared to tell the doctor because they'll get it 
checked by somebody else and again and again" 
There were negative responses from the MET itself for making the decision to call for a MET review: 
JD: "I don't think I've ever seen the MET get up anyone. And yet we had this 
discussion in Mand M the other day and the RMOs were saying I've seen people 
get told off [and so] 'why would you call a MET what a waste of time', which I've 
never seen" 
The uninte.nded consequence of the negative response from the MET was that staff would then 
question the-need to call for a MET review, which in turn would delay appropriate care. 
N: "Yes I think because they [MET] were great I thought yes I've made the right 
decision. Had they [MET] ripped my head off the next time around I might be 
thinking 'oh my God will I do this or wont I do it"' . 
However, · there were some nursing staff who believed. that if their patient was so desperately unwell 
that their consultants could not be in a position to respond negatively to their decision making for 
calling for a ~ET review. It was merely enacting out the MET policy, which effectively was a system 
that overrode the historical dominance of medical hierarchal decision making to ensure patient 
deterioration was adequately managed: 
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N: "You challenge them [consultants] and because they have a policy to back 
them up so 'oh well I am required to call the MET', then you just wear it later" 
Whilst the nurses felt supported by the existence of a hospital policy to justify calling a MET, the junior 
doctors continued to fear calling the MET. The reason cited was the fear that they had failed in their 
role as a junior doctor and would be perceived poorly by their consultant and consequently receive a 
poor end of term report from their consultant. 
SD: "They're [JMOs] allowed to call the MET but there's a lot of unhappiness then 
from the consulting staff down to resident registrar, remember they are the ones 
who assess them and give them a little grade at the end of the term" 
This fear of calling for a MET may also have been seen as challenging the management decisions 
made by their consultant and may explain some of the reasons delayed METs were seen in 'The 
Observational Study". The consequences of challenging decisions are explored further. 
8.4.3.2.3 Decision Challenging and its Consequences 
Traditionally, doctors have dominated the medical scene by virtue of their social positions and 
monopoly of knowledge (Freidson, 1970). This hierarchy has not allowed for open communication and 
so for decades it has been the nurses role to merely inform and advise the doctor without challenging 
the position of the doctor (Stein, 1967). Although this traditional model is probably undergoing 
transformation (Allen, 1997), the difficulty of challenging a medical decision remains ever present even 
today: 
N: "If he [the registrar] says to me 'I don't want you to' well no then maybe I would 
be a little bit more apprehensive [about calling a MET]" -
Added into the traditional model of medical decision making is the influence of the consultant, the 
ultimate decision maker, who also writes the reports and references for the junior doctors under their 
supervision, which in turn often influences the junior doctor's success or failure in their career 
destination (Kennedy et al., 2009) and as quoted previously: 
SD: "They're [JMOs] allowed to call the MET but there's a lot of unhappiness then 
·from the consulting staff down to resident registrar, remember they are the ones 
who assess them and give them a little grade at the end of the term" 
This defere.ntial powerbase could reduce the junior doctor's willingness to make or challenge decisions 
of their consultants for fear of reprisals in their report although it was not possible to tease this concept 
out from the data. In general the reluctance to challenge care was not restricted to nurses or junior 
medical sta_ff but also felt by consultants who perceived that a junior doctor from a particular speciality 
would have a greater expertise in an area .that they had not specialised in, e.g. intensive care: 
SD: "I mean why would a [non intensive care] consultant not question an 
intensive care registrar?" ' 
Sometimes challenging care was purely limited by practical issues, e.g. limited time to question the 
care: 
N: "No time to question, you've got four, five, six patients. You could have eight if 
you are doing intravenous drugs" • 
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Sometimes nurses sought more senior and experienced nurses outside of their own hierarchy to 
provide them with the courage to carry out the action that they wished originally to perform: 
N: "[New grads] would ring me [as Clinical Development Nurse] and say 'this is 
my situation this is what my T[eam] L[eader] is telling me can you come down' 
and like I said I had to call the MET" 
However, there were also negative experiences expressed by nurses when they challenged the 
consultant decision making: 
N: "I've had a consultant say: 'Why have you called a MET they're not for 
resuscitation this is ridiculous and I've said: 'They're still for MET calls they're still 
according to the medical manual' and this was a senior consultant who yelled" 
Which in turn made the nurses question their confidence in clinical decision making ability? 
N: "I was the one that was yelled at [by a senior consultant] and that's fine for me 
because I know that I did the right thing and I had to get a management plan 
because this patient was ready for MET calls. It makes you question your 
judgement" 
The ability to challenge care often resided in confidence, derived from having had the experience and 
hence the knowledge to know that care needed to be challenged , to ensure that the patient received 
appropriate care. However, as a junior doctor's experience is limited there is a need to seek advice 
and help but as the data indicated sometimes this deficiency in knowledge was neither appreciated nor 
articulated. 
8.4.3.2.4 Admission of Knowledge Deficits and its Consequence 
There were limitations in decision making by some junior doctors because it appeared from the data 
that either the nurses assumed that the junior doctors had the knowledge to manage patient 
deterioration or the junior doctors believed that they did not need help managing patient deterioration. 
It is very likely that the junior doctors did not have the knowledge and that it was a case of "you don't 
know what you don't know": 
JD: "They [doctors] have the knowledge to not require a MET" 
However, the junior doctors in the focus 9roups who were still very inexperienced (less than two years 
since graduation) and seemed to recognise their lack of knowledge and believed that it was still 
acceptable. for them to admit that they did not nave enough knowledge or experience, inferring that at 
some time point it would not be acceptable for them not to know: 
JD: "And I think I'm still quite junior so I definitely feel like I'm in the space where I 
can readily admit that I don't know. And if I don't do that then something is 
wrong" 
This ability and ease of junior doctors to admit their knowledge deficiency seemed to disappear as they 
climbed higher up the medical hierarchy, where there appeared to be an increasing expectation by 
them and others around them, that they should know what to do, which in turn was likely to reduce 
their calling for help, including a MET review, in their decision making: 
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SD: "If a nurse calls a MET it's a call for help 'it's a very sick patient I need some 
care' but for the doctor to call a MET it's to admit that your skills are not good 
enough and you need more help. There's a reluctance for doctors to call the MET 
and say 'I can't do anything further"' 
The anxiety of calling for help from others reduces once the doctor becomes a consultant and was 
expressed by several of the senior doctors in the focus groups: 
SD: "I'm happy to admit that to myself, to the patient's family to the people 
around. Some people might think you're a lesser individual because you don't 
know so you must be a lesser doctor but some people say at least you admit that 
you don't know" 
The inability to admit one's deficiencies is not only related to the rank reached but also to the ethnic 
culture of healthcare professional and this varied from consultant to consultant: 
JD: "And certainly certain [ethnic] cultures don't like to admit that they're wrong in 
fact they will do anything to cover up that they were in the wrong . It is not 
accepted that you can admit that you're wrong as a doctor I can't speak for the 
nurses" 
SD: "But it's much better than it was 30 years ago. The surgeons 30 years ago, 
every surgeon was his own man he could never ask anybody else, would never 
be asked by anybody else. He had to make his way through alone" 
Although the junior doctors in the focus groups did not disclose when they might have been out of their 
depth, the nurses in the focus groups, having observed junior doctors on the wards, were able to 
confirm that there were times when junior doctors, reluctantly, admitted that they were out of their 
depth. 
N: "I have seen uunior] doctors call the MET when after a while they say 'we're 
not winning here yes they need help"' 
When the junior doctors did eventually seek help because of their uncertainty as to what to do next, 
they often sought the expertise from someone other than their registrar or consultant, such as the ward 
nurses they were working with: 
JD: "Because they've [the nurses] got the clinical experience that registrars might 
not have the same on the ground exp.erience" 
.N: "Interns feel a little but more reliant on nurses [when making decisions]" 
Their seeking of help from someone other than their registrar or consultant suggests that the junior 
doctors did. not want to reveal their own inadequacies to their consultant and so would actively seek 
out other sources of hel"p: 
JD: "But it's also them not letting the consultant know so they then also see it as 
defeat" 
There were multiple reasons for doctors being unable to admit that they had inadequate knowledge to 
manage and make decisions on patient care and included having to accept that they had failed the 
patient, fear of being ridiculed (although it was unclear by whom) or that their consultant would become 
aware of their deficiency in knowledge at a time in their career when they should have known what to 
do: 
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JD: "I think it's more to do with the admission of defeat and that you've failed your 
patient" 
JD: "Again the fear, fear of looking stupid, fear of defeat, or fear of looking 
inadequate and it affects my pride" 
SD: "But it's also the [registrar] not letting the consultant know, [if they did] [the 
consultants] see it as defeat" 
There were specific situations when doctors appeared more comfortable to admit their deficiencies and 
often it was when they were with people who do not directly affect their career. 
JD: "But...[you] can admit to a nurse that you do not know" 
JD: "It's okay to admit to nurses than to actually bother a consultant" 
SD: "But he [the surgeon] feels much more comfortable admitting it to you [as a 
physician]. I suppose because you can't threaten him" 
However, in some of the hospital units the ability to acknowledge one's deficiencies in knowledge were 
more likely to have been applauded rather than apprehended: 
SD: "I'll tell you [in registrars come to my unit [and] they don't know [something] 
and [then] they don't ring the consultant, [they are] in big trouble." 
In summary, even though junior doctors may be aware of their deficiencies in knowledge, they 
appeared to be reluctant to admit this to senior medical staff, other than those recently graduated. 
Reasons for this include the previous negative responses from their seniors that they did not know 
something, a reluctance to seek help and admit their lack of knowledge to their consultants for fear that 
the consultants would become aware of their deficiencies, which might impact negatively on them 
either in an end of term report or career promotion. 
Mechanism for decreasing knowledge deficiencies and improving the ability t6 make decisions may be 
through personal reflection and peer review. Indeed, being a professional requires lifelong learning and 
this can be done through personal reflection on how patient care can be improved as well as learning 
from doctors open to acknowledging their knowledge deficiencies, peer review, and individual 
feedback on performance. 
8.4.3.2.5 P~rsonal Reflection and Peer Review 
The focus groups agreed that an important component of improving patient care was to reflect 
personally upon the care delivered. The consultants in the focus groups viewed personal reflection as 
essential to personal development given that no one formally over-saw the delivery of their care on a 
daily basis. As one senior doctor argued on behalf of the group: 
SD: ·"Instead of learning from mistakes and saying' look guys I've made this 
mistake, I hope you don't ever make this mistal<e, but this is what happened and 
for those reasons I've chosen to do this and it backfired"' 
He went on to suggest that doctors that could not reflect would be dangerous to patient care: 
SD: "If you don't have the insight having looked at this [adverse event] then you 
are dangerous" 
Alongside-personal reflection to increase a consultant's ability to make the right decision was the peer 
review of care delivered by another consultant. Peer review from one's own craft group was-seen as a 
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mechanism for not only improving one's knowledge and decision making ability but also improving 
patient care both current and future: 
SD: "Peer review and that can actually create a positive outcome for future 
patients" 
N: "[I] take the time to spend the time to try and explain to them 'well if you do it 
like this and look at your patient today isn't he better' and stuff like that, regular 
feedback" 
However, creating the appropriate environment for people to feel comfortable in discussing their cases 
was seen as essential and it was suggested that the more involvement of all the healthcare 
professions, the better the peer review process. This concurs with suggestions on how to conduct a 
useful clinical peer review process (Johnston et al. , 2000): 
SD: "I think it is a matter of trying to develop an environment where people will 
recognise the fact that not only they but everyone else is going to have the 
problems and if you look at things in an honest way, you can be critical without 
attacking" 
Not all peer review environments were positive and would lead either to blaming others for their 
mistakes or minimising and curtailing the discussion, thereby decreasing the usefulness of the 
potential learning experience: 
SD: "Our meetings are like an egotistical meeting and so I often won't talk about 
my patients in that meeting because I don't want to be put down so what I'll do is 
I'll talk to consultants privately" 
Further commentary is made on appropriate approaches for constructive peer review process later on 
in this chapter. A more immediate mechanism of receiving feedback, particularly for junior doctors, is 
receiving commentary from their consultant on the way in which the patient was managed. 
8.4.3.2.6 Individual Performance Feedback 
The literature argues that performance feedback can be an excellent learning opportunity for 
understanding whether the junior doctor had engaged in the correct clinical decision making (Mann et 
al. , 2009). However from the data, the feedback either occurred infrequently: 
SD: "I don't think you'd have any idea [about performance]. And I think that goes 
right across the board from registrars through to consultants" 
Or the feedback was not useful: 
JD: "You get eyebrows raised [from a consultant] in the morning and you only 
saw five patients " 
JD: "I have jokes made about my seven page admissions. People roll their eyes 
at me" 
Or the feedback provided was only negative feedback: 
JD: "I think continually you're being told how bad you are" 
JD: I do not get much feedback about the way I've managed patients. A lot of 
feedback but mostly negative. Not a lot of appreciation or anything" 
JD: "There's not constructive criticism [by a consultant]" . 
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Sometimes, the only mechanism for receiving feedback was either from personal reflection or from the 
patients themselves: 
SD: "You know if you've done a bad job you know if you've done an okay job" 
SD: "A lot of patients have told me I've done a great job and some of them I've 
done a really shocking job but fortunately they're very kind" 
In conclusion, although personal refiection, peer review and performance feedback have the potential 
to provide avenues for personal development, increasing knowledge and ability to make decisions, 
from the data it was either not done or performed poorly thereby minimising its usefulness. 
Whilst the ability to make decisions largely rests with the personnel directly involved at the time, there 
are also systemic reasons for why decision making may not be optimised including the manner in 
which the institution rosters personnel as discussed below. 
8.4.4 Healthcare Institution Rostering 
Over the last ten years, there has been both a significant increase in the number of doctors graduating 
and the numbers of doctors employed. This has allowed for a predominance of shift work, which often 
reduces the numbers of hours the doctors' work and allows compliance with the safe working hours 
ruling. However, the rostering of junior doctors continues to see the majority of junior doctors working 
during the working week, which both minimises cost to the institution with the absence of overtime 
payments and caters for the elective work in hospitals, which predominantly occurs during the working 
week. Despite the increase in number and acuity of patients, leading to sicker patients throughout the 
24 hour period all week long, there has been little focus on increasing the numbers of doctors outside 
of normal working hours. Reasons for this include financial limitations, limiting working anti-social hours 
and failure to review the historical manner of rostering to address the increase in acuity of patients 24 
hours per day. Inevitably, this results in a mismatch of the care required out of hours to that delivered. 
Rostering of staff is a complex process but in an ideal world four domains need to be considered to 
maximise the potential for safe patient care, maximise patient exposure, maximise safe working hours 
and minimise budget expenditure: 
1. Adequate clinical exposure to gain experience 
2. Safe working hours and fiscal responsibility 
3. Workload 
4. Adequate senior support. 
8.4.4.1 Adequate Clinical Exposure 
The data suggest that nurses and doctors need to gain adequate clinical exposure to facilitate decision 
making by gaining the "gut feeling" to recognise and respond to patient deterioration, which 
undoubtedly speeds up the decision making process. However, the time and type of clinical exposure 
that nurses and doctors experience is dictated by the hours that they are employed and the manner in 
which they are rostered by the healthcare institution. Over time, the time and type of exposure have 
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been limited and this was expressed earlier by both the junior and senior doctors as impacting on their 
ability to make decisions (page 109). 
8.4.4.2 Safe working hours and fiscal responsibility 
Over the last twenty years, there has been a drive to cut medical staffing costs and limit the numbers 
of hours that junior doctors work. This has led to keen junior doctors feeling inadequate in that they 
cannot complete their workload within the time allocated to them, which they believe is not due to their 
inefficiency: 
JD: "The parent team, which is 8 till 5 because we're not allowed to stay after 5 
Monday to Friday because we're .. . and if we have to then that's because we've 
got poor time management and it's our own fault" 
8.4.4.3 Workload 
The workload of staff is dictated either by the growing demands of patients through their increasing 
acuity, coexisting comorbidities, the increasing numbers of patients, the reduction in time allowed to 
care for patients through the safe working hour rule and the reduction in staff to patient ratio. For 
whatever reason, both the junior doctors and nurses repeatedly expressed a lack of time to manage 
their own workloads: 
JD: "I don't have a meal break and on a night shift would rarely leave to even go 
to the toilet in my 13 hour shift" 
N: "An intern that has got a million things that they're doing, they've got so much 
to do you sort of think to yourself: 'Yes I can understand why you can't get here"' 
N: "It's eight hour shifts well I kind of scrape through and give it on to the next person" 
At times the nurses' workload was driven by roles that no one else would take on and by default they 
undertook them, limiting their time further: 
N: "A lot of our time is consumed by doing things that are not really what we 
should be doing like delivering items that nobody wants to deliver, fixing things 
and all that kind of stuff'' 
The nurses were also further burdened by the Administration not replacing nurses that called in sick: 
N: "When it gets really busy and I guess in view of the budget there's times when 
we're not replacing sick -leave on shifts then that makes it even heavier. You've 
got an extra patient and if you've got a -sick patient and a patient with dementia 
it's a nightmare" 
Through the · lack of experienced doctors being rostered out of hours, the few experienced doctors 
were excessively burdened and were likely to leave patient reviews longer than they would have liked 
as reported by one of the medical registrars in the focus groups: 
JD: "After hours people might say: 'Oh when you have time please go and check 
on my patient' like I'm getting so many pages or I've got so many people that are 
allocated to me they are kind of really on the backburner" 
For the surgical registrars it became physically impossible to see patients on time as the registrars 
were caug_ht up in the operating theatre as explained by one of the surgical registrars in the focus 
group: 
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JD: "If you are orthopaedic registrar you are on call you have to run two theatres 
you have to be in theatre all the time every time and you have to be with your 
patient all the time every time and seeing all the patients and multiply all this 
complication which is virtually not possible for a superman" 
The physical availability of experienced staff to less experienced staff was not isolated to the doctors 
as the senior nurses reported: 
N: "She [the nursing team leader] is being constantly called away to deal with 
these other problems of other really sick patients" 
Given the time limitations of the experienced junior doctor, the less experienced junior doctor was then 
delegated to performing tasks that were within their skill set so that they could be left unsupervised. 
However, by only performing rudimentary tasks, their learning experience for making more complex 
decisions was minimised: 
JD: "So what is your responsibility [in ED as a registrar] put in the cannula, start 
some fluid and take some blood, chest x-rays, and that's all. That's all you're 
supposed to do" 
JD: "During the day administrative type sort of thing. You don't actually see the 
patients clinically you're requesting investigations" 
Similarly, with the experienced nurses, since the complex tasks took up most of their time less complex 
tasks had to be delegated to other workers: 
N: "As an RN you have eight patients and you're doing [the] medication [round] 
and so on a reciprocal sort of agreement the EN will do the observations for the 
RN" 
Even relatives of patients were taking on some of the nurses' previous roles: 
N: "I think that's where it comes in that the mother was happy to do the saline 
nebs and the nurse would think: 'Great someone to help me with the load"' 
Traditional aspects of nursing care were delegated to others through lack of time: 
N: "I had to get a psychologist to come in and sit with him [the patient] for an hour 
because nurses don't have enough time" 
Reducing the time that experienced nurses spent with the patients minimised their ability to develop a 
rappo~ with t~e patient and thereby they ·missed opportunities for patients to confide in them that they 
did not feel very well: 
N: "This is your patient you need to talk to them because if you don't spend those 
few minutes with them they won't Cqll you back to tell them when they've got a 
problem" 
Another unintended consequence of handing over parts of patient care to other people such as AINs is 
that whilst they able to carry out the tasks, they are p~obably not as able to interpret their findings of 
the task. An added danger is that sometimes the supervising staff member does not then have time to 
ask the person who has performed the task about their findings. So, whilst information is collected, it is 
neither u_nderstood nor questioned or interpreted correctly and so cannot be used in any decision 
making process: 
N: "i don't think they process it, I think they are task orientated" 
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As highlighted earlier, the handing over of tasks can affect the content of communication as well as the 
interpretation of data: 
N: "EN might just say to the RN 'I've done the observations' and the RN might 
say 'oh good' and not actually question well were they okay what was the blood 
pressure and these are okay. What's okay? They don't ask the in depth 
questions" 
Other consequences of excessive workload also include: 
• Reduced time for understanding the patient's condition: 
N: "We're doing so much more and there's so many other problems that they 
have it's not just the cut and dried this person's got this you can't possibly get 
your head around all of it" 
• Reduced time to receive education: 
N: "But [the hospital administration] won't release our staff to do it though we've 
been told that you've got to have three days off a week to do it and management 
went 'no you can't do it"' 
Understanding the workload of others can result in changes to patient allocation, possibly improving 
patient care. One team leader explained that by seeing the patients for herself she would become 
aware of the workload of others and redistributed the work as needed to provide equity of workload 
across her nursing staff, which in turn, allowed for better nursing care delivered. 
N: "You visualise your patient and then you have an appreciation of your other 
colleagues' workload and you have an idea what everybody else is doing and I 
think that's a good thing" 
Despite the repetitive nature of the comments from the junior doctors and nurses that their workload 
was excessive, the senior doctors in the focus group could not understand why the junior doctors and 
nurses struggled with their time management: 
SD: "It is amazing the amount of .. . how few patients ... even if you compare the 
number of patients admitted here under a particular team if they get five 
admissions a day that's a lot" 
SD: "Ten minutes at an observation time can that not happen? When you think 
about it, you see people [nurses] chatting at the nurses' desk" 
This lack of understanding of the time pressures by the senior doctors may have arisen because they 
did not appreciate the number of patients that the junior doctors have to care for out of hours, which 
often exceeded 100 patients. Another factor.that the senior doctors may not have appreciated was that 
because the majority of junior doctors after hours were inexperienced, it would undoubtedly take the 
junior doctors longer to perform each task, than a senior doctor. These characte.ristics of junior doctors 
were not appreciated by those rostering the junior medical staff as little has changed in rostering junior 
medical staff over the last decade. 
8.4.4.4 Adequate Senior Support 
The findings reported here suggest that junior doctors and bedside nurses are either in a stage of 
development or have reached a threshold where they do not have the capability to make certain 
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decisions and need to involve those that can. However, from the data, the physical availability of these 
decision makers was limited because they were occupied elsewhere such as the operating theatre: 
JD: "They've got theatre and if they're going to theatre it's your problem" 
JD: "Trainee registrar they are just there for operations so they go to theatre and 
most of them never do the ward round" 
Their physical availability varied from speciality to speciality: 
N: "Our consultants [X speciality] are there pretty much. Our registrars are there 
pretty much all the time. The [Y speciality] you don't see very often. Very rarely 
you might see them once" 
The absences of consultants were extreme in one case: 
SD: "I know an intern who was in a ward for at least 6 weeks and eventually 10 
weeks but in 6 weeks they had never seen their consultant" 
For the nurses, they would often need to wait for decisions to be made on the formal consultant ward 
round rather than interrupt them for a senior decision maker's decision, which could delay care for the 
deteriorating patient: 
N: "We'll just keep going and if it [the blood pressure] drops a bit more I'll get an 
intern but will not question it further because you know that doctors come in on 
the morning rounds" 
Often the consultant ward rounds would not be until the afternoon because of outpatient clinics: 
N: " ... for me the team do their morning clinic here so they actually don't come to 
the ward until the afternoon and they do rounds when it's the afternoon or the 
morning shifts lunch" 
As for the doctors, the nurses also had limited access to their senior nursing decision makers through 
their rostering practices as very few were rostered on at any one time, which meant they were 
excessively busy: 
N: "They [Team Leaders] do but it's just bigger than Ben Hur for the team leader 
particularly if there's six nurses on the ward and the TL is the most experienced 
and then you haven't got another level two to support her particularly in the 
mornings and then you've got this big drop you've got no middle range 
experienced $taff experience level 1" 
N: "In my ward I actually prefer the Team Leader to have a light load so that they 
are free to help the other_ people" 
At times, jur-iior nurses were left to care for the sickest patients on the ward, through poor allocation of 
nursing staff: . 
N: "That's an allocation problem too, someone that sick shouldn't be given a 
junior nurse really" · · 
Or junior nurses were left to lead the ward team of nurses. However, they had inadequate experience 
and this left them feeling very negative about the experience: 
N: "I've just finished my grad year and I've been a team leader twice on my ward 
already: It's horrendous" 
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In summary, the influences on decision making are numerous, complex and interrelated and include 
the type and duration of clinical experience, access to a senior decision maker, ability to reflect on the 
care delivered and institutional impositions. 
8.5 Discussion 
8.5.1 Principal Findings 
The findings reported above indicate that it is possible to determine that the major influence on 
capacity of healthcare professionals to manage patient deterioration appropriately is their ability or lack 
of ability, to make the right clinical decision at the right time following patient deterioration. There are 
multiple influential factors, including individual and environmental characteristics, which influence the 
manner in which clinical decisions are made or not made. Whilst clinical decision making and its 
influences is not a new concept (Croskerry, 2005), this has not been reported in the literature in the 
arena of patient deterioration. 
8.5.1. 1 Patient Characteristics 
The deteriorating patient provides the healthcare professional with a number of cues, which are often 
physiological derangements (Harrison et al., 2005) but some can be more subjective (Cioffi et al., 
2009), and may or may not prompt the healthcare professional to make appropriate clinical decisions. 
In this study, it appeared that the more dramatic the deterioration, the more it triggered the healthcare 
professional to feel "the need to do something quickly". These decisions are likely to be intuitive 
(Lyneham et al., 2008; Fulop et al., 2009), a form of cognitive short circuitin1l, which are said to be 
subconscious and normally created from extensive clinical experience. Although the exact nature of 
the relationship between depth of clinical experience and intuitive decision making is unclear (Hall, 
2002), intuitive decision making often forms the basis of clinical reasoning, which is often beyond our 
understanding (Sox et al., 1988; Lyneham et al., 2008; Lyneham et al. , 2009). 
Given a large proportion of our focus group participants would be considered to be novices (two years 
or less of work experience), they would be lacking in depth of clinical experience and unable to draw 
on intuition to manage quickly d_eteriorating patients, it may be considered unusual that they described 
their ability 1'to do something" in an acutely deteriorating patient. Unlike an experienced clinician who 
can draw upon a well organised store of networks and rules, which allow efficient access and retrieval 
of information, the novice is unable to do this because of their lack of clinical experience. However, 
there is one situation, where the inexperienced novice need not have to .draw on their clinical 
experience but rather can draw upon a well organised set of rules namely in a cardiopulmonary arrest, 
one spectrum of a deteriorating patient. In this cli~ical situation they can draw upon basic and 
advanced life support guidelines (Australian Resuscitation Council, 2010). These guidelines or rules 
adhere to a specific set of tasks in a specific setting, namely cardiopulmonary arrest, which is an easily 
identifiable_ cue that can then engage a rigid set of tasks that does necessitate experience other than in 
the training laboratory. This also may reflect a pattern r~cognition process for decision ma~ing often 
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seen in clinicians (Croskerry, 2002) given that that the management of cardiac arrest is taught 
throughout medical and nursing school training. 
8.5.1.2 Junior Doctor or Nurse Attributes 
There were two attributes of the junior doctors and bedside nurses, their clinical experience and ability 
to communicate, that determined their ability to make appropriate decisions. 
8.5.1.2.1 Clinical Experience 
The natural career pathway for both junior doctors and bedside nurses involves an increasing 
exposure to clinical practice. A career stage will be reached when they will have seen, common clinical 
scenarios being managed a number of times, thereby gaining appropriate clinical experience. 
However, until this point is reached, it is likely they will be novices in their clinical decision making skills 
due to lack of clinical experience. The increasing clinical experience is often integrated with, and 
supported by, an increasing knowledge base often from text books, web sites, tutorials, simulation 
experiences and didactic teaching driven by assessment for post graduate examinations. 
From the data, junior doctors and nurses in the focus groups accounted for some of their difficulties in 
making clinical decisions through perceived or actual lack of clinical experience. This relationship 
between degree of clinical experience and response to making a clinical decision has been seen in 
intensive care nurses whereby the more frequently nurses dealt with particular patient situations, the 
more confident and less stressed they felt in their decision making (Bucknall, 2003). As well as the 
difficulties in making clinical decisions, the junior doctors and nurses in the focus groups revealed a 
lack of time to perform tasks. Reasons for this include that their inexperience-leads to a less focused 
and a more time consuming clinical assessment of deteriorating patients and the need to concentrate 
on a wider range of cues (Nojima et al., 2003) than an expert to help them make a decision. This leads 
the novice to being less able to sift out quickly what is important and what is not, and thereby decisions 
take longer. Equally, with reduced ability through a deficiency in cJinical experience, it is likely that 
there will be "bounded rationality" decision making (Simon, 1991 ), whereby a complex scenario is 
reduced to a level at which it can be readily understood by the decision maker. In the case of a novice 
managing a complex deteriorating patient, there is the risk that only simple components of the signs 
and sympto·ms will be managed. This limited assessment and interpretation of signs and symptoms is 
not likely to address the underlying reason for patient deterioration, which in turn limits the treatment 
options and may explain a commonly seen phenomenon, the clinical futile cycle (Buist, 2008). This is 
when there •is much clinical activity (all of it with good intention) directed at the patient, but little of this 
activity relieves the dire circumstances of the patient. 
8.5.1.2.2 Communication Skills 
Communication errors between healthcare professionals have long been identified as a significant 
contributor to medical errors (Leape et al., 1991; Wilson et al., 1995). The junior doctors in the focus 
groups appreciated the importance of communication in appropriate medical decision making, not only 
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in terms of the content of information provided to their more senior doctors but also the construct of the 
information conveyed. The importance of communication, both in content and delivery, has been 
reflected on by other clinical researchers who have effectively used communication tools that have 
taken content and its construction into consideration for delivering information to others (Marshall et al., 
2009; Thompson et al., 2011). The communication tools used in these studies were originally designed 
for the US Navy for standardising important and urgent communication in nuclear submarines. The 
clinical researchers found that the tools increased the transfer of key clinical information and reported 
that there was an improvement in the structure and consistency in the handover of information, a time 
when information is handed over to the next shift workers. From the data in the current study, the 
varied nature of requirements of information by senior doctors added an additional complexity in the 
delivery of clinical information. 
The universal adoption of a standardised communication tool such as ISBAR (Introduction, Situation, 
Background, Assessment, Recommendation) by universities training doctors and nurses may eliminate 
the confusion and maximise the transfer of important patient information to allow appropriate clinical 
decisions to be made. The use of such a communication tool by healthcare professionals is likely to 
become mandatory in Australia by the need to comply with Standard 6 from the Australian Commission 
on Safety and Quality in Healthcare (Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Healthcare, 
2011 ), which relates to the quality of information handed from one healthcare worker to another. 
8.5.1.3 Supervising Consultant 
8.5.1.3.1 Patient Ownership 
From the data, decision making appeared to be significantly influenced by who "owned" the patient 
sometimes with catastrophic, unintended consequences. These included the failure to enact 
appropriate decisions and actions because clinicians would be obstructed from engaging in life saving 
activities by the "owning" consultant, or clinicians would not engage in appropriate management 
activities if the patient concerned was not un·der their care. Obstruction to care due to possessiveness 
of consultants -has not been reported before in the literature. However, this lack of ownership by junior 
doctors has been reported since the introduction of shift work (Van Eaton et al., 2005), junior doctors 
do not perceive patients to be "their" patients (Drazen, 2004) if their supervising consultant does not 
own them a~d this was also found amongst the focus group junior doctors. This becomes an even 
greater issue out of hours, which occupies 70% of the week, because junior doctors will tend not to 
make decisions on patients they are only "covering", delaying definitive decision making until the 
"owning team" are back to care for their patient. Why this should be the case is unclear but could 
include; the fear of exposing inadequacies to other healthcare professionals including another 
. 
consultant, excessive workload affording little time to make decisions, uncertainty as to which 
consultant to call for advice and inadequate rapport with the patient's consultant. An important start 
would be 9 clear understanding of junior doctors' responsibilities regarding patient care needs (Van 
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Eaton et al., 2005) to increase the sense of the need to make decisions even when the patient does 
not belong to the team of the junior medical officer. 
8.5.1.3.2 The Consultant Supervising Care 
As the consultant supervising the care delivered by the patient's team of junior doctors and nurses, the 
data suggested that there were six related components that influenced patient deterioration decision 
making. 
8.5.1.3.2.1 The Role and Expectations of Healthcare Professionals 
Traditionally it is assumed that the consultant caring for the patient, from whatever speciality, is 
expected to care for the acutely unwell patient even though their experience may be limited given their 
specialisation in other areas of medicine (Hillman, 2002) and with the advent of intensive care as a 
speciality (Ibsen, 1954). Intensive care specialists are specifically trained to care for the critically ill 
patient and are increasingly caring for patients outside the walls of the ICU (Hillman, 2004), including 
the establishment of models of care such as the MET (Lee et al., 1995). These developments probably 
further diminishes healthcare professionals' experience of managing the acutely unwell patient further 
and so hospitals today are grappling with who has the role of managing acutely unwell patients so that 
they receive timely and appropriate treatment. 
8.5.1.3.2.2 Decision Making and their Consequences 
Decision making is an integral part of a healthcare curriculum. Two decades ago, doctors completed 
their medical training by being immersed for hours on end in the clinical arena so that they learned to 
decide which diagnostic and treatment plans to put in place to meet patients' needs (Drazen et al. , 
2002) . However, the graded learning experience to acquire the skill base to decision making requires a 
delicate balance between the individual initiative and supervision by their supervisors (Gawande, 
2002). This delicate balance of giving the trainee room for initiative to make decisions but being there 
to provide support makes clear articulation of roles and responsibilities of their trainees very difficult. 
Supervisors also need to balance the provision of direction and self-direction and be approachable; 
qualities akin to those of a PhD supervisor (Lee et al., 2007) . Data from the focus groups did not 
. . 
universally reflect that supervisors had the pre-requisite qualities particularly in "being approachable". 
This lack o! approachability of supervisors, particularly after hours, has been described previously 
(Kennedy et al., 2009) and can often hi~der timely, appropriate decision making. Some of the 
approachability was the genuine (intended or unintended) lack of physical presence of their supervisor 
but an undercurrent that pervaded the focus groups was the fear of the consequences that may have 
resulted from calling for help to facilitate decision making. This fear of asking for help from supervisors 
is not new and has been previously reported by both junior doctors (Garrud, 1990) and by junior 
nurses (Cioffi, 2000). Culturally, this is first seen in the teaching of healthcare students where teaching 
is often by humiliation with the main perpetrators being male and senior medical staff (Lempp et al. , 
2004). In this study the fear of asking for help appeared to be in association with either previously poor 
interactions with their supervisor or that they were too afraid to admit their inadequacies to their 
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supervisor. Of note, the consultants in the focus groups did not perceive that consultants could be 
unapproachable or reflect the extent of the fear that the junior doctors expressed in contacting 
consultants. 
8.5.1.3.2.3 Decision Challenging and their Consequences 
From the focus groups, challenging consultant decisions was uncommon and independent of whether 
the nurses and junior doctors believed or knew whether the consultants had the skills and knowledge 
of managing patient deterioration. In the case of Alice, the failure to challenge the consultant's decision 
led to delays in appropriate care. However, the ability to challenge decisions often depends on whether 
the challenger feels the confidence to do so, which is often provided either by experience or using 
communication techniques such as graded assertiveness (Brindley et al., 2011) or other strategies 
(Curtis et al., 2011 ). Other strategies include the fostering of communication by understanding each 
clinician's information needs in a mutually respectful manner, especially in the context of uncertainty. 
Ideally, the ability to challenge decisions is to be aware of the barriers of communication (lack of 
knowledge creating lack of confidence, fear of experiencing a negative reaction from the decision 
maker, excessive workload and lack of time, talking to an unknown quantity, lack of physical presence 
of the decision maker, adhering to rigid, traditional communication hierarchies) and creating 
communication opportunities by addressing the communication barriers. 
8.5.1.3.2.4 Admission of Knowledge Deficits and their Consequences 
The ability to admit to or acknowledge deficiencies in knowledge provides a platform for openness in 
asking further questions to facilitate decision making and caring for deteriorating patients. The doctors 
in the focus groups described three phases of their ability or inability to admit their deficiencies in 
knowledge. The phases were temporally related to the time from graduation. The first phase was with 
newly qualified doctors who believed that it was still "safe" to admit that they did not know "everything" 
as there was a general expectation that those around them would appreciate their lack of experience in 
the role. This appreciation allowed for an open dialogue between the junior doctor and their consultant 
or between junior nurses and senior nurses without negative consequences. The second phase 
appeared around two years after graduation from medical school when the junior doctors were starting 
to perceive that it was not "safe" to admit their deficiencies to their consultant. This sense of inability to 
admit their d~ficiencies is likely to be associated with either a lack of approachability of their supervisor 
or the fear of upsetting their supervisor, which is perceived by the junior doctor to lead to a poor 
reference and reduce their ability for career progression (Kennedy et al., 2009). As acknowledged 
earlier in the chapter, the junior doctors preferred to seek advice from outside their traditional medical 
hierarchy, frequently the experienced nursing staff. This has been described as the newer negotiated 
modification of the nursing and medical boundary (Svensson, 1996; Allen, 1997). In contrast in .ICUs 
(Coombs et al. , 2004) the medical hierarchy has been found to be more dominating than the senior 
experience_d nurses. The third phase was found in experienced consultants when they felt able, once 
more, to admit their deficiencies in knowledge and requept advice to facilitate decision making. Some 
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of the reasons for this include: the consultant position currently is almost immune from accountability 
with no one deriding their knowledge deficiency; attaining enough clinical experience to appreciate that 
it was always going to be impossible to know everything given the complex medical world (Gawande, 
2009) and being able to seek advice from distant geographical peers without local peers being aware. 
In being aware that junior doctors often find it difficult to seek advice from their own supervisors, 
strategies to either overcome this difficulty need to be pursued or it has to be accepted that it becomes 
the norm for seeking information outside of the normal social paradigm. If continuing with the traditional 
medical hierarchies of seeking advice, strategies will need to include both the encouragement of junior 
doctors to ask for advice and for the supervisors to understand the importance of seeking help rather 
than responding negatively to requests. These issues have been increasingly addressed in medical 
curricula (Hafferty, 1998; Montgomery et al., 2003) but serve only to inform the student leaving senior 
medical staff ill-informed on the issues. 
8.5.1.3.2.5 Peer Review and Personal Reflection 
Reflection, the purposeful critical analysis of knowledge and experience in order to achieve deeper 
meaning and understanding (Mann et al., 2009), has been used toas a learning tool in medicine and 
nursing for decades. It allows healthcare professionals to revisit experiences so that they can learn 
from complex problems in professional practice. Whilst reflective practice has been qualitatively 
demonstrated to allow new knowledge to be integrated with past experiences, there is little to guide 
medical educators and senior doctors how to encourage and develop reflective ability in their novices 
(Mann et al., 2009). There was very little evidence from the focus groups that nurses and doctors were 
using reflection as a tool for learning to strengthen their ability to make clinical decisions, which has 
been found useful by other groups of medical trainees and medical students (Branch et al., 2002) . 
Steps to improve this include: the teacher being a good role model, gaining the trust of the learners, 
and having the skills to facilitate reflection (Branch et al., 2002). Indeed, receptiveness to reflection 
requires a willingness to learn and an acknowledgment of a deficiency in knowledge, which the junior 
doctors in the focus groups were unwillin_g to admit, whereas the senior doctors in the focus groups 
were m·uch ha.ppier to admit their uncertainties. The literature (Keren, 1987) suggests that the greater 
the expertise the greater the readiness to admit one's deficiencies and one senior doctor in the focus 
group was strongly supportive of reflection and actively participated in self-reflection. However, the 
focus group doctors acknowledged that doctors are generally poor at reflecting on the care that they 
have delivered although it is recognised as an essen_tial element of continuing professional 
development (General Medical Council, 2009). One rea~on for this may be the inadequate provision of 
reflection tools to medical students or junior doctors, although this is now being recognised by both 
universities (Law, 2011) and training programs (Berger et al., 2011 ). Once reflection becomes the 
cultural norm, learning opportunities will grow and might improve the quality of decision making. 
Since the exposure of landmark medical disasters (Mitchell et al., 2008) in the mid-1990s, participation 
in clinical peer review and audit processes have formed part of many post graduate medical and 
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nursing professional development programs, which are now demanded by licensing medical 
authorities. The premise of clinical audit and peer review is to improve the quality of patient care 
delivered by allowing clinicians to understand their short comings in the care that they have delivered 
to patients. To date, although a mandatory requirement for licensure, clinical audit and peer review is 
yet to demonstrate that care and outcome of patients is improved. 
As experienced by some in the focus groups, peer review and clinical audit can be counterproductive 
and provide a potentially threatening environment for junior medical and nursing staff (Johnston et al., 
2000). There are described methods of improving the usefulness of clinical audit and peer review. 
Conducive, confidential environments for audited are needed and ideally the problems tackled as a 
multidisciplinary unit with the oversight from a strong and fair facilitator. Training programmes for 
clinical audit are a necessity along with establishing evaluation programmes (Johnston et al., 2000). 
These prerequisites for clinical audit and peer review were not reflected by those in the focus group as 
the main aim of the focus group was to reflect upon clinical management of patient deterioration. 
8.5.1.3.2.6 Individual Perlormance Feedback 
A frequent complaint by both medical students and junior doctors is that they "never receive any 
feedback" (Ende, 1983; Sheehan, 1984). In the focus groups it was not only the junior doctors who 
expressed this opinion but also the consultants. This is disappointing given that feedback can be an 
effective learning tool. There are many opportunities for using feedback as a learning tool in healthcare 
institutions (Branch et al., 2002) and feedback can either be done informally ~r in a highly structured 
environment. Examples of how feedback can be delivered include: 
i. Brief feedback 
The teacher or supervisor provides feedback that is useful during a specific event. 
ii. Formal feedback 
The teacher or_ supervisor provides feedback related to a previous specific event and encourages self-
fe'edback. 
iii. Major feedback 
The teacher 0,r supervisor schedules a feedback session so that the learner will know that feedback 
will provided and that they will have an opportunity to reflect upon their performance. 
Learners are highly appreciative of feedback as a mechanism to increase their knowledge to provide a 
greater capacity to make the right clinical decision. In response, hospitals and postgraduate 
professional development programs have developed an infrastructure for formal feedback. 
Accreditation requirements for both hospitals and post graduate professional development 
programmes include mandatory performance agreements for all healthcare professionals and for 
trainees to' be supervised by appointed supervisors of training, which provides an opportunity for 
regular feedback on their performance. It is imperative tliat supervisors providing feedback are given 
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the appropriate tools and techniques to provide helpful and supportive feedback as it is likely that 
poorly constructed feedback will have a negative impact upon the behaviour of a healthcare 
professional. 
8.5.1 .4 Healthcare Institution Rostering 
8.5.1.4.1 Adequate Clinical Exposure 
Unless there is a clinical situation such as a cardiopulmonary arrest, described earlier (Page 106), 
which has a set of strict management rules, the duration and type of clinical experience that affords 
intuitive decision making, is probably critical in the management of the deteriorating patient. An added 
strength to the experienced clinician's clinical decision making is that they can also raise diagnostic 
possibilities of the atypical variant (Croskerry, 2002) rather than be influenced by recent exposure to a 
particular disease, which often influences more inexperienced clinicians. 
Although clinical exposure can be gained through a simulated environment (Maran et al., 2003; 
Beaubien et al., 2004), it is hard to substitute this for real life clinical experiences to aid the ability of 
doctors to make clinical decisions. In nursing, increasing clinical experience is associated with a 
reduction in the incidence of adverse events (Morrison et al., 2001) suggesting improved decision 
making. As a result, it is essential to consider how rostering and allocation of staff can affect clinical 
exposure when developing rosters for junior medical staff and allocation of nursing staff on shifts. 
8.5.1.4.2 Safe Working Hours and Fiscal Responsibility 
In the mid-1990s, Healthcare Institutions in Europe faced pressure from the European Working Time 
Directive (Spurgeon et al., 1997) and in Australia from the Australian Medical Association (Australian 
Medical Association, 2003) to reduce the number of hours junior doctors worked per week. This 
reduction in working hours was an attempt to reduce the fatigue and stress experienced by healthcare 
professionals, which was said to impact upon patient safety (Spurgeon et al., 1997). The experience 
from junior medical staff working night s~ifts is that whilst they report fatigue and poor performance 
(Ahmed-Little, 2007), a study of fatigued airline pilots suggested that if they had worked previously 
-
together, they worked better than those that had been well rested but had not worked together 
previously. Although ind_ividual team members made more errors, the team was able to compensate 
for the errors· of individuals (Carter et al., 1999). In the focus groups, the shortened hours for junior 
doctors resulted in them being frustrated with their inability to handover completed tasks, which they 
felt would be interpreted as their poor time management. by their supervisors. 
It is unclear from healthcare institutions whether the drive for safe working hours is to benefit the 
delivery of safe patient care or to reduce public healthcare costs by reducing the need for overtime in 
both medical officers and nurses. Aside from the cost or safe working hours issues, the manner in 
which rosters are written need to consider carefully not only duration of clinical exposure but also the 
, 
manner in which they can be taught during these clinical experiences. From the discussions in the 
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focus groups, it would appear that rosters were infrequently written to enable maximal clinical 
exposure, such that junior doctors felt inadequate in the clinical areas that they had been rotated to as 
part of their rotational roster. 
8.5.1.4.3 Workload 
The reduction in working hours for junior medical staff has reduced their clinical exposure and so for 
their years of graduation, they are relatively less clinically experienced. Despite this relative clinical 
inexperience the manner in which we roster, teach, train and supervise both junior medical and nursing 
staff has remained largely unchanged for over a century. Clinical inexperience also increases the time 
to make decisions and is compounded by the increasing complexity of patients cared for in acute care 
hospitals leading to the sense of excessive workloads (Collins, 2010; Temple, 2010), which was 
reported frequently by the nurses and doctors in the focus groups. In the UK systems have been put in 
place (Collins, 2010) to provide a curriculum for training with an emphasis on competency based 
training to try and combat the deficiencies in clinical exposure. However, they have been taken up 
inconsistently (Collins, 2010). In Australia, a curriculum framework for junior doctors has been 
established (Confederation of Postgraduate Medical Education Councils., 2006), which should allow 
junior doctors to gain appropriate skills. Its effect on providing skills to make decisions to minimise 
workload was not felt by junior medical staff in the focus groups despite their hospital providing .an 
education program that delivered the curriculum framework for junior doctors. 
If safe working hours limit clinical exposure, which increases the time for junior doctors to make 
decisions, a greater emphasis needs to be placed on making each clinical experience a useful learning 
situation. This requires time and dedication to teaching from supervisors. As an alternative or as an 
addition, high fidelity simulation can provide useful experiences, which facilitate clinical teaching, often 
in a multi-disciplinary environment. 
8.5.1.4.4 Adequate Senior Support 
To reduce working hours per week, junior doctors and nurses work shifts, wh ich mean that for large 
periods of time they work outside of "normal" working hours. For the junior doctors much of their work 
is not direct(y supervised by their designated s~pervisor. Instead, they have to liaise with a variety of 
consultants to deliver safe, effective care by _seeking advice on clinical decision making. Whilst having 
access to other consultants through on call rosters, junior medical officers, often remain reluctant to 
seek advice, for a variety of reasons '(Kennedy et al., 2009). These reasons include the need to 
determine the relative importance of the clinical question, the desire to seek independence, the belief 
that their credibility may be under threat if they choose to seek advice and the consultants' 
approachability and availability. The Visiting Medical Officers and to a lesser degree Staff Specialists 
are often reviewing ward patients either early or late in the day when their junior doctors are not 
rostered on. This reduces the ability of junior doctors and nurses to obtain timely advice and this was 
identified as an issue in the focus groups. The fractured nature of the parent team, either through the 
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junior doctor working shifts or the consultant working different hours increases the risk of 
miscommunication and diminishes the opportunities for communication, which risks the right decisions 
being made and acted on in a timely manner. 
8.5.2 Strengths and Limitations of the Study 
The strength of this study is that it has used a de-identified and a previously unknown deteriorating 
patient case as the spring board for focus group discussion. It was designed to encourage the 
participants to appreciate that healthcare professionals are imperfect and to permit the participants to 
feel able to air their true feelings and perceptions of their own memories of managing patient 
deterioration. The use of a professional external facilitator who was not a healthcare professional for 
three of the four focus groups, may have allowed for more free expression and a greater degree of 
probing where no assumptions were made for the processes in healthcare delivery. The composition of 
the focus groups, including both senior and junior doctors and nurses, afforded representation of 
different viewpoints. The final group was a mixed group, reflecting the multidisciplinary nature of caring 
needed for the deteriorating patient and this multidisciplinary group provided a depth of conversation 
with some triangulation between nurses' and doctors' thoughts, perceptions and actions. The use of 
focus groups in determining why healthcare professionals struggle to recognise and respond to patient 
deterioration has not been previously reported. 
There is a number of limitations to this study including its generalisability. This study relays thoughts 
and perceptions of tertiary hospital nurses and doctors where two systems run in parallel for the 
recognition and response to patient deterioration and may not be applicable to other healthcare 
settings. However, many of the findings are similar to those reported in the literature, which suggests 
that the findings are likely to be generalisable to other healthcare settings. The small numbers used in 
the focus groups may not have been an adequate representation of junior and senior doctors and 
nurses in the hospital. The author's recruitment of the focus groups, particularly of the doctors, may 
have biased the selection leading to members being more attuned to the deteriorating patient and 
again may not have represented the general views of nurses and doctors. Equally, with the presence 
of the author at all the focus groups, the groups may have been intimidated, particularly the junior 
doctors, thereby limiting the depth of discussion and exhibiting some of the characteristics described in 
inability to ta!k to senior doctors (Kennedy et al., 2009). On the other hand, working within an 
environment where participants felt comfortable, and where they closely identified with the case study 
provided a level of credibility to the discussion which might hot have been there had the study been 
conducted differently 
However, to gain further insights into the influene,es on decision making in managing patient 
deterioration, triangulation of the data gained from these focus groups is needed. This is likely to 
involve real time data collection in the clinical environment. 
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8.6 Conclusion 
Appropriate and timely decision making is crucial to managing patient deterioration and is likely to be 
the limiting factor for attaining positive outcomes in interventional deteriorating patient studies. Key 
challenges are lack of clinical experience and access to senior decision makers through fear of calling 
them. Improvement in managing patient deterioration requires a review of not only the way our 
healthcare institutions manage, train and educate nurses and doctors but also a minimisation of the 
barriers to timely, appropriate communication with the senior decision makers, including the consultant 
medical staff. 
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CHAPTER 9: SUMMARY, FUTURE 
DIRECTIONS AND CONCLUSION 
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9.1 Introduction 
" ..... as the hours passed, I should have insisted that she be reviewed with a view 
to intervention and much sooner as I most certainly had presided over copious 
monitoring and review but a seemingly total lack of clinical assessment and 
decision making affording early intervention in order that her deterioration was 
halted" 
The key issues that Alice's mother identified when the healthcare professionals caring for her 16 year 
old daughter failed to provide timely treatment are very relevant to this research. Although the work of 
this thesis does not directly address the specific issues raised in the case of Alice, there is now a better 
understanding of the key elements needed to recognise and respond to patient deterioration. 
9.2 Key Findings 
The key findings from this thesis that affect the management of a deteriorating patient are as follows: 
1. Lack of consistent definition of a deteriorating patient; 
2. Clinical processes in managing patient deterioration are deficient; 
3. Patient deterioration systems only partially improve the clinical processes; 
4. Decision making determines timely and effective clinical management. 
9.2.1 Lack of Consistent Definition of the "Deteriorating Patient" 
From the literature review, one of the significant challenges to the deteriorating patient arena is that 
there no agreed definition of a deteriorating patient (McQuillan et al. , 1998; Hillman et al., 2001 ; Parr et 
al., 2001; Whitehead et al. , 2002). Without an agreed definition, the curriculum for teaching about 
patient deterioration is ill define9 and not systematically taught at both the undergraduate and 
postgraduate level. Without appropriate teaching and training, deteriorating patients are less likely to 
be recognised, which makes the provision of timely and appropriate care more precarious. The lack of 
consistent defini.tion also means that enrolment of deteriorating patients for research studies is 
inconsistent and study generalisability is limited. This lack of generalisability of studies may explain the 
delay in the development of national programs for patlent deterioration by national healthcare providers 
[(National Confidential Enquiry into Patient Outcome and Death, 2005; Australian Commission for 
Quality and Safety in Healthcare, 2010; Health Services Executive Ireland, 2010)]. 
For the purposes of this research , the definition of a deteriorating patient was presumed to be "a 
patient who is at risk of critical illness". Deteriorating patients are often at risk of developing organ 
failure from inadequate oxygen delivery leading to depletion of the intracellular energy, ATP. 
Inadequate oxygen delivery is frequently reflected in the development of abnormal vital signs and 
0 
although vital signs lack sensitivity for the detection of patient deterioration, they have a better 
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specificity to detect deteriorating patients (Fieselmann et al. , 1993). This is presumably the reason that 
there is ubiquitous measurement and documentation of vital signs and has been the cornerstone of 
acute healthcare since Nightingale's days of nursing (Nightingale, 1859). 
9.2.2 Clinical Processes in Managing Patient Deterioration are Deficient 
"The Observational Study" revealed large gaps in the clinical processes of managing patient 
deterioration including infrequent documentation of respiratory rate and the delay in appropriate 
treatment for deteriorating patients. Importantly, the delays in appropriate care, such as calling for a 
MET review, were associated with multiple communications between nursing and junior medical staff. 
Multiple interactions that were well intentioned but did not result in meaningful management of the 
deteriorating patient featured strongly in Alice's care and have been described aptly as the "clinical 
cycle of futility" (Buist, 2008). In "The Observational Study", there was also a lack of consultant 
engagement in managing patient deterioration and these data triangulated well with "The Human 
Element Study", where the junior medical staff feared calling for help from their consultants unless it 
was unavoidable. Concomitantly, there were also delays seen in the healthcare workers calling for a 
MET review in one third of the patients who fulfilled MET criteria similar to other studies (Calzavacca et 
al., 2010) and this may be due to fear of calling for a MET review (Cioffi, 2000) . 
9.2.3 Patient Deterioration Systems only Partially Improve Clinical Processes 
Patient deterioration researchers have designed systems, predominantly using vital signs, to identify 
deteriorating patients and alert ward staff that they are caring for a deteriorating patient. In turn, the 
ward staff can then call for appropriate help. These systems can track a patient's condition and if 
specific criteria are met then they can trigger ward staff to call f~r further help, the so called "track and 
trigger system". The single parameter track and trigger system (Lee et al. , 1995) uses one vital sign 
measurement to prompt ward staff to call for a critical care team. The multi-parameter track and trigger 
system (Morgan et al. , 1997) summates scores from up to eight different vital sign measurements and 
? pre-determined score can prompt ward staff to call for help often from the patient's own medical 
team. However as stated earlier, because these systems use vital signs, they have lacked sensitivity 
(Smith et al., 2008; Smith et al. , 2008) so have been unlikely to detect-all deteriorating patients. More 
recently, a scoring system has been.developed with improved sensitivity and specificity (Prytherch et 
al. , 2010; Bleyer et al. , 2011) . To avoid the reliance on vital signs on detecting patient deterioration, 
some systems have used subjective criteria, such as "worried", to increase their sensitivity thereby 
capturing more deteriorating patients. The difficulty with subjective criteria is that they rely on staff 
having had adequate clinical experience, often lacking in junior healthcare workers, which is generally 
the predominant workforce out of hours. In the light of these issues, the systems that should prompt 
nurses and doctors to seek more appropriate help for deteriorating patients may not necessarily 
instigate help any earlier than traditional models of care. 
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Although many deteriorating patient studies have focussed on installing tools that use vital signs and 
communication frameworks, researchers have not predominantly concentrated on addressing ward 
processes such as the documentation of vital signs and communication strategies. However, it is 
acknowledged that as a spin-off of these deteriorating patient studies an increase in documentation of 
respiratory rate has occurred (McBride et al. , 2005; Chen et al., 2009) and an increase in calling for 
METs has been demonstrated (MERIT Study Investigators, 2005). 
By providing a multifaceted system for patient deterioration in "The lnterventional Study" that focussed 
on educating ward healthcare workers involved in patient deterioration significant changes in behaviour 
were found. These behavioural changes included an increase in frequency of documentation of all vital 
signs including respiratory rate and instances of review by the patient's junior doctor and MET. 
Although these changes were associated with positive patient outcomes, issues with some of the 
clinical processes required for managing patient deterioration remained. There continued to be 
numerous instances where the alerts for deteriorating patients, determined by their MEWS or MET 
trigger, were seemingly ignored by the ward staff despite the multifaceted intervention. 
Changes in behaviour are often seen at the outset of clinical research projects and can be maintained 
during the study through constant reminders (visual, verbal , and repercussions of the failure to behave 
appropriately) by the research staff. The harder challenge of sustaining behaviour is when research 
projects move into every day clinical practice as there is often no behavioural reminders or governance 
of the behaviours examined. In "The Sustainability Study" two key behaviours for managing patient 
deterioration remained two years following the initial introduction of the multifaceted intervention. 
However there was no sustained positive impact upon patient outcome, which could reflect an 
underpowered observational study or a regression back to the mean of prior to the installation of the 
intervention, a known limitation of the interpretation of the before and after intervention trials (Moran et 
al., 2005). 
The findings that some of the behavioural changes that are pivotal for managing patient deterioration 
were sustained in every day practice are reassuring and could be built on to improve patient care 
further. Reasons for the sustained improvement are likely to be multi factorial. The deteriorating patient 
education program, COMPASS@, became mandatory at both the nursing and medical undergraduate 
and post graduate level. There was a hospital governance structure that oversaw and reviewed 
relevant policies. All cases of clinical deterioration were reviewed at a weekly multidisciplinary 
committee meeting and any issues occurring were taken back to the relevant clinical area for feedback 
and learning. However, there were still some important behaviours that had not improved (e.g . nursing 
communication to doctors) or had even deteriorated (e.g. calling for a MET review) despite the 
installation of the multifaceted intervention and the sustainability support structures. 
9.2.4 Decision Making Determines Timely and Effective Clinical Management 
Despite the issues with the definition of the deteriorating patient, the sensitivity of vital signs to detect 
. 
deteriorating patients and the systems currently available to detect and manage patient deterioration, 
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the greatest challenge remains the manner in which healthcare professionals respond to managing the 
deteriorating patient (Buist, 2008) . The story from Alice's mother revealed that her daughter was 
observed with due diligence and was reviewed on multiple occasions by nurses and doctors and yet 
seemingly the right care was not being provided to Alice. Understanding human responses to a 
particular set of circumstances is only partly possible through quantitative data and better insights are 
revealed with exploring healthcare professionals' thoughts and perceptions through qualitative 
research . 
Some of the shortcomings in human behaviour when managing patient deterioration were identified in 
"The Observational Study", "The Behavioural Study and "The Sustainability Study" and include the 
reluctance to seek expert guidance on further management. As such, it may mean that more "Alices"' 
are likely to occur. Better insights into the nursing and medical behaviour are essential to determine 
where the next steps need to occur in managing patient deterioration. Through talking to both doctors 
and nurses caring for deteriorating patients, it appears that the major decider on whether deteriorating 
patients are cared for appropriately is whether healthcare professionals make the right decision at the 
right time on the right patient. A major influence on decision making was the perceived or actual 
inability to communicate with a key decision maker, specifically trained consultants, to help both junior 
doctors and nurses make the right decisions. In order to facilitate this communication pathway, 
perceived and actual hierarchical barriers will need to be broken down to allow junior doctors and 
nurses to feel comfortable to communicate with their senior decision makers in the event of patient 
deterioration. 
Other key influences on appropriate decision making were the extent of clinical experience and the 
communication structure between healthcare professionals. By addressing and improving these 
influences, it may be possible to provide better decision making affording earlier intervention to prevent 
further patient deterioration. What also may impact the care delivered to a deteriorating patient is the 
open acknowledgement by healthcare workers that their standard of care delivered has a bearing upon 
the patients themselves, something that none of the healthcare workers touched upon during the 
interviews or discussions. 
9.3 Limitations 
There are limitations to this thesis and they have been described in detail in relation to each study but 
given the case study nature of the thesis many of the studies involved either small patient or 
healthcare professional samples, which may not reflect other healthcare professionals or institutions. 
However, the findings of the observational, quantitative studies are very similar to those found in other 
healthcare settings and so it is likely that the deficiencies found and described are generalisable. What 
is less known is whether the qualitative findings can be generalisable as there has been very limited 
qualitative work in the arena of the deteriorating patient. So whilst the results from this particular work 
may not be generalisable, the method of investigation to understand the social context of the 
management of patient deterioration can be generalised . Other issues include the researcher being 
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herself a member of the healthcare staff at the hospital where the studies were undertaken posed a 
limitation to the study it is proposed that in fact this involvement was a strong positive. With an intimate 
knowledge of the system and an understanding of the local environment, the researcher was able to 
bring insights that someone from outside would not have been able to provide. 
9.4 The Impact of the Thesis Findings on the Candidate's Work at the 
Canberra Hospital 
The thesis has generated significant changes in work practice both personally and in the intensive care 
unit that the candidate directs. There is now a much greater emphasis on patient and family centred 
care in the intensive care unit so that families are invited to take part in the intensive care ward rounds. 
This allows them opportunities to talk to the clinician caring for their loved ones attempting to maximise 
the input of their voice. Leading on from the work down on the multifaceted intervention and listening to 
the concerns of Alice's mother, a family escalation system (Call and Respond Early [CARE] for Patient 
Safety) has been piloted and will be rolled out in 2012. The candidate now appreciates the inability for 
junior doctors and nurses to make decisions particularly after hours when so few senior decision 
makers are physically present in the building. In understanding this limitation, more resources have 
been implemented including greater consultant and senior registrar cover for the intensive care unit. 
This provides a larger number of hours with senior decision makers in the hospital specifically for 
managing patient deterioration. 
9.5 Further Studies 
There is a number of studies that require further exploration including the investigation of which 
detection tool is likely to identify deteriorating patients prior to the onset of organ dysfunction. It may 
well be that using a combination of . using vital signs or other parameters from the laboratory and 
stratifying for the presence of comorbidities can provide a more effective tool. Undoubtedly, if the tools 
are going to involve complex multi variable logistic regression equations, then to be applicable at the 
bedside, the tool will need to be digitised and used through a handheld computer system. Future 
studies will need to focus on overcoming hospital hierarchy to ensure that there is timely engagement 
of senior decision makers, this may well be through automated patient detection tools that 
automatically engage the senior decision maker without the ward staff needing to decide whether they 
should or should not call the consultant. All these sys_tems need to be tested in large, probably cluster 
randomised, controlled trials to ensure that they ~re adequately powered to determine whether hospital 
mortality is improved. 
9.6 Conclusion 
The delayed management of a deteriorating patient can lead to unexpected and potentially preventable 
deaths and it is, therefore, critical that the all the necessary steps are put in place to minimise harm to 
deteriorating patients. However, from the data, the question of why patients are allowed to deteriorate 
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on hospital wards is complex and includes many traits of poor teamwork that increases the likelihood 
of harm being bestowed on deteriorating patients. Although healthcare teams are employed to care for 
patients, including deteriorating patients, it is evident that the team is fragmented both physically (shift 
work, attendance other than the hospital ward and being part of different peer groups) and mentally 
(perceived or actual hierarchal barriers). The fragmentation of the healthcare team neither fosters 
collaborative working relationships nor encourages the drawing upon of clinical expertise, which is 
particularly needed out of hours when the junior, inexperienced nurses and doctors are the mainstay of 
healthcare delivery including managing patient deterioration. 
By understanding the clinical processes that are needed for exemplary team work for managing 
deteriorating patients, it is possible to install a deteriorating patient intervention that potentially improve 
patient outcome. These interventions are aimed at providing a common goal of timely and appropriate 
recognition and response to patient deterioration, an understanding of the roles and responsibilities of 
all doctors and nurses around patient deterioration and a clear structure for communication, which 
overcomes medical hierarchy. Additionally, patient deterioration interventions need to seriously 
consider involving patients and families, who are often more in tune as to whether anything is wrong, 
as part of the caring team. 
However, if patient outcome following patient deterioration is to improve consistently, all academic 
health institutions need to focus on curricula that include education and training on patient 
deterioration, communication between healthcare workers and an open understanding that their 
management decisions significantly affect patient care. In the age of shift work and reduced clinical 
experience, enhanced decision making in the management of patient deterioration and teamwork will 
need the combination of intelligent systems that can detect accurately patients who are likely to be at 
risk of deterioration and achieving better access to senior decision makers by breaking down further 
the traditional perceived or actual medical hierarchy. 
146 
REFERENCES 
147 
ACT Health. (2007). "COMPASS." Retrieved 21st June 2010, from 
http://www. health .act.gov .au/c/health ?a=da&did= 11025490. 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. (2001 ). "Translating Research Into Practice (TRIP)-I1." 
Retrieved 9th January 2012, from http://www.ahrq.gov/research/trip2fac.htm. 
Ahmed-Little, Y. (2007). "Implications of shift work for junior doctors." British Medical Journal 
334(7597): 777-778. 
Allen, D. (1997). "The nursing-medical boundary: a negotiated order?" Sociology of Health & Illness 
19: 498-520. 
Altman, D. G. and J. M. Bland (1994). "Diagnostic tests. 1: Sensitivity and specificity." British Medical 
Journal 308: 1552. 
Andrews, T. and H. Waterman (2005). "Packaging: a grounded theory of how to report physiological 
deterioration effectively." Journal of Advanced Nursing 52: 473-481. 
Australian College of Emergency Medicine. (2005) . "Statement on Responsibility of Care in Emergency 
Departments." Retrieved 21st August 2011, from 
http://www.acem.org .au/media/policies and guidelines/responsibility care.pdf. 
Australian Commission for Quality and Safety in Healthcare. (2010) . "Essential elements for 
recognising an responding to clinical deterioration." Retrieved 4th January 2012, from 
http://www. health .gov.au/internet/safety/publishing. nsf /Content/RaRtCD Con Stat. 
Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Healthcare. (2011). "Clinical Handover." Retrieved 
1st July, 2012, from http://www.safetyandquality.gov.au/our-work/clinical-
communications/clinical-handover/. 
Australian Medical Association. (2003). "Hospital Medical Officers' Hours of Work and Workloads: A 
strategic approach to occupational health and safety- 1996." Retrieved 18th September 
2011, from http://ama.com.au/node/1315. 
Australian Resuscitation Council. (2010) . "Australian Resuscitation Guidelines." Retrieved 28th 
August 2011, from http://www.resus.org .au/policy/guidelines/index.asp. 
Beaubien, J. M. and D. P. Baker ( 2004). "The use of simulation for training teamwork skills in health 
care: how low can you go?" Quality and Safety in Health Care 13;(Suppl 1 ): i51-i56. 
Bellomo, R., D. Goldsmith, et al. (2004). "Prospective controlled trial of effect of medical emergency 
. team on postoperative morbidity and mortality rates." Critical Care Medicine 32: 916-921. 
Bellomo, R., D. Goldsmith, et al. (2003). "A prospective before-and-after trial of a medical emergency 
team." Medical Journal of Australia 179: 283-287. 
Bennett, D. and J. Bion (1999). "ABC of intensive care: Organisation of intensive care." British Medical 
Journal 318: 1468-1470. 
Berger, E., M. Shouldice, et al. (2011). "The CanMEDS portfolio: a tool for reflection in a fellowship 
programme." The Clinical Teacher 8(3): 151-155. 
148 
Bhonagiri, D., D. V. Pilcher, et al. (2011). "Increased mortality associated with after-hours and 
weekend admission to the intensive care unit: a retrospective analysis." Medical Journal of 
Australia 194: 287-292. 
Biggs, J. and C. Tang, Eds. (2007) . Teaching for Quality Learning at University. Maidenhead, Open 
University Press. 
Bion, J. (1995). "Rationing intensive care. Preventing critical illness is better, and cheaper than cure." 
British Medical Journal 310: 682-683. 
Bleyer, A. J., S. Vidya, et al. (2011 ). "Longitudinal analysis of one million vital signs in patients in an 
academic medical center." Resuscitation 82: 1387-1392. 
Bowton, D., P. Schuderi, et al. (1994). "The incidence and effect on outcome of hypoxemia in 
hospitalized medical patients." The American Journal of Medicine 97: 38-46. 
Boyd, 0 ., M. Grounds, et al. (1993). "A randomized clinical trial of the effect of deliberate perioperative 
increase of oxygen delivery on mortality in high-risk surgical patients." Journal of American 
Medical Association 270: 2699-2707. 
Branch, W. T. and A. Paranjape (2002). "Feedback and Reflection: Teaching Methods for Clinical 
Settings." Academic Medicine 77: 1185-1188. 
Brindley, P. G. and S. F. Reynolds (2011) . "Improving verbal communication in critical care medicine." 
Journal of Critical Care 26(2): 155-159. 
Bristow, P. J., K. M. Hillman, et al. (2000). "Rates of in-hospital arrests, deaths and intensive care 
admissions: The effect of a medical emergency team." Medical Journal of Australia 173: 236-
240. 
British Broadcasting Corporation. (2009). "Digital 'plaster' for monitoring vital signs undergoes first 
clinical trials." Retrieved 4th January 2012, from 
http://www3.imperia1.ac.uk/newsandeventspggrp/imperialcollege/newssummary/news 2-11 -
2009-11 -43-15. 
Bucknall, T. (2003). "The clinical landscape of critical care: nurses' decision-making." Journal of 
Advanced Nursing 43: 310-319. 
Buist, M. (2008) . "The rapid response team paradox: Why doesn't anyone call for help?" Critical Care 
Medicine 36: 634-636. 
Buist, M., S. Bernard, et al. (2004) . "Association between clinically abnormal observations and 
subsequent in-hospital mortality: A prospective study." Resuscitation 62(2): 137-141. 
Buist,. M., J. Harrison, et al. (2007). "Quality improvement report: Six year audit of cardiac arrests and 
medical emergency team calls in an Australian outer metropolitan teaching hospital." British 
Medical Journal 335: 1210-1212. 
Buist, M. , G. Moore, et al. (2002). "Effects of a medical emergency team on reduction of incidence of 
and mortality from unexpected cardiac arrests in hospital: preliminary study." British Medical 
Journal 324: 387-390. 
149 
Calzavacca, P., E. Licari, et al. (2010). "The impact of Rapid Response System on delayed emergency 
team activation patient characteristics and outcomes-A follow-up study." Resuscitation 81: 31 -
35. 
Calzavacca, P., E. Licari, et al. (2008). "A prospective study of factors influencing the outcome of 
patients after a Medical Emergency Team review." Intensive Care Medicine 34: 2112-2116. 
Carter, A. J. and M. A. West, Eds. (1999). Sharing the burden; team work in health care setting. Stress 
in health professionals. Chichester, John Wiley. 
Chan, P. S., R. Jain, et al. (2010). "Rapid Response Teams: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis." 
Archives of lnternl Medicine 170: 18-26. 
Chatterjee, M. T. , J. C. Moon, et al. (2005). "The "OBS" chart: An evidence based approach to re-
design of the patient observation chart in a district general hospital setting." Postgraduate 
Medical Journal 81: 663-666. 
Chen, J., R. Bellomo, et al. (2009). "The relationship between early emergency team calls and serious 
adverse events." Critical Care Medicine 37: 148-153. 
Chen, J. , A. Flabouris, et al. (2008) . "The Medical Emergency Team System and Not-for-Resuscitation 
Orders: Results from the MERIT Study." Resuscitation 79: 391-397. 
Chen, J., K. Hillman, et al. (2009). "The impact of introducing medical emergency team system on the 
documentations of vital signs." Resuscitation 80: 35-43. 
Chernow, B. (1996) . "Back to the drawing board ." Critical Care Medicine 24: 1097-1098. 
Cioffi , J. (2000). "Nurses' experiences of making decisions to call emergency assistance to their 
patients." Journal of Advanced Nursing 32: 108-114. 
Cioffi , J. (2000). "Recognition of patients who require emergency assistance: A descriptive study." 
Heart and Lung 29: 262-268. 
Cioffi, J. , R. Conwayt, et al. (2009) . "'Patients of concern' to nurses in acute care settings: A descriptive 
study." Australian Critical Care 22(4): 178-186. 
Collins, J. (2010) . Foundation for Excellence: An Evaluation of the Foundation Program. M. E. 
England. London, National Health Service. 
Confederation of Postgraduate Medical Education Councils. (2006). "Australian Curriculum Framework 
• for Junior Doctors." from http://curriculum.cpmec.org.au/introduction.cfm. 
Considine, J. (2005) . "The role of- nurses in preventing adverse events related to respiratory 
dysfunction: literature review." Journal of Advanced Nursing 49: 624-633. 
Cook, C. and G. Smith (2004). "Do textbooks of clinical examination contain information regarding the 
assessment of the critically ill patients?" Resuscitation 60: 129-136. 
Coombs, M. and S. J. Ersser (2004). "Medical hegemony in decision-making - a barrier to 
interdisciplinary working in intensive care?" Journal of Advanced Nursing 46(3) : 245-252. 
Cooper, N. (2001 ). "Patient at risk!" Clinical Medicine 1: 309-311. 
Crispin, C. and K. Daffurn (1998). "Nurses' responses to acute severe illness." Australian Critical Care 
11: 131 -133. 
150 
Croskerry, P. (2002). "Achieving Quality in Clinical Decision Making: Cognitive Strategies and 
Detection of Bias." Academic Emergency Medicine 9(11 ): 1184-1204. 
Croskerry, P. (2005). "The theory and practice of clinical decision-making." Canadian Journal of 
Anesthesia 52: R1-R8. 
Curtis, K., A. Tzannes, et al. (2011). "How to talk to doctors - a guide for effective communication." 
International Nursing Review 58(1 ): 13-20. 
Cuthbertson, B. H., M. Boroujerdi, et al. (2007). "Can physiological variables and early warning scoring 
systems allow early recognition of the deteriorating surgical patient?" Critical Care Medicine 
35: 402-409. 
Cuthbertson, B. H., M. Boroujerdi, et al. (2010). "The use of combined physiological parameters in the 
early recognition of the deteriorating acute medical patient." Journal of the Royal College of 
Physicians of Edinburgh 40: 19-25. 
Cuthbertson, B. H. and G. B. Smith (2007). "A warning on early-warning scores!!" British Journal of 
Anaesthesia 98: 704-706. 
Daffurn, K., A. Lee, et al. (1994) . "Do nurses know when to summon emergency assistance?" Intensive 
Critical Care Nursing 10: 115-120. 
Daly, M. L., J. Powers, et al. (2007). "Innovative Solutions: Leading the Way: An Innovative Approach 
to Support Nurses on General Care Units With an Early Nursing Intervention Team." 
Dimensions of Critical Care Nursing 26: 15-20. 
Day, B. A. (2003). "Early warning system scores and response times: an audit." Nursing in Critical 
Care 8: 156-164. 
Department of Health. (2001 ). "Comprehensive Critical Care . . " Retrieved 22nd June 2010, from 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidanc 
e/DH 4006585. 
DeVita, M. A., R. S. Braithwaite, et al. (2004). "Use of medical emergency team responses to reduce 
hospital cardiopulmonary arrests." Quality and Safety in Health Care 13: 251 -254. 
DeVita, M. A. , J. Schaefer, et al. (2005) . "Improving medical emergency team (MET) performance 
using a novel curriculum and a computerized human patient simulator." Quality and Safety in 
Health Care 14: 326-331 . 
DeVita, M. A., G: B. Smith, et al. (2010). ""Identifying the hospitalised patient in crisis"-A consensus 
conference on the afferent limb of Rapid Response Systems." Resuscitation 81 : 375-382. 
Dobbs, P., K. Stubbins, et al. (2002). "A prospective audit of the incidence of physiological monitoring 
in the 24 hours before a cardiac arrest in a district general hospital." British Journal of 
Anaesthesia 89: 353P. 
Downey, A. W., J. L. Quach, et al. (2008). "Characteristics and outcomes of patients receiving a 
medical emergency team review for acute change in conscious state or arrhythmias." Critical 
Care Medicine 36: 477-481 . 
Drazen, J.M. (2004). "Awake and Informed." New England Journal of Medicine 351(18): 1884-1884. 
151 
Drazen, J. M. and A. M. Epstein (2002). "Rethinking Medical Training - The Critical Work Ahead." 
New England Journal of Medicine 347(16): 1271-1272. 
Dubois, R. and R. Brook (1988). "Preventable deaths: who, how often, and why?" Annals of Internal 
Medicine 109: 582-589. 
Edwards, M., H. McKay, et al. (2010) . "Modified Early Warning Scores: inaccurate summation or 
inaccurate assignment of score? ." Critical Care 14: P257. 
Ende, J. (1983). "Feedback in Clinical Medical Education." Journal of the American Medical 
Association 250(6): 777-781. 
Evans, D., B. Hodgkinson, et al. (1999). "Vital Signs." Joanna Briggs 3: 1-6. 
Fieselmann, J. F., M. S. Hendryz, et al. (1993). "Respiratory rate predicts cardiopulmonary arrest for 
internal medicine inpatients." Journal of General Internal Medicine 8: 354-360. 
Fletcher, S. J. and B. H. Cuthbertson (2010). "Outreach, epistemology and the evolution of critical 
care." Anaesthesia 65: 115-118. 
Franklin, C. and J. Mathew (1994). "Developing strategies to prevent inhospital cardiac arrest: 
Analyzing responses of physicians and nurses in the hours before the event." Critical Care 
Medicine 22: 244-247. 
Freidson, E. (1970). Profession of Medicine. A Study of Applied Knowledge. New York, Harper and 
Row. 
Fuhrmann, L. , A. Lippert, et al. (2008). "Incidence, staff awareness and mortality of patients at risk on 
general wards." Resuscitation 77: 325-330. 
Fulop, L. , S. Linstead, et al. (2009) . Types of Decisions. Management and Organization. S. Linstead, 
L. Fulop and S. Lilley, Palgrave Macmillan: 672-686. 
Gao, H., A. McDonnell, et al. (2007). "Systematic review and evaluation of physiological track and 
trigger warning systems for identifying at-risk patients on the ward." Intensive Care Medicine 
33: 667-679. 
Garcea, G., S. Thomasset, et al. (2004) . "Impact of a critical care outreach team on critical care 
readmissions and mortality." Acta Anaesthesiologica Scandinavica 48: 1096-1100. 
Garrud, P. (1990). "Counselling needs and experience of junior hospital doctors." British Medical 
Journal 300(6722): 445-44 7. 
Gawande, A. (2.002) . Complications: A surgeon's notes on an imperfect science. New York, 
Metropolitan Books. 
Gawande, A. (2009) . The checklist manifesto-how to g'et it right. New York, Henry Holt and Company. 
General Medical Council (2009) . Tomorrow's Doctors. London, General Medical Council. 
General Medical Council. (2010) . "Treatment and care towards the end of life: good practice in 
decision making." Retrieved 29th June 2010, from http://www.gmc-
uk.org/guidance/ethical guidance/6858.asp. 
Gol~hill , D. and A. Sumner (1998). "Outcome of intensive care patients in a group of British intensive . 
care units." Critical Care Medicine 26: 1337-1345. 
152 
Goldhill, D. R., A. F. McNarry, et al. (2005). "A physiologically-based early warning score for ward 
patients: The association between score and outcome." Anaesthesia 60: 547-553. 
Goldhill, D. R., S. A. White, et al. (1999). "Physiological values and procedures in the 24 h before ICU 
admission from the ward." Anaesthesia 54: 529-534. 
Goldhill, D. R., L. Worthington, et al. (1999) . "The patient-at-risk team: Identifying and managing 
seriously ill ward patients." Anaesthesia 54: 853-860. 
Goodacre, S. , J. Turner, et al. (2006). "Prediction of mortality among emergency medical admissions." 
Emergency Medicine Journal 23: 372-375. 
Hafferty, F. W. (1998). "Beyond curriculum reform: confronting medicine's hidden curriculum." 
Academic Medicine 73(4): 403-407. 
Hall, J. (2011). Guyton and Hall Textbook of Physiology. Philadelphia, Saunders Elsevier. 
Hall, K. H. (2002). "Reviewing intuitive decision-making and uncertainty: the implications for medical 
education." Medical Education 36: 216-224. 
Harrison, G. A., K. M. Hillman, et al. (1999). "The need for undergraduate education in critical care." 
Anaesthesia and Intensive Care 27: 53-58. 
Harrison, G. A., T. C. Jacques, et al. (2005). "The prevalence of recordings of the signs of critical 
conditions ·and emergency responses in hospital wards - The SOCCER study." Resuscitation 
65: 149-157. 
Hayes, M.A., A. C. Timmins, et al. (1994). "Elevation of systemic oxygen delivery in the treatment of 
the critically ill patients." New England Journal of Medicine 330: 1717-1722. 
Health Services Executive Ireland. (2010). "National Early Warning Score Program." Retrieved 9th 
January 2012, 2012, from 
http://www.hse.ie/eng/about/Who/clinical/natclinprog/acutemedprogramme.html. 
Healthcare Improvement Scotland. (2012). "Healthcare Improvement Scotland Clinical Engagement 
Strategy." Retrieved 9th June, 2012, from 
http://www.healthcareimprovementscotland.org/previous resources/policy and strategy/clinic 
. al engagement strategy.aspx. 
Hillman, K. (2002). "Critical care without walls." Current Opinion in Critical Care 8(6): 594-599. 
Hillman, K. (2004). "Expanding intensive-care medicine beyond the intensive care unit." Critical Care 
8(1): 9-10. 
Hillman, K. (2008). "Rapid response systems." Indian Journal of Critical Care Medicine 12: 77-81. 
Hillmc)n, K. M., P. Bristow, et al. (2001). "Antecedents to hospital deaths." Internal Medicine Journal 31: 
343-348. 
Hillman, K. M., P. J. Bristow, et al. (2002). "Duration of life-threatening antecedents prior to intensive 
care admission." Intensive Care Medicine 28: 1629-1634. 
Hodgkinson, G. P., J. Langan-Fox, et al. (2008). "Intuition: A fundamental bridging construct in the 
behavioural sciences." British Journal of Psychology 99: 1-27. 
153 
Horswill, M. , M. Preece, et al. (2009) . Identifying human factors problems in the design of 25 
observation charts Recognising and Responding to Clinical Deterioration: Solutions for Safe 
Care Sydney, University of Queensland. 
Horswill, M. , M. H. W. Preece, et al. (2010). "Human factors research regarding observation charts: 
Research project overview." Retrieved 10th March 2011, from 
http://www. health .gov .au/i ntemet/safety/publ ish ing. nsf /Content/948D9B D2E 1901786CA2577 
740008E18F/$File/35986-HumanFactors.pdf. 
Hourihan, F., G. Bishop, et al. (1995). "The Medical Emergency Team: A new strategy to identify and 
intervene in high-risk patients." Clinical Intensive Care 6: 269-272. 
Hravnak, M., L. Edwards, et al. (2008). "Defining the incidence of cardiorespiratory instability in 
patients in step down units using an electronic integrated monitoring system." Archives of 
Internal Medicine 168: 1300-1308. 
Ibsen, B. (1954). "The anaesthetist's viewpoint on the treatment of respiratory complications in 
poliomyelitis during the epidemics in Copenhagen, 1952." Proceeding of Royal Society of 
Medicine 47: 72-74. 
lmprovement4Health (2008) . Engaging Clinicians in a Quality Health Care Agenda N. L. a. I. A. f. H. 
Care. Cardiff, NHS Wales. 
Institute for Healthcare Improvement (2005) . The "MERIT" trial of medical emergency teams in 
Australia: an analysis of findings and implications for the 100,000 campaign. 
Jacques, T., G. A. Harrison, et al. (2006). "Signs of critical conditions and emergency responses 
(SOCCER): A model for predicting adverse events in the inpatient setting." Resuscitation 
69(2) : 175-183. 
Johnston, G., I. K. Crombie, et al. (2000). "Reviewing audit: barriers and facilitating factors for effective 
clinical audit. " Quality in Health Care 9: 23-36. 
Jones, D. , S. Bates, et al. (2006) . "Effect of an education programme on the utilization of a medical 
emergency team in a teaching hospita l." Internal Medicine Journal 36: 231 -236. 
Jones, D., H. Opdam, et al. (2007) . "Long-term effect of a Medical Emergency Team on mortality in a 
teaching hospital." Resuscitation 74: 235-241 . 
Jones, D. M., X. Song, et al. (2004). "Operationalizing a Frailty Index from a Standardized 
. Comprehensive Geriatric Assessment." Journal of the American Geriatrics Society 52(11 ): 
1929-1933. 
Jones, S. , M. Mullally, et al. (2011 ). "Bedside electronic capture of clinical-observations and automated 
clinical alerts to improve compliance with an Early Warning Score protocol." Critical Care and 
Resuscitation 13: 83-88. 
Kaplan, S. H., G. Sheldon, et al. (1989) . "Assessing the Effects of Physician-Patient Interactions on the 
Outcomes of Chronic Disease." Medical Care 27: S110-S127. 
154 
Kause, J., G. Smith, et al. (2004). "A comparison of antecedents to cardiac arrests, deaths and 
emergency intensive care admissions in Australia and New Zealand, and the United 
Kingdom-the ACADEMIA study .. " Resuscitation 62: 275-282. 
Kennedy, T., G. Regehr, et al. (2009). "Preserving professional credibility: grounded theory study of 
medical trainees' requests for clinical support." British Medical Journal 338: b128. 
Keren, G. (1987). "Facing uncertainty in the game of bridge: a calibration study." Organ Behaviour and 
Decision Process. 39: 98-114. 
Kirschenbaum, L. (1998) . "Antibodies to TNF alpha: Too little, too late?" Critical Care Medicine 26: 
1625-1626. 
Knaus, W. A. , E. A. Draper, et al. (1985). "APACHE II: a severity of disease classification system." 
Critical Care Medicine 13: 818-829. 
Knaus, W. A., E. A. Draper, et al. (1985). "Prognosis in acute organ-system failure." Annals of Surgery 
202: 685-693. 
Konrad, D., G. Jaderling, et al. (2010). "Reducing in-hospital cardiac arrests and hospital mortality by 
introducing a medical emergency team." Intensive Care Medicine 36: 100-106. 
Kruse, J. A., M. C. Thill-Baharozian, et al. (1988). "Comparison of clinical assessment with APACHE II 
for predicting mortality rissk in patients admitted to a medical intensive care unit." Journal of 
the American Medical Association 260: 1739-17 42. 
Lamont, T. and J. Scarpello (2009) "National Patient Safety Agency: combining stories with statistics to 
minimise harm." British Medical Journal 339 DOI: 10.1136/bmj.b4489. 
Law, S. (2011 ). "Using narratives to trigger reflection." The Clinical Teact:ier 8(3): 147-150. 
Leape, L. L., T. A. Brennan, et al. (1991 ). "The nature of adverse events in hospitalized patients. 
Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study II." New England Journal of Medicine 324: 377-
384. 
Lee, A., G. Bishop, et al. (1995) . "The Medical Emergency Team." Anaesthesia and Intensive Care 23: 
183-186. 
Lee, A., .C. Dennis, et al. (2007). "Nature's guide for mentors." Nature 447(7146) : 791 -797. 
Lempp, H. and C. Seale (2004). "The hidden curriculum in undergraduate medical education: 
• qualitative study of medical students' perceptions of teaching." BMJ 329(7469): 770-773. 
Leonard, M. , S. Graham, et al. (2004) : "The human factor: the critical importance of effective teamwork 
and communication in providing safe care." Quality and Safety in Health Care 13: i85-i90. 
Lighthall, G. K., S. Markar, et al. (2009). "Abnormal vital signs are associated with an increased risk for 
critical events in US veteran inpatients." Resuscitation 80(11 ): 1264-1269. 
Lyneham, J., C. Parkinson, et al. (2008). "Explicating Benner's concept of expert practice: Intuition in 
emergency nursing." Journal of Advanced Nursing 64: 380-387. 
Lyneham, J., C. Parkinson, et al. (2008). "Intuition in emergency nursing: A phenomenological study." 
International Journal of Nursing Practice 14: 99-106. 
155 
Lyneham, J., C. Parkinson, et al. (2009) . "Expert nursing practice: A mathematical explantation of 
Benner's 5th stage of practice development." Journal of Advanced Nursing 65: 2477-2484. 
Makoul, G. (2001) . "Essential Elements of Communication in Medical Encounters: The Kalamazoo 
Consensus Statement." Academic Medicine 76: 390-393. 
Mann, K., J. Gordon, et al. (2009). "Reflection and reflective practice in health professions education: a 
systematic review." Advances in Health Sciences Education 14(4): 595-621 . 
Maran, N. J. and R. J. Glavin (2003) . Medical Education 37(Suppl. 1 ): 22-28. 
Marshall, S., J. Harrison, et al. (2009) . "The teaching of a structured tool improves the clarity and 
content of interprofessional clinical communication." Quality and Safety in Health Care 18: 
137-140. 
McArthur-Rouse F (2001 ). "Critical care outreach services and early warning scores: a review of the 
literature." Journal of Advanced Nursing 36: 696-704. 
McBride, J. , D. Knight, et al. (2005) . "Long-term effect of introducing an early warning score on 
respiratory rate charting on general wards." Resuscitation 65: 41-44. 
McGain, F. , M. A. Cretikos, et al. (2008). "Documentation of clinical review and vital signs after major 
surgery." Medical Journal of Australia 189: 380-383. 
McGloin, H., S. Adam, et al. (1997). "The quality of pre-ICU care influences outcome of patients 
admitted from the ward." Clinical Intensive Care 8: 104. 
McQuillan, P., S. Pilkington, et al. (1998). "Confidential inquiry into quality of care before admission to 
intensive care." British Medical Journal 316: 1853-1858. 
MERIT Study Investigators (2005) . "Introduction of the medical emer§ency team (MET) system: A 
cluster-randomised controlled trial." Lancet 365: 2091 -2097. 
Mitchell, I., H. McKay, et al. (2010). "A prospective controlled trial of the effect of a multi-faceted 
intervention on early recognition and intervention in deteriorating hospital patients." 
Resuscitation 81: 658-666. 
Mitchell, I. A., B. Antoniou, et al. (2008) . "A robust clinical review process: the catalyst for clinical 
governance in an Australian tertiary hospital." Medical Journal of Australia 189: 451 -455. 
Montgomery, K., T. Chambers, et al. (2003). "Humanities Education at Northwestern University's 
Feinberg School of Medicine." Academic Medicine 78(10): 958-962. 
Moran,. J. L. and P. J. Solomon (2005). "The interpretation of uncontrolled before and after studies: as 
demonstrated by recent studies of the introduction of the medical emergency teams . . " Critical 
Care and Resuscitation 7: 153-159. 
Morey, J., R. Simon, et al. (2003). ''Error reduction and performance improvement in the emergency 
department through formal teamwork training : evaluation results of the MedTeams project. ." 
Health Services Research 37: 1553-1581. 
Morgan, R. J. M., F. Williams, et al. (1997). "An early warning scoring system for detecting critical 
illness." Clinical Intensive Care 8: 1388--1392. 
156 
Morrison, A. L. , U. Beckmann, et al. (2001 ). "The effects of nursing staff inexperience (NSI) on the 
occurrence of adverse patient experiences in IC Us." Australian Critical Care 14(3): 116-121 . 
National Confidential Enquiry into Patient Outcome and Death. (2005). "An acute problem?" 
Retrieved 12th March 2011, from www.ncepod.org .uk. 
National Health and Medical Research Council. (2010) . "The NHMRC Strategic Plan for 2010-2012." 
Retrieved 7th January 2012, from http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/guidelines/publications/nh132. 
Nightingale, F. (1859). Notes on Nursing: What It is, and What It is Not. London, Harrison. 
Nojima, Y. , T. Tomikawa, et al. (2003) . "Defining characteristics of expertise in Japanese clinical 
nursing using the Delphi technique." Nursing & Health Sciences 5: 3-11 . 
NSW Clinical Excellence Commission. (2010). "DETECT." Retrieved 21st June 2010, from 
http://www.cec.health.nsw.gov.au/programs/between-the-flags.html. 
Nurmi, J., V. P. Harjola, et al. (2005). "Observations and warning signs prior to card iac arrest. Should a 
medical emergency team intervene earlier?" Acta Anaesthesiologica Scandinavica 49: 702-
706. 
Oakey, R. J. and V. Slade (2006). "Physiological observation track and trigger system." Nursing 
Standard 20: 48-54. 
Odell , M., I. J. Rechner, et al. (2007). "The effect of a critical care outreach service and an early 
warning scoring system on respiratory rate recording on the general wards." Resuscitation 74: 
470-475. 
Osmon, S. , D. Warren, et al. (2003). "The influence of infection on hospital mortality for patients 
requiring > 48 h of intensive care." Chest 124(3): 1021-1029. --
Parr, M. J. A., J. H. Hadfield, et al. (2001). "The Medical Emergency Team: 12 Month analysis of 
reasons for activation, immediate outcome and not-for-resuscitation orders." Resuscitation 50: 
39-44. 
Patientrack. (2006) . "Global solutions for global leaders." Retrieved 22nd June 2010, from 
http://www.patientrack.com/. 
Pinsky, M. R. (2007). "Hemodynamic Evaluation and Monitoring in the ICU." Chest 132: 2020-2029. 
Pittard, A. J. (2003) . "Out of our reach? Assessing the impact of introducing a critical care outreach 
service." Anaesthesia 58: 882-885. 
Priestley, G., W. Watson, et al. (2004). "Introducing Critical Care Outreach: A ward-randomised trial of 
phased introduction in a general hospital." Intensive Care Medicine 30: 1398-1404. 
Prytherch, D. R. , G. B. Smith, et al. (2006). "Calculating early warning scores-A classroom comparison 
of pen and paper and hand-held computer methods." Resuscitation 70: 173-178. 
Prytherch, D. R. , G. B. Smith, et al. (2010). "ViEWS-Towards a national early warning score for 
detecting adult inpatient deterioration." Resuscitation 81 : 932-937. 
Quach, J. L., A. W. Downey, et al. (2008) . "Characteristics and outcomes of patients receiving a 
medical emergency team review for respiratory distress or hypotension." Journal of Critical . 
Care 23: 325-331 . 
157 
Ramritu, P. L. and A. Barnard (2001). "New nurse graduates' understanding of competence." 
International Nursing Review 48: 47-57. 
Reinertsen, J. L., A.G. Gosfield, et al. (2007). Engaging Physicians in a Shared Quality Agenda. I. f. H. 
Improvement. Cambridge, MA. 
Resuscitation Council (UK) . (2008). "Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation - Standards for Clinical Practice 
and Training." Retrieved 23rd June 2010, from 
http://www.resus.org.uk/pages/pub CPR.htm. 
Rivers, E., B. Nguyen, et al. (2001 ). "Early goal-directed therapy in the treatment of severe sepsis and 
septic shock." New England Journal of Medicine 345: 1368-1377. 
Rothschild, J. M. , E. Gandara, et al. (2010) . "Single-Parameter Early Warning Criteria to Predict Life-
Threatening Adverse Events." Journal of Patient Safety 6: 97-101. 
Ryan, H., C. Cadman, et al. (2004). "Critical care. Setting standards for assessment of ward patients at 
risk of deterioration." British Journal of Nursing 13(20): 1186-1190. 
Santamaria, J., A. Tobin, et al. (2010). "Changing cardiac arrest and hospital mortality rates through a 
medical emergency team takes time and constant review." Critical Care Medicine 38: 445-
450. 
Sax, F. L. and M. E. Charlson (1987) . "Medical patients at high risk for catastrophic deterioration." 
Critical Care Medicine 15: 510-515. 
Schein, R. M. H., N. Hazday, et al. (1990). "Clinical antecedents to in-hospital cardiopulmonary arrest." 
Chest 98: 1388-1392. 
Sheehan, T. J. (1984). "Feedback: giving and receiving." Journal of Medical Education 59: 913. 
Sherman, J. D. and H. L. Smith (1984) . "The Influence of Organizational Structure on Intrinsic versus 
Extrinsic Motivation." The Academy of Management Journal 27: 887-885. 
Shoemaker, W. C., P. L. Appel , et al. (1988). "Prospective trial of supranormal values of survivors as 
therapeutic goals in high-risk surgical patients." Chest 94: 1176-1186. 
Simon, H. A. (1991). "Bounded Rationality and Organizational Learning." Organization Science 2: 125-
.134. 
Simpson, M., R. Buckman, et al. (1991). "Doctor-patient communication: the Toronto consensus 
statement." British Medical Journal 303: 1385-1387. 
Smith, A. F. and R. J. Oakey (2006). "Incidence and significance of errors in a patient 'track and trigger' 
system during an epidemic of Legionnaires' disease: Retrospective casenote analysis." 
Anaesthesia 61: 222-228. 
Smith, G. (2000). "ALERT." Retrieved 21st June 2010, from http://www.alert-course.com/. 
Smith, G. B., V. M. Osgood, et al. (2002). "ALERT™-a multiprofessional training course in the care of 
the acutely ill adult patient." Resuscitation 52 281-286. 
Smith, G. 8., D. R. Prytherch, et al. (2006) . "Hospital-wide physiological surveillance-A new approach 
to the early identification and management of the sick patient." Resuscitation 71: 19-28. 
158 
Smith, G. B., D. R. Prytherch, et al. (2008) . "Review and performance evaluation of aggregate 
weighted 'track and trigger' systems." Resuscitation 77: 170-179. 
Smith, G. B., D. R. Prytherch, et al. (2008). "A review, and performance evaluation, of single-parameter 
"track and trigger" systems." Resuscitation 79: 11-21 . 
Smith, G. B., D. R. Prytherch, et al. (2008). "Should age be included as a component of track and 
trigger systems used to identify sick adult patients?" Resuscitation 78: 109-115. 
Smith, I., P. Kumar, et al. (2001). "Base Excess and lactate as prognostic indicators for patients 
admitted to intensive care." Intensive Care Medicine 27: 74-83. 
So, H. Y., T. A. Buckley, et al. (1994) . "Factors affecting outcome following cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation ." Anaesthesia and Intensive Care 22: 647-658. 
Solet, D. J., J. M. Norvell, et al. (2005). "Lost in Translation: Challenges and Opportunities in 
Physician-to-Physician Communication During Patient Handoffs." Academic Medicine 80: 
1094-1099. 
Sox, H. C., M. A. Blatt, et al. (1988). Medical Decision Making. Boston, Butterworths. 
Spurgeon, A., J.M. Harrington, et al. (1997). "Health and safety problems associated with long working 
hours: a review of the current position." Occupational and Environmental Medicine 54(6): 367-
375. 
Stein, L. I. (1967). "The Doctor-Nurse Game." Arch Gen Psychiatry 16: 699-703. 
Stenhouse, C., S. Coates, et al. (1999). Prospective evaluation of a modified early warning score to aid 
detection of patients developing critical illness on a general surgical ward . State of the Art 
Meeting. London, Intensive Care Society. 
Strauss, A. and J. Corbin, Eds. (1998) . Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for 
Developing Grounded Theory. London, Sage Publications. 
Subbe, C. P. , R. G. Davies, et al. (2003). "Effect of introducing the Modified Early Warning score on 
clinical outcomes, cardio-pulmonary arrests and intensive care utilisation in acute medical 
admissions." Anaesthesia 58: 797-802. 
Subbe, C. P., M. Kruger, et al. (2001). "Validation of a modified early warning score in medical 
admissions." Quarterly Journal of Medicine 94: 521-526. 
Svensson, R. (1996). "The interplay between doctors and nurses-a negotiated order perspective." 
Sociology of Health & Illness 18(3): 379-398. 
Szalados, J. E. (2004). "Critical care teams managing floor patients: The continuing evolution of 
hospitals into intensive care units?" Critical Care Medicine 32: 1071-1072. 
Tarassenko, L. , A. Hann, et al. (2006). "Integrated monitoring and analysis for early warning of patient 
deterioration." British Journal of Anaesthesia 97: 64-68. 
Tee, A., P. Calzavacca, et al. (2008). "Bench-to-bedside review: the MET syndrome-the challenges of 
researching and adopting medical emergency teams." Critical Care 12: 205. 
Temple, J. (2010). Time for Training : A review of the impact of the european working time directive on 
the quality of training. M. E. England. London, Crown. 
159 
Thompson, J. E., L. W. Collett, et al. (2011) . "Using the ISBAR handover tool in junior medical officer 
handover: a study in an Australian tertiary hospital." Postgraduate Medical Journal 87: 340-
344. 
Van Eaton, E. G., K. D. Horvath, et al. (2005). "Professionalism and the Shift Mentality: How to 
Reconcile Patient Ownership With Limited Work Hours." Archives of Surgery 140(3): 230-235. 
Van Leuvan, C. and I. Mitchell (2008). "Missed opportunities? An observational study of vital sign 
measurements." Critical Care and Resuscitation 10: 111-115. 
Wayne, D. B., A. Didwania, et al. (2008) . "Simulation-based education improves quality of care during 
cardiac arrest team responses at an academic teaching hospital : a case-control study .. " 
Chest. 133: 56-61 . 
Whitehead, M. A., Z. Puthucheary, et al. (2002). "The recognition of the sick patient." Clinical Medicine 
2: 95-98. 
Wilson, R. M., W. B. Runciman, et al. (1995). "The Quality in Australian Health Care Study." Medical 
Journal of Australia 163: 458-4 71 . 
Zeitz, K. and H. Mccutcheon (2006). "Observations and vital signs: ritual or vital for the monitoring of 
postoperative patients?" Applied Nursing Research 19: 204-212. 
160 
APPENDICES 
161 
Appendix A: Comparative Ranges 
for Scoring the Individual 
Components of the Modified Early 
Warning Scores 
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MEWS 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 
Heart Rate (Day, 2003) <30 31-40 41-50 51-100 101-110 111-129 >=130 
(bpm) 
(Morgan et <40 41-50 51 -100 101-110 >=130 
al. , 1997) 
(Subbe et <40 41-50 51-100 101-110 >=130 
al., 2003) 
(Odell etal. , <=40 41-50 51-100 101-110 111-129 >-130 
2007) 
(Pittard, <40 41-50 51-100 101-110 111-130 >130 
2003) 
(Goldhill et <40 40-49 50-99 100-114 115-129 >-130 
al., 2005) 
Systolic BP (Day, 2003) Dependent on Usual BP 
(mmHg) 
(Morgan et <70 71-80 81-100 101-199 >200 
al., 1997) 
(Subbe et <70 71-80 81-100 101-199 >=200 
al. , 2003) 
(Odell etal. , <=70 71-80 81-100 101-199 >=200 
2007) 
(Pittard, <70 71-80 81-100 101-179 180-199 200-220 >220 
2003) 
(Goldhill et <70 70-79 80-99 100-179 >=180 
al. , 2005) 
-Resp. Rate (Day, 2003) <6 6-8 9-14 15-20 21-29 >=30 
(breaths per 
minute) (Morgan et <8 9-14 15-20 21-29 >30 
al. , 1997) 
(Subbe et <9 9-14 15-20 21-29 >=30 
al., 2003) 
(Odell etal. , <=8 9-14 15-20 21 -29 >=30 
2007) 
(Pittard, <8 8-11 12-20 21-25 26-30 >30 
2003) 
(Goldhill et <10 10-19 20-29 30-39 >-40 
al., 2005) 
Temp. · (Day, 2003) <35 35.1-35.9 36-38 38.1-39 >39.5 
(oC) 
(Morgan et <35 35.1-36.5 36.6-37.4 >37.5 
al. , 1997) 
(Subbe et <35 35-38.4 >=38.5 
al. , 2003) 
(Odell etal., - -
-
- - - -
2007) 
(Pittard, - - - - - - -
2003) 
-
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(Goldhill et <35 35-35.9 36-37.4 37.5-38.4 >=38.5 
al. , 2005) 
Central (Day, 2003) Alert and Responds Responds Unconscious 
Nervous orientated only to only to 
System voice □ ain (Morgan et A V p u 
al. , 1997) 
(Subbe et Alert Reacting to Reacting Unresponsive 
al., 2003) voice to Pain 
(Odell etal., Unresp Pain Voice/or new Alert 
2007) onsive confusion 
(Pittard, Confused Awake and Responds Responds Unresponsive 
2003) Responsive to verbal to painful 
commands stimuli 
(Goldhill et Alert Confused Responds Responds to 
al., 2005) to voice pain or 
unresponsive 
Urine (Day, 2003) Anuric <0.5ml.kg/h >1 .5ml/kg/h 
(Morgan et - - - - - - -
al. , 1997) 
(Subbe et - - - - - - -
al., 2003) 
(Odell etal. , 0 <=30ml/h 31-44ml/h 45ml/h or 
2007), in 2 h more 
(Pittard, <80mls 80-120mls 120-200mls >800mls 
2003),in 4 h 
(Goldhill et Nil <0.5ml/kg/hr Dialysis 0.5- >3ml/kg/hr 
al., 2005) 3ml/kg/hr 
Sa02 (Day, 2003) - - -
- - - -
-
(Morgan et - - - - - - -
al. , 1997) 
(Subbe et - - - - - - -
al., 2003) 
(Odell etal. , - -
- - - - -
2007) 
(Pittard, <85% 86-89% 90-94% >95% - - -
2003) 
(Goldhill et - - - - - - -
al. , 2005) 
Respiratory (Pittard, BiPAP, Hi Flow Supplemental 
Support 2003) CPAP 02 
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Appendix B: Examples of Rapid 
Response Teams (Triggers and 
Team Member 
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HR BP RR GCS uo SaO2 Combination Other 
PART(Goldhill ~110 ~90 ~25 Not fully alert :o;1Q0ml/4 <90 3 or more, or 
et al. , 1999) hours not fully alert 
and HR~140 
OR RR~36 
MET (Parr et CA, <40, <90 RA, <5, Sudden fall in - - - Seriously 
al., 2001) >140 >36 GCS, GCS>2 worried, 
point fall, airway 
seizures threatened 
MET (Bellomo <40 or <90 <8 or >30 Acute change in <50ml <90% despite Any staff 
et al., 2003) >130 conscious state /4hou rs 02 admin member 
worried 
about a 
patient 
MET (DeVita <40or <80 or <8 or Acute loss of <85% for Colour 
et al., 2004) >140 with >200 or >36, new consciousness, more than 5 change, 
symptoms DBP>110 onset new lethargy, minutes chest pain, 
or>160 with difficulty seizures, unexplaine 
symptoms in sudden d agitation 
breathing movement loss 
face, arm, leg 
ME (MERIT CA, <40, <90 RA, <5, Sudden fall in - - - Anyone 
Study >140 >36 GCS, GCS>2 seriously 
Investigators, point fall, worried 
·-
2005)T seizures about, 
airway 
threatened 
ENIT (Daly et <40 or SBP <90 <8 or >30 Mental state Below Acute 
al. , 2007) >130 changes, baseline bleeding 
seizures while 
receiving 
supplemental 
02 
MET <40 or <90 <8 or Acute change in <50ml/4 <90 Airway 
(Calzavacca >120 >25, neuro state, hours obstruction 
et al., 2008) dyspnoea unarousable , stridor, 
patient noisy 
breathing, 
problems 
with trache 
tube 
MET (Konrad <40 or <90 <8 or >30 Sudden altered <90 Worried 
et al., 2010) >130 level of 
consciousness 
(Santamaria CA, <40, <90 RA, <5, Sudden fall in - - - Seriously 
et al., 2010) >140 >36 GCS, GCS>2 worried , 
Santamaria: point fall, • airway 
seizures threatened 
. 
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Chart 
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Appendix D: Notification Process 
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MEWS ~4 
Contact R MO, to 
review within 30 
.·J m in.~tes . 
After 60 .mins pt 
not reviewed & 
MEWS has not 
decreased 
•••·•. Registrar 
contacted and to 
review with.in 30 
minutes 
,. 
After 60 mins pt 
not reviewed & 
. MEWS has .not 
decreased 
i,.;_ ··• 
MEWS>6 
Contact Registrar & 
RM O, to· review in 30 
minutes . Consultant 
. . notified of patients 
condition 
,, 
After 60 mins pt ··· 
not reviewed & 
rill EV\/S has not 
decreased 
,, 
MEWS ~8 
., 
,. 
Registrar & Consu.ltant notified, Both to review . ···· 
I " " Consider MET/ICU ·consult 
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Appendix F: Hospital Policy for 
Measuring Vital Signs 
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e ACT 
~Health 
POLICY: Modified Early Warning Scores 
Document Number: 
Publication date: 
Document Classification: Policy 
Authored by: Early Recognition of the Deteriorating Patient Project Team 
Applies to: Pilot wards of the Early Recognition of the Deteriorating Patient 
Project 
Distributed to: 
Replaces Doc. No.: NIA 
Status: Draft for trial in pilot wards 
Review date: 
Authorised by: 
Authorising Signature: 
1. Purpose and Scope 
The purpose of this policy is to improve patient outcomes by detecting and acting 
upon early signs of deterioration in patients. This will be achieved through the 
implementation of the Modified Early Warning Scores (MEWS) system that: 
• Identifies trends in patient observations; 
• Ensures that timely patient review and appropriate treatment occurs; and 
• Improves the documentation of patient observations. 
2. Policy 
All staff are to apply the Modified Early Warning Scores (MEWS) system when patient 
observations are taken: 
• A MEWS is to be .calculated each time a set of observations is performed. 
• If a trigger score of 4 or greater is reached the activation protocol is initiated. 
Observations to be recorded include Temperature, Pulse, Blood Pressure, Oxygen 
Saturations (SpO2), Respiratory Rate, Sedation Score and Urine Output. 
3. Procedures 
Clinical Alert: 
MEWS does NOT replace calling the Medical Emergency 
Team (MET). 
If the patient meets the MET criteria a Code Blue/MET should be called as per 
MET protocol. 
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Each individual observation is scored according to the criteria in Attachment A. 
The blood pressure score is determined by calculating the difference between the 
current reading and the patient's usual blood pressure. 
The MEWS is calculated and documented on the trial General Observation Chart, 
which incorporates the MEWS. If a different chart is being used then the MEWS 
score is still required to calculated and recorded. 
The patient's usual systolic blood pressure is to be recorded on the blood pressure 
table on the observation chart in the space provided; the medical officer must be 
consulted in determining the usual systolic blood pressure for the patient. 
Additional considerations relating to the MEWS for the individual patient can be 
documented in the space provided (i.e. chronic lung disease, dialysis patients). 
If the total MEWS reaches an initial trigger point of 4 the activation protocol is to be 
initiated (see Attachment B). 
Clinical Alert: 
If the MEWS is 4 or greater the protocol is activated. 
If the score is equal to or greater than 4, the frequency of observations is escalated 
to: 
• ½ hourly for the first hour (or more frequently if the patient's condition dictates). 
• Then hourly for the next four hours 
• Then 4/24 for the next 24 hours 
If the trigger score is reached, the following guide is to be used if the patient 
requires escort out of the ward area. 
• MEWS~ 4 Registered Nurse 
• MEWS~ 6 Registered Nurse & Intern 
• MEWS~ 8 Registered Nurse & Registrar 
Clinical Alert: 
At the time of reaching a trigger score the nurse MUST also notify the 
team leader or CNC. 
4. Attachments 
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Attachment A 
MEWS Calculation: 
MEWS Score 
Resp Rate 
SpOz 
Temperature 
Heart Rate 
Blood pressure 
Sedation Score 
UOP for 4 hrs 
1rii~~1liiir "' 2 1 
<8 
< 84 85-89 90-92 
< 34 34.1-35 35.1-36 
~ 40 41-50 
See chart below 
<80 80-119 
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0 1 2 ;11,:3 
9-20 21-30 31-35 ~36 
~93 
36.1-37.9 38-38.5 ~ 38.6 
51-99 100-110 111-130 >130 
0-1 2 3 4 
120-800 >800 
Patient's Usual Systolic BP= 
Additional considerations: 
Usual 180 170 160 150 140 130 120 110 100 90 80 
SBP 
200s 0 2 2 2 3 5 
190s 0 0 2 2 4 
180s 0 0 0 0 2 4 
170s 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 
160s 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 
e 150s 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
::::, 
"' 
"' 140s 0 0 0 0 0 e 
a.. 
"C 
0 130s 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
00 
-C: 120s 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 
::::, 
u 110s 0 
100s 0 
90s 0 
80s 0 
70s 
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Attachment B 
Notification is to occur using the following flow chart: 
MEWS.> 4 
Contact RMO, to 
review within 30 
minutes. 
After 60 mins pt 
not reviewed & 
MEWS has not 
decreased 
.. 
MEWS> 6 
... 
Contact Registrar & RMO, to review in 30 
minutes 
l 
After 60 mins pt 
not reviewed Si 
MEWS has not 
· decreased 
l 
. MEWS>8 
•I, 
Registrar & Consultant notified , Registrar to review within 10 minutes. 
No response from the page or the treatment, the MEWS has not 
decreased consider MET/ICU consult 
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Participant Information Sheet 
Intensive Care Unit 
Y amba Drive, Garran ACT 2605 
PO Box 11 Woden ACT 2606 
Phone: (02) 6244 2222 Fax: (02) 6285 3020 
Website: www.health.act.gov.au 
ABN: 82 049 056 234 
"Perceptions of the Recognition of the Deteriorating Patient Intervention" 
General Background Information 
Patient adverse events occur in up to 17% of all hospital admissions. Of these, nearly 20% suffer 
death or permanent disability. One of the factors that has been identified in the causation of these 
patient adverse events is the failure to recognise and appropriately manage deteriorating patients on 
the general ward. The failure to recognise deteriorating patients is evidenced by delays in admission 
to the intensive care unit (ICU), unexpected referrals to intensive care and unexpected deaths that are 
often being preceded by significant, unrecognised physiological disturbances. The ability to detect 
early deterioration in patients allows early appropriate intervention, which may reduce unplanned 
admissions to the intensive care unit and unexpected deaths. 
ACT Background Information 
In 2006, ACT Health sponsored a project "Early Recognition of the Deteriorating Patient" which was a 
prospective, controlled before and after intervention trial. The intervention included the employment of 
a new education package "COMPASS©" available to all healthcare workers, the instalment of a new 
observation chart and the utilisation of a track and trigger system in four general hospital wards at two 
hospitals (The Canberra Hospital and Calvary Hospital). The aim was to determine whether this 
intervention increased the early recognition of the deteriorating patient, which would be measured by 
the number of unplanned admissions to intensive care, the number of cardiac arrests and the overall 
hospital mortality. The study was completed in June 2007 and data analysis suggests that there was a 
significant improvement in patient outcome. There was a reduction in hospital mortality and a 
reduction in unplanned admissions to the intensive care unit. There was also an increase in the 
documentation of vital signs and an increase in the number of medical emergency team call outs. 
What does it involve? 
Approv9I has been given by the ACT Department of Health Ethics Committee to undertake a project 
that will allow the understanding of the overall impact of the intervention, a qualitative assessment of 
the thoughts and perceptions of healthcare workers ne~ds to be undertaken. This will involve semi-
structured interviews of a random, representative sample of the healthcare workers involved in the 
original intervention. There will also be semi-structured interviews pre and post intervention of a 
random, representative sample of the healthcare workers in areas where the intervention will occur in 
the coming months. The project will involve an interview lasting 30 minutes where questions will be 
asked relevant to the understanding of why the recognition of the deteriorating patient project may 
positively influence patient outcome. 
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What will be the outcome of the project? 
The interviews will help determine whether the health care workers perceived the intervention as 
useful to patient care and try and elucidate which, if any, part of the intervention was deemed more 
useful. This will allow improvements to be made to the intervention to not only improve patient care 
but also patient outcome. 
Who can I contact about the actual Study? 
Should I develop a problem which I suspect may have resulted from my involvement in this project, I 
am aware that I may contact-Dr Imogen Mitchell, Director, Intensive Care, The Canberra Hospital, 
Garran ACT 2605, Tel : 02 6244 3305, email: lmogen.mitchell@act.gov.au 
Who can I contact in General? 
Should I have any problems or queries about the way in which the study was conducted, and I do not 
feel comfortable contacting the research staff, I am aware that I may contact the ACT Department of 
Health Ethics Committee Secretary, 11 Moore Street, Canberra City, ACT 2601 , telephone (02) 
62050846. 
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Intensive Care Unit 
Y amba Drive, Garran ACT 2605 
PO Box 11 Woden ACT 2606 
Phone: (02) 6244 2222 Fax: (02) 6285 3020 
Website: www.health.act.gov.au 
ABN: 82 049 056 234 
--------
Consent Form to Participate in a Research Project 
I, 
(name of participant) 
of 
(street) (suburb/town) ( state & postcode) 
have been asked to consent to participation in a research project entitled: 
"Perceptions of the Recognition of the Deteriorating Patient Intervention" 
In relation to this project I have read the Patient Information Sheet and have been informed 
of the following points: 
1. Approval has been given by the ACT Department of Health Ethics Committee. 
2. 1:he airI?- of the project is to determine which of the three major components of the 
intervention, namely: 
Education program (COMPASS©) 
New Observation Chart 
Track and trigger system (Modified Early Warning Score System) 
was perceived as having the greatest impact on patient care and outcome. 
3. The results obtained from the study may or may not be of direct benefit to the care of my 
patients 
4. The project will involve an interview lasting 30 minutes where questions will be asked 
relevant to the understanding of why the recognition of the deteriorating patient project may 
positively influence patient outcome. 
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5. Should I develop a problem which I suspect may have resulted from my involvement in this 
project, I am aware that I may contact -Dr Imogen Mitchell, Director, Intensive Care, The 
Canberra Hospital, Garran ACT 2605, Tel: 02 6244 3305, email: 
Imogen.mitchell@act.gov .au 
6. Should I have any problems or queries about the way in which the study was conducted, 
and I do not feel comfortable contacting the research staff, I am aware that I may contact the 
ACT Department of Health Ethics Committee Secretary, 11 Moore Street, Canberra City, 
ACT 2601 , telephone (02) 62050846. 
7. I can refuse to take part in this project or withdraw from it at any time without affecting my 
workplace environment. 
8. Participation in this project will not result in any extra costs to me and can occur during 
working hours, at the discretion of my area supervisor 
9. I understand that the results of the research will be made accessible and that my 
involvement and my identity will not be revealed. 
After considering all these points, I accept the invitation to participate in this project. 
I also state that I have/have not participated in any other research project in the past 3 
months. If I have, the details are as follows: 
Date: Witness: 
(Please print name) 
Signature: 
( of participant/volunteer) ( of witness) 
Investigator's Signature: 
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Semi Structured Interview 
"Perceptions of the Recognition of the Deteriorating Patient Intervention" 
A. General Questions 
1. What ward are you currently working on? 
2. What is your current role on the ward you are working? 
3. When did you graduate? 
4. Where did you graduate? 
B. Questions Relevant to those participants that have yet to experience the Recognition of the 
Deteriorating Patient Intervention 
1. Are you aware of the Early Recognition of the Deteriorating intervention? 
2. What details are you familiar with? 
3. In your own mind, do you think we have a difficulty in recognising the deteriorating patient/ 
4. What aspects or areas of our patient care, if any, particularly concern you? 
5. If you were able to change the way we care for our patients and particularly the recognition of the 
deteriorating patient, what would you change? 
6. What do you think of the current general observation chart? 
7. Do you feel that your university gave you a good grounding in why we record observations and the 
reasons why they might be abnormal? 
8. Have you ever called a MET? 
9. Do you feel comfortable calling a registrar/MET/Consultant? 
10. Do you feel that your university gave you a good grounding in the way we communicate information to 
seniors/doctors? 
11 . Have you heard of a MEWS? 
C. Questions Relevant to those participants that experienced the Recognition of the Deteriorating 
Patient Intervention during the pilot project in 2007 
1. What was your role between F~bruary and June 2007 on 9A/1 0A/5W/4E? 
2. Do you know anything about the Early Recognition of the Deteriorating Patient project? 
3. If you do know something, what do you know about the project? 
4. Did you think that there was adequate information about the project prior to the initiation of the pilot 
study? 
5. How might you have improved the information and understanding of the project if you had been 
running a similar project? 
6. . Are you aware of the results? 
D. Questions Relevant to those participants that experienced the Recognition of the Deteriorating 
Patient lnt~rvention during the pilot project in 2007 and those participants that will have 
experienced the intervention and will have been interviewed prior to the introduction of the 
intervention 
1. The project appeared to demonstrate an improvement in outcome for patients on these wards, 
, reduced unplanned admissions to the intensive care unit and reduced patient complaints with regard 
to patient care and management, are you able to give me any personal insight why you think this may 
be the case? 
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2. What do you believe to be the biggest influence on the change of outcome? 
3. Did you manage to attend one of the COMPASS© education sessions? 
4. If did manage to get to one, did you have an opportunity to read and listen to the material beforehand? 
5. Did you get an opportunity to do the quiz prior to going to the face to face session? 
6. Was anything in the material before going to the face to face that was particularly useful? Any that was 
particularly difficult or confusing? 
7. Did you think the face to face sessions related to what you do on the ward? Explore answer with 
regard to interpreting observations, ability to communicate, ability to prioritise seeing patients and 
better understanding of how to initiate patient care when they are deteriorating. 
E. Direct Questions 
Observations and Interpretation 
a. What did you think of the new observation chart? 
b. Has the way you have done observations changed since the intervention? 
c. If so, were there any in particular that were more interesting than others and why was this the 
case? 
d. Following the introduction of ERDP, did you notice if observations were recorded any differently? 
e. Did you take notice of observations any more yourself, did they get incorporated into your routine 
review of the patient particularly on ward rounds? Did anyone else in the team look at them 
before and after the pilot trial? 
f. Were there any observations in particular that interested you more than they used to? Why was 
this the case? 
g. Did the education program help improve your understanding and importance of observations? 
h. Did this help you manage the patient when they were deteriorating? 
i. In what way did it help you manage the patient? 
j. Did you think that the MET was called more often than it had been before? 
k. Do you think that this is helpful? 
I. If so, why do you think it was helpful? 
Communication 
a. Had you heard of the SBAR method of communication? 
b. Do you remember what it was about? 
c. Do you think it has any merits and what do you think they are? 
d. Did you ever find yourself using it? 
e. Why do you think we use the SBAR so infrequently? 
f. What would help facilitate its dissemination? 
g. How do you think patient care might change if more nurses used SBAR? 
Track and Trigger System 
a. Do you remember the MEWS system? 
b. What is your understanding of it? 
c. Did you ever call a doctor. because of a high MEWs? 
d. Did you feel it gave you more confidence to call the doctor? 
e. Did you feel that it was taking away your ability to think for yourself? 
f. Did the MEWs often match what your thought was happening to the patient or were you 
surprised sometimes at the level of the score? 
g. If you called a doctor to describe that you had a patient had a MEWS of four or more, what 
response did you have? 
The doctor realised that they had a sick patient and came to see them quickly 
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The doctor realised that they had a sick patient and gave a telephone order 
The doctor did not realise that they had a sick patient but came to see them quickly 
The doctor did not realised that they had a sick patient and did not come to see them quickly 
h. Did it enable you to prioritise which patient to see next 
i. Feel more confident to communicate more successfully with your registrar/consultant 
j. Did you communicate more readily and more confidently with your seniors when calling about a 
patient deteriorating 
k. Did you ever have to accompany a patient to Medical Imaging? Did you think it was appropriate 
that you should accompany the patient? 
I. Would you like to see the MEWS on other wards? 
m. If you think it is helpful , why do you think it I helpful? 
F. Overall 
How would you improve the process of: 
Installation 
Content of the education package 
The day to day running of the process. 
188 
Appendix J: Participant Information 
Sheet for Human Element Study 
189 
Participant Information Sheet 
Intensive Care Unit 
Yamba Drive, Garran ACT 2605 
PO Box 11 Woden ACT 2606 
Phone: (02) 6244 2222 Fax: (02) 6285 3020 
Website: www.health.act.gov.au 
"Perceptions of the Recognition of the Deteriorating Patient Intervention" 
General Background Information 
Patient adverse events occur in up to 17% of all hospital admissions. Of these, nearly 20% suffer 
death or permanent disability. One of the factors that has been identified in the causation of these 
patient adverse events is the failure to recognise and appropriately manage deteriorating patients on 
the general ward. The failure to recognise deteriorating patients is evidenced by delays in admission 
to the intensive care unit (ICU), unexpected referrals to intensive care and unexpected deaths that are 
often being preceded by significant, unrecognised physiological disturbances. The ability to detect 
early deterioration in patients allows early appropriate intervention, which may reduce unplanned 
admissions to the intensive care unit and unexpected deaths. 
ACT Background Information 
In 2006, ACT Health sponsored a project "Early Recognition of the Deteriorating Patient" which was a 
prospective, controlled before and after intervention trial. The intervention-included the employment of 
a new education package "COMPASS®" available to all healthcare workers, the instalment of a new 
observation chart and the utilisation of a tr-ack and trigger system in four general hospital wards at two 
hospitals {The Canberra Hospital and Calvary Hospital). The study was completed in June 2007 and 
data analysis suggests that there was a significant improvement in patient outcome and decrease in 
adverse- events. 
Since 2007, despite a robust system in place to recognise and respond to deteriorating patients, 
health care workers are still failing to recognise and respond to deteriorating patients. Using focus 
groups and critical incident methods insight will be gained into why healthcare workers feel that they 
fail to recognise and respond to deteriorating patients. 
What does it involve? 
Approval has been given by the ACT Department of Health Ethics Committee to undertake a project 
that will use stratified focus groups. This will allow healthcare workers to consider and discuss their 
own experiences of caring for deteriorating patients and relate any similar incidents and discuss 
experiences as a collective to provide an opportunity to explore the understanding of why healthcare 
workers do not recognise and respond to deteriorating patients and provide novel perspectives. This 
method provides holistic views, unlimited by defined and discrete areas of inquiry and unencumbered 
by theoretically derived hypotheses. Six volunteers will be sought to develop any themes that have 
arisen out of the focus groups. 
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What will be the outcome of the project? 
The focus groups will help gain insights into the experiences and beliefs of healthcare workers and 
development themes and concepts from this will inform further development of the multifaceted 
intervention, most particularly the 'human factor'. 
Who can I contact about the actual Study? 
Should I develop a problem which I suspect may have resulted from my involvement in this project, I 
am aware that I may contact-Dr Imogen Mitchell, Director, Intensive Care, The Canberra Hospital, 
Garran ACT 2605, Tel: 02 6244 3423, email: lmogen.mitchell@act.gov.au 
Who can I contact in General? 
10. Should I have any problems or queries about the way in which the study was conducted, and I do not 
feel comfortable contacting the research staff, I am aware that I may contact the ACT Human 
Research Ethics Committee Secretary, Building 10, Level 6 the Canberra Hospital, Garran ACT 2605 
or on telephone (02) 6205 0846. 
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Consent Form to Participate in a Research Project 
I, 
(name of participant) 
of 
(street) (suburb/town) 
Intensive Care Unit 
Yamba Drive, Garran ACT 2605 
PO Box 11 Woden ACT 2606 
Phone: (02) 6244 2222 Fax: (02) 6285 3020 
*rcume. www.healm.act.gov.au 
ABN: 82 049 056 234 
(state & postcode) 
have been asked to consent to participation in a research project entitled: 
"A qualitative assessment of the holistic perspective on understanding why healthcare workers fail to 
recognise and respond to deteriorating patients through workplace experience" 
In relation to this project I have read the Participant Information Sheet and have been informed of the 
following points: 
11. Approval has been given by the ACT Department of Health Ethics Committee. 
1. The aim of the project is: 
To gain insight into why healthcare workers feel that they fail to recognise and respond to 
deterior(;lting patients. 
To re-design ACT Health's multifaceted intervention for the recognition and response to deteriorating 
patients based on the material received during the project. 
12. The results obtained from the study may or may not be of direct benefit to the care of my patients 
13. The project will involve a focus group lasting 120 minutes where discussion and refiection will occur in 
an effort to try and develop ideas, critical incidents and why or why not intervention occurred as a 
means of understanding why the case story unfolded as it did. Six volunteers will sought to undertake 
further examination of the themes identified through the focus groups. 
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14. Should I develop a problem which I suspect may have resulted from my involvement in this project, I 
am aware that I may contact - Dr Imogen Mitchell, Director, Intensive Care, The Canberra Hospital, 
Garran ACT 2605, Tel: 02 6244 3423, email : lmogen.mitchell@act.gov.au 
15. Should I have any problems or queries about the way in which the study was conducted, and I do not 
feel comfortable contacting the research staff, I am aware that I may contact the ACT Human 
Research Ethics Committee Secretary, Building 10, Level 6 the Canberra Hospital, Garran ACT 2605 
or on telephone (02) 6205 0846. 
16. I can refuse to take part in this project or withdraw from it at any time without affecting my workplace 
environment. 
17. Participation in this project will not result in any extra costs to me and can occur during working hours, 
at the discretion of my area supervisor. 
18. I understand that the results of the research will be made accessible and that my involvement and my 
identity will not be revealed. 
After considering all these points, I accept the invitation to participate in this project. 
I also state that I have/have not participated in any other research project in the past 3 months. If I 
have, the details are as follows: 
Name: 
-----------
Witness: 
--------------
(Please print name) 
Signature: 
( of participant/volunteer) ( of witness) 
Date: 
Investigator's Signature: ______________ _ 
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ALICE 
Aged 16 years old 
The following is a detailed history of my daughter's assessments by the GP and my account of the medical 
and nursing management in the Emergency Department (ED) and then in the ward of The Canberra 
Hospital (TCH). 
I have included the GP assessments leading up to our referral to ED as, I believe, they demonstrate the 
appropriate use of the primary health care system. I am left wondering of what significance are the 
primary health care interventions and the individual assessment of the GP and subsequent referral to the 
ED on how the ED triages the patients? My experience tells me primary health care assessment and 
subsequent referral is of no importance ie makes absolutely no difference to the way a person is managed 
when presenting at the ED. And yet I am so aware that the ED should be used by those in the community 
who need timely and probably emergency access to the skill and expertise available in the ED. 
Overview of Alice's Illness 
Alice was assessed on; 
• Wednesday March 18 2009 at 1330 by our GP with mild rash, had bloods taken . Noted that Alice 
had had a urinary tract infection January 30 2009, 
• Thursday March 19 at approximately 0930 again by our GP, widespread erythema multiforme, 
low grade fever, referred to an immunologist; 
• Thursday March 19 approximately 1130 seen by the immunologist, more bloods. 
• Friday 20 March at 0830 seen by our GP, referred to ED of TCH 
• Friday March 20 arrive ED TCH with referring documentation. Confirmed Epstein Barr Virus 
(EBV), glandular fever; 
• Discharged TCH, March 20 1700; 
• Saturday March 21, 1030, home visit by a close friend who is a .GP, provisional diagnosis, 
pneumonia, must be admitted, referred to admitting specialist of the day 
• Saturday Marc~ 21 , 1130, arrive ED TCH, provisional diagnosis mycoplasma pneumonia,; 
• Saturday March 21, 2345 admitted, paediatric ward ; 
• Sunday March 22, 0600, transferred high dependency paediatrics; 
• Sunday March 22, 1700, transferred Intensive Care Unit (ICU), intubated; 
196 
• Sunday March 29, extubated; 
• Wednesday April 1, transferred to ward 6A; 
• Saturday April 4, discharged home 
Alice's provisional diagnosis made earlier in the ED on Saturday March 21 was mycoplasma pneumonia, 
noting positive EBV and the erythema multiforme. Her condition continued to deteriorate throughout 
Saturday and all of Sunday. As her mother I will never forget that Sunday. My daughter was so very ill 
and I felt completely powerless to have someone, anyone do anything other that simply look at the monitor 
and walk out of the room and leave me with her. I was anxious and fearful. It was not until I asked "does 
my daughter have to have a respiratory arrest before someone will do something?" that action was taken . 
The ICU specialist came to Alice's bedside in the high dependency unit introduced herself, saying that she 
had been requested to review Alice and, without laying a hand on her, informed me that my daughter was 
critically ill and must be transferred to the ICU and that my family should be notified and come 
immediately. My heart sank ...... .... ..... I knew that this was very serious for my daughter. 
I still believe that either someone or something failed my daughter on that weekend . In looking back later 
on the Saturday and Sunday as the hours passed, I should have insisted that she be reviewed with a view 
to intervention and much sooner as I most certainly had presided over copious monitoring and review but 
a seemingly total lack of clinical assessment and decision making affording early intervention in order that 
her deterioration was halted. 
Early signs of Alice's developing illness . 
• Wok~ on Monday March 12, following a restless sleep, and noticed a fine pin point rash on the 
palms of her hands and on the abdomen, though very faint; 
• Attended school as usual; 
• did not sleep well Monday night, though not really complaining, as school activities very 
demanding and at her own admission "I'm just tired"; 
• Slept poorly Tuesday night; 
• Wednesday morning rash more visible, red and raised in places and had spread up forearms and 
across abdomen. Alice stated that "I only feel really tired" . No temperature, no itching, not 
hungry; 
• Alice attended school as usual (she had a math exam); 
• I decided to phone the GP and see if someone could see her, just in case; 
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• Attended the GP at 1330, Wednesday 18 March. On seeing Alice it was obvious to me that the 
rash had spread and was generalized over her body. Our GP described the rash as erythema 
multiforme. Only complaint was tiredness, not febrile, no itching. Prescribed antihistamine and 
referred for range of bloods. NB Alice was diagnosed with a Urinary Tract Infection on 30 
January 2009. She has never had UTI and her only symptom was a low back ache, no 
temperature, no frequency, no burning, no fatigue, pathology E-coli, treated with antibiotics. (Alice 
is not sexually active). She made what to me seemed a full and uneventful recovery. 
• Distressing night, rash widespread much denser in places and raised, uncomfortable and fever 
38, no sleep at all; 
• I took Alice back to our GP on Thursday (March 19) morning. Our GP consulted and both 
agreed that she should see an immunologist, whom we saw in the pathology dept of TCH. His 
assessment was she probably has "infectious mono", agreed that the rash indicative of infection 
and use the polaramine as prescribed. He ordered repeat bloods and told me to phone tomorrow 
for the results; 
• I took photos of the rash (from Thursday to Saturday morning) as I was not convinced that I would 
be able to describe it adequately, should it somehow disappear! 
• I was slightly anxious as the afternoon wore on and I decided to contact the immunologist, 
unsuccessfully. I was still concerned so decided to try for "the registrar", whom I did not know nor 
did he know me. I explained my situation to the registrar, who did his best to assist me. He 
confirmed that the blood results would not be available until tomorrow, and that he would make 
sure that he called me with the results. 
• Thursday night was distressing for me as I could not alleviate her discomfort. Alice visibly 
distressed, unable to tolerate standing, not cooperative with fluids, febrile 38-39, tepid showers, 
cold packs to try to sooth the heat.generated from the rash. I noted her rapid pulse 100 and she 
had started coughing ; 
• I arrived unannounced at GP, Friday March 20 . Following assessment by our GP, Alice was 
referred to the Emergency Department of Canberra Hospital. Our GP provided me with a referral 
letter and phoned the "admitting Officer" regarding our attendance. 
Emergency Department (ED) activity, Friday March 20. 
I am now very concerned for my daughter as she is clearly much worse. 
As we waited at the glass partition to be triaged, Alice was unable to sit on the seat, so I laid her down 
while my Jetter and our details were being processed. The person, an RN I assumed, behind the glass 
screen called out that she "should sit up as you have .that rash ." I was taken back by the remark and 
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immediately responded that she was too ill to sit, by which time my husband was back from parking the 
car and he cradled her as I asked please could we lay her down on a bed somewhere? 
We were shown to a bed behind the front reception, where Alice could lie down. Her general observations 
were taken and the nurse asked Alice how long she had been sick. She responded with "a few days I 
think, is that right Mum?" she asked. At which point the nurse asked Alice, "How old are you?" To which 
Alice replied "I'm still 16", "well in that case you are old enough to tell your own story", said the nurse. This 
comment was uncalled for and unprofessional in my view. Alice is an intelligent young woman; the 
circumstances were obvious, just looking at her indicated that she was very sick. I noted for the nurse that 
there is a letter from the GP that I had handed through the glass partition (not sure to whom I gave it), but 
she wanted me to proceed and provide the history for Alice to date, which I did. I did not observe the GP 
referral being read. 
We were then moved to a single "room" in the ED. The resident and RN came and asked the same 
questions regarding her history and I re-iterated the story again. I asked could the immunology registrar 
please be paged, explaining that I had spoken with him and been seen by an immunology consultant the 
day before. I was told that he would be paged when necessary to which I replied that I thought it 
appropriate and I would be happy to call the registrar using my phone, to which the nurse replied that that 
would not be necessary. 
There was general agreement that Alice was dehydrated, should have IV fluids and further bloods and she 
was given maxalon. The immunology registrar came, confirmed Epstein Bar Virus, Glandular fever. This 
was a relief, we had a diagnosis. One of my sons, like many other adolescents, had had glandular 
fever .. .. ........ but I was uneasy as he did not ever look like Alice did now .... .. covered head to toe in a fiery 
rash, lethargic, hot, coughing, unwilling to weight-bear, and asking "can't I just go to sleep, am I going to 
be alright Mum?" 
We were di~charged home at approximately 5pm. 
Later that night I read the discharge summary that the resident had provided for our GP. That summary of 
the day's events describing my daughter as having a rash and unwell to me was a total understatement 
and in no way gave the reader a true picture of the patient and how unwell she was. 
Friday night, through to Saturday morning was another simply terrible night. Alice was febrile 39+, very 
uncomfortable with the heat from the rash . I continued .with s_howers, cold compresses, and fan all night. 
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Her coughing was increasing, her pulse was 110 -120 and her breathing was "more shallow" and she kept 
telling me "I just want to sleep". Both of us were now very fatigued as we had not slept since Wednesday 
night. 
Emergency Department (ED) activity, Saturday March 21. 
Saturday morning and I am very alarmed. Alice is worse, erythema multiforme very pronounced, 
respirations rapid, she has had very little to drink. I did not want to simply re-appear at the ED as I did not 
want to have to go through the whole saga of her illness/history again. I called a personal friend, a GP, 
who came to the house (1030) and took one look at Alice and said she has pneumonia and must be 
admitted. I requested could we somehow avoid having to sit in the waiting area as this was so distressing 
to Alice yesterday. The GP contacted the admitting officer, who said to send her in and was I happy with 
the physician on for the day and I confirmed I was. 
We arrived at the ED at approximately 1130. Alice was unable to walk, let alone hold her head up, I put 
her in a wheelchair presented at the glass grill, and almost immediately asked "could I please lay her 
down". To my complete amazement the whole triage process began again . I advised that the GP had 
referred us and that the admitting officer knew we were coming and that we had been here all day 
yesterday and please can we come inside and lay her down. The nurse said "OK. Come through" which 
meant that I pushed Alice through the door but she then had to remain sitting in that chair with me trying to 
support her, while the nurse found her on the system. My husband had returned from parking _the car and 
I asked could he come in and the nurse actually said "no, there's not enough room." 
I cannot adequately articulate how that initial interaction with the triage nurse felt. Completely gob 
smacked by the lack of professionalism of the nurse and her seemingly complete inability to use her eyes 
to make an ~ssessment that this young girl was very ill, very hot, shocking rash and with laboured 
breathing. We had to wait in the wheelchair while her details of yesterday were confirmed and her vital 
signs were. recorded. 
We were taken back to the single room in the ED we had occupied the previous day. We then had a 
resident (very pleasant young woman) who went thr~ugh the whole history "taking again. I asked her 
where the file notes of yesterday were as they would provide the overview ......... but she insisted on me 
re-telling the entire story for her to be able to make document her own assessment. A registrar in ED, 
came in,_ had a chat said more bloods would be required, that Alice was 'dry' and needed fluids and that 
the resident would attend to this. Alice looked at me with alarm as the previous day the IV line and the 
bloods had been difficult in her dehydrated state and distressing to her. I said to the resident, after two 
failed attempts and my daughter visibly distressed, please could some-one else try. She agreed. The ED 
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registrar returned and said he would do it, but there was an ankle that needed re-alignment and some 
other orthopaedic type casualty and he would be back soon. 
I noted that she wanted to sit up a bit more, her coughing was getting worse, temp still up, heart rate fast. 
I can't re-call if the nasal oxygen had started at this stage, but oxygen via nasal prongs was started. 
In the meantime the consultant physician came in and consulted with us. His assessment was that Alice 
had mycoplasma pneumonia. She needed IV fluids, antibiotics and would need to be admitted to hospital. 
I was relieved and commented that I didn't think that she could only have glandular fever and be this sick. 
We thanked him and he left. 
It took a few more hours before the IV line went in. My daughter was exhausted, continually coughing, 
febrile, tachycardic, not saturating well. The rash was flaming hot, itchy and very uncomfortable and 
further complicated by the fact that she had reacted instantly to the bolus dose of antibiotics she had been 
given earlier. Her hands and feet in particular required ice packs for the blisters and general comfort. We 
spent 12 hours in ED "under observation." People came and went, they didn't say much, some did obs 
others just looked and slowly my daughter deteriorated. The night RN came on at 9pm. She asked me 
how I thought Alice was, asked Alice how she was, to which she said "I've never felt so bad ever," I said I 
was very worried as she is really struggling to breath and asked, perhaps naively, why is she having to 
work so hard and shoudn't she be improving a little?. She was most professional in explaining and talking 
frankly with me about how sick Alice was, that there was not a bed available at the moment, but that she 
would be with us until she could be moved to a ward or somewhere suitable. She got me a comfortable 
chair and blankets showed me the tea making facilities and offered me a sandwich. Her kindness and 
thoughtfulness was much appreciated as _I was truly feeling the strain of what was now 3 full days of 
watching my daughter slide downhill. 
At about 1 Opm it was decided that Alice should move to the paeds area in ED. The RN who took over her 
care, whose_ name I cannot remember was· most professional and attentive to observations, but had other 
smaller children to provide care to. I was becoming more fragile (very teary) as my daughter was not 
improving and seemed more agitated, given the constant coughing and I am not exaggerating when I say 
constant. By this stage I think she had had about 10 litres of fluid . I discussed with the RN that I thought 
she was getting worse. She was now sitting upright most of the time, draped over the bed side table or 
over my shoulder, saying to me "I can't do this anymore Mum" and then started talking about random, 
disconnected thoughts, she was delirious .. ... ... I consoled her by saying that you sometimes say 'funny' 
things wh_en you are really tired, try not to worry. 
201 
A doctor came up to the bed, I have no idea who he was and he did not introduce himself nor tell me what 
he was doing. It became evident he was assessing her for a move, and assessed that she would go to 
paediatrics as she was still 16. I asked "is she going to be monitored?" to which he replied "there are 
monitors by the bed." And that was the extent of the "consultation." He did not ask me one single 
question. let alone acknowledge how sick my daughter was, or how I might be feeling about the situation! 
Hospital admission 
Sunday March 22 
We were in the ED until nearly midnight when Alice was transferred to a paediatric bed. My husband 
insisted that I go home have some sleep and he would stay with our daughter. I left, reluctantly, at approx 
0045. I knew that I would be of no use if I did not have some sleep and I re-assured myself that she was 
now in the hospital and in good hands. As I drove home it crossed my mind that Alice had not had a chest 
x-ray ......... and that I had not seen anyone Dr or nurse listen to her chest ...... or talk to me about her. 
When I got home I rang the ward, spoke to the night nurse re my concerns (I could hear Alice coughing) 
and was assured that she would be reviewed regularly. 
My husband's account of the night was disturbing. At about 2.30 a female doctor (no name or 
introduction) came in response to my husband asking about cough suppressant. This doctor again asked 
for a full history (i.e. start at the start) which he provided and ordered nebulized oxygen. At 4am another 
doctor appeared, no name given, though he was pleasant. He took bloods and did that skillfully and 
asked again for a full account of Alice's history. About 04.30 - 0500 another doctor came, neither 
introduction nor purpose for visit offered, but more history wanted. My husband told him he had told the 
story enough for one night and that he could read the notes afterall isn't that what they are for and then my 
husband assured him he would be happy to answer any queries or provide clarification. From the 
description my husband gave me my guess is that it was the same doctor who saw Alice in paeds ED at 
approx 11 pm. 
My husban~s report to me (by phone) the next morning was "She's coughed all night, she's so tired , she 
looks awful. Three doctors have seen her, but they didn't say anything to me, they've taken blood and put 
a nebuliser on her which seems to have made her a bit more comfortable and now (0500 - 0600, Sunday 
March 22) she is being transferred to high dependency in paeds, so they can watch her more closely". 
High Dependency, Paediatrics 
As I drove back to the hospital early on Sunday I remember thinking what is happening, why is Alice so 
-
sick, what is missing? What am I going to do to help my daughter? 
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Looking at Alice that morning, I noticed several things: 
► Face very red and swollen; 
► Eyes very puffy and bloodshot; 
► Rash more noticeable on ears and ears swollen; 
► Fluid very noticeable in arms and legs 
► Rash on arms and legs red ++ 
► Sitting bolt up-right in the bed; 
► Coughing every few minutes; 
► Grimacing while coughing; 
► Nebulised oxygen in place; and 
► IV fluids still running . 
Alice was so very happy to see me and said how she was so tired and could I help her sleep. I tried to 
prop her over the bedside table, but she was unable to breath and the coughing ... ..... She asked me "am I 
going to get better?" to which I replied very firmly "of course you are." 
I introduced myself to the RN and asked her "how do you think she's going?" "She's very sick .... ........ " 
was the reply. I asked about the medical team and when would she be reviewed . The consultant 
paediatrician came in with his team sometime in the morning, I cannot remember exactly when. He 
confirmed that Alice was being treated for pneumonia. I do not remember much more of note in that 
consultation and perhaps I thought that I would see him again that day, but I have never seen him since, 
not even in the ICU. 
Later, around lunch time my observations were: 
► Heart rate 120+, resps up to 45 sometimes more when coughing, BP 80/60, sats 75-80; 
► Not cooperative with oral fluids; 
► Whole body appeared bloated; 
► I could re-call that she used the pan once; 
► Very dry around the mouth; 
► Complaining of very sore ears, they were very swollen; 
► Saying that she could not see well and her eyes were sore, they were very bloodshot; 
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► Continual cough that at times was productive, but always very distressing to her; and 
► Moving in and out of rational and coherent discussion and sometimes asking me, "what am I 
talking about mum?" 
One of my sons came and remarked "gee mum Alice is all swollen, even her eyes are, and that fluid would 
make you cough wouldn't it?" My mother-in law and sister-in law were reduced to tears as they saw her 
"she looks so sick ..... " My 85 year old mother-in law then slowly but clearly said to me "what is going on, 
can't you see she's dying." That moment is also clear in my mind ....... and I continued to care for my 
daughter. 
About lunch time the RN shift change occurred and a very pleasant young woman, I cannot recall her 
name, was assigned to care for Alice. 
I asked the RN for more normal saline for the nebulizer. She immediately gave me one and also provided 
a supply at the edge of the desk at the nurse's station that I could get as required. While this gave me 
instant access to the normal saline, I was concerned that she didn't think it necessary to monitor the 
number of times I needed to re-fill the saline and it was often. 
Alice's rash was hot to touch, raised and itchy. The itchiness was compounded by the fact that as a result 
of the antibiotic that was given in ED she had blisters on her hands and feet and burning sensation all over 
her body which was driving her mad. I asked the same nurse for ice which she provided and I rotated 
those bags around my daughter's very red, itchy and swollen body and I cried as she rambled about 
school and various bits and pieces of her life. She was delirious .... The nurse did not stay in that room for 
more that a few minutes at a time, long enough to provide the ice bags or look at the monitor. At no stage 
was I ever engaged in a discussion with the nursing staff about Alice's status, nor did I ever see a more 
senior nurse come and either clinically review her or at least look at her. This was in an area called paeds 
high dependency, where the nurse has either I or 2 patients to monitor and provide care to and yet I spent 
most of the time in that room alone with my' daughter. I was uneasy. 
My husband had a public open day work commitment that Sunday and I had assured him that we would 
be ok and he should go to work. I had spoken to him several times on the phone during the morning, 
raising my concern at her lack of improvement and how difficult it was for her to breathe. He re-assured 
me "they know what they're doing, they are the experts, and she is in hospital and will be ok." 
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Alice was finding it increasingly difficult to get comfortable, her bottom was sore and her lower back was 
aching, not to mention the discomfort from the hot, itchy rash. This was not at all surprising given that she 
had basically been resting on her back and/or sitting almost upright since Friday. I decided that I should try 
calm and comfort her with hand and back wash, clean her teeth and change her pyjama's and re-position 
her. I maneuvered her to her right side. She lasted seconds, panicked she said "no no mum I can't 
breathe." I sat for about the next half hour with her draped (rather awkwardly) over my shoulder. It was 
during this time that I noticed her coughing had reduced. I asked her was she ok, she said "I've worked it 
out; if I sort of don't breathe I don't cough." I held her for a few more minutes, she was calm and then I 
panicked. 
I laid her back, went out to the nurse's station and said abruptly, 
"Does my daughter have to have a respiratory arrest before anyone does anything?" 
A person appeared and introduced herself to Alice and me as the intensivist, who had come to review 
Alice. Almost immediately she beckoned me to follow her. She informed me that my daughter was 
critically ill and that she would need to be transferred to ICU to have her breathing assisted. She further 
stated that I should contact other family members immediately. I was emotional to say the least, on one 
hand I was so relieved that someone had made a decision that would see Alice treated on the other I 
knew that this was confirmation of what I knew to be true, her continued deterioration. After all you don't 
take a 16 year old healthy girl to ICU simply to assist them to breathe! 
Alice was transferred to the ICU from the paediatric high dependency area on Sunday March 22, 2009 at 
approximately 5pm, from which time her treatment was exemplary. By 7pm she was intubated. At this 
time my family, my husband and two sons, met the intensive care specialist and the ICU staff for the first 
time. She told us to prepare for the fact that our daughter may die. We were shocked to hear these 
words. Little did we know that this was to be the beginning of life altering experience for us as a family 
and for my daughter in particular? 
That Sunday is stamped in my memory for many reasons, the most significant of which is that I was 
unable to get adequate and timely clinical intervention for my daughter when she needed it and that may 
have prevented her admission to the ICU. The trauma for our family and for me in particular, leading to 
her admission to ICU, and during the week that followed and the enormous impact the events have had on 
Alice's health and schooling cannot be overstated. 
, 
Alice's recall of events from the Wednesday 18 March through to extubation on the 29 March 2009 is at 
best sketchy. This has caused her great difficulty in understanding what happened to her and of course 
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why. She has proven however to be a most determined and resilient young woman and she is beginning 
to accept and understand what occurred, what effect that has had on her mental and physical health and 
that, in time, she should return to her strong capable healthy self. 
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Appendix M: Alice's Observation 
Chart 
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